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After the complete liberalization of the airline industry during the 1990s the industry has 
faced a rapid growth in passenger numbers. This has mainly been caused by the emergence 
of so-called Low Cost Carrier (LCC) that offer a simplified product (i.e. point-to-point flights 
without any frills) at a lower cost than traditional Network Carriers. Furthermore LCC also 
introduced a less differentiated pricing structure (Restriction Free Pricing) which forced 
competing network carriers to reduce the degree of price discrimination which they were able 
to practice until then in order to defend their market shares. This has led to a decrease of 
average yields, which resulted in difficulties for (smaller) Network Carriers to cover their fixed 
costs, related to the operation of a hub & spoke network. In this environment network airlines 
are looking for new revenue sources as well as further sources of cost reduction. This 
development has amplified the consolidation trend of the airline industry and led to the 
emergence of several multi-hub networks (e.g. Lufthansa runs hub-operation in Frankfurt, 
Munich, Zurich and Vienna).  
 
One way to leverage the fact that multi-hub networks allow several routings for one origin-
destination city pair would be the introduction of flexible tickets, where the actual routing of 
the passenger is not defined at the moment of purchase but only a certain time prior to 
departure. This allows airlines to raise the load factor on their network by increasing the 
degree of overbooking which they currently practice by pooling the risk that more passengers 
arrive than there is capacity among several flights. Furthermore these tickets might allow 
network carriers to compete in the low-cost-airline segment without having to further reduce 
the price level of their regular product (with specified routing).  
 
The present dissertation examined possible designs of such a ticket and their impact on the 
acceptance by passengers by means of a choice based conjoint study among 356 travelers. 
The findings suggest that while 77.5% of leisure travelers are willing to accept flexible time-
range tickets in their relevant set, only 56% of business travelers are considering using this 
kind of ticket. More particular the results also showed that business travelers are not willing 
to compromise on travel duration and departure times, and are subsequently willing to pay a 
premium for specified tickets. A market share simulation showed that depending on the 
selected product layout flexible time-range tickets are able to gain up to 60% market share 
when offered at a discount of up to 33% relative to traditional tickets. When it comes to the 
actual layout, the largest lever to increase the acceptance is to exclude connection flights 
from the potential set of flights. 
 
The results contribute to the young research area on flexible products by assessing the 
disutility which is experienced by customers with regard to particular product characteristics 
of flexible products. Furthermore the results aim at providing airline managers with a 
comprehensive overview of the possibilities which flexible time-range tickets bring along 
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Figure 3: Fuel price development5 Figure 4: Passenger yield development6 
 
1.1.1 High cost pressure due to the development of fuel prices and 
the inclusion of aviation in the European Emission Trading 
Scheme 
In 2008 the price per barrel of jet fuel (kerosene) has reached its all-time high of 180 US 
dollar per barrel. Within only four years the price thereby had more than quadrupled. 
Although the price for jet fuel has lately decreased to 87.5 USD per barrel (average price 
for 2010, as at 22.01.2010)7 due to the economic crisis it is improbable to assume that it 
would stay at this level after the economy recovers.8 The resulting need for fuel 
efficiency is furthermore amplified by the fact that air transport is getting under scrutiny 
for its impact on greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Based on the figures for 2006, the transport sector is made responsible for 24% of 
EU27s greenhouse gas emissions, with aviation alone accounting for 2.9%.9 While 
these figures would suggest that aviation is not the first issue to tackle for policymakers 
aiming at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, this impression changes if growth 
rates are taken into consideration. Within 16 years (1990-2006) greenhouse gas 
emissions from civil aviation have increased by 89% (cf. Figure 5) 
 
 
                                                
 
5 Cf. Energy Information Administration (2009), tonto.eia.doe.gov 
6 Cf. Air Transport Association of America (2009), www.airlines.org; Yields were computed from passenger 
revenue and mileage data provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The portrayed yield was 
adjusted for U.S. inflation terms. 
7 Cf. IATA (2010), www.iata.org 
8 Cf. IATA (2010), http://www.iata.org; Since – in contrast to similar products such as diesel - there is no 
taxation on kerosene the price correlates more directly with the underlying oil price, which also results in 
(relatively) more severe price fluctuations in comparison to car fuel prices.  
9 Cf. European Commission, DG TREN (2009), http://ec.europa.eu; This figure is also in line with the IPCC 
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Figure 5: Greenhouse gas emissions by sector in the EU27 (1990 – 2006)10 
 
As a reaction to this development the European Parliament has in July 2008 adopted a 
directive by the European Commission which includes the airline industry into the 
European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) by January 2012.11 Following a “cap and 
trade“ approach, airlines will in the first trading period (2012) only receive allowances for 
97% of the greenhouse gas emissions caused by the sector in a reference period 
(average year based on the years 2004-2006). Out of these allowances, 85% will be 
distributed for free based on the traffic share of airlines in the reference period, while the 
remaining 15% will be auctioned. Based on the directive, the amount of allowances as 
well as the share of auctioned certificates will be continuously evaluated and most 
probably also adjusted (to the detriment of the airline sector) in the period after 2012 in 
order to decrease the environmental impact of aviation. The IATA estimates an 
additional cost burden of € 3.5 billion in 2012 as a result of the inclusion of aviation in 
the European Emission Trading Scheme. If in the long run (e.g. 2020) all certificates will 
be auctioned, annual expenses to cope with the regulation are expected to increase to 
up to € 12.8 billion.12  
 
 
                                                
 
10 Cf. European Commission, DG TREN (2009), http://ec.europa.eu 
11 Cf. Directive 2008/101/EC, p. 8/5 
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Operative measures to reduce fuel consumption and emissions 
Measure Description 
Use of right 
sized airplane 
Due to differing landing & take off consumptions as well as different en-route consumptions 
per passenger, various aircraft types are more or less efficient in serving specific route 
lengths. For instance on short routes, the use of turboprop aircrafts is often more fuel 
efficient than the use of jet airplanes. 
Installation of 
winglets 
So called winglets are blended extensions of the wing which aim at a reduction of air 
turbulences that can result in fuel savings of up to 3%. Winglets are already standard 
equipment of most new aircrafts, but are also largely refurbished to existing aircrafts. 
Single-Engine 
Taxi 
Only one engine is used to move an aircraft from the runway to its parking position (and the 
other way round). 
Weight 
reduction 
To save weight airlines can use lighter aircraft interior equipment (less catering, lighter 
chairs,...), remove paint from aircraft hull and take only required fuel on board (e.g. by 
selecting the closest alternate airport as a basis for the fuel reserve calculation). This is also 
reflected in the massive use of carbon elements in new aircrafts such as the Boeing 787 or 
the Airbus A350. 
Flight route 
optimization 
By carefully planning the right flight altitude (lower consumption on cruising altitude) as well 
as cruising at the right speed airlines can reduce consumption. A large lever is also seen in a 
standardization of the European Air Traffic Management ("Single European Sky") which can 
lead to more direct flight routes and less holding patterns. 
Use of ground 
power unit 
Instead of generating its own power on the ground by using the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), 




This procedure, which depends on traffic situation at an airport, implies that aircrafts follow a 
continuous descent from their cruise altitude towards their touchdown on the ground which 
reduces the required engine thrust. 
Use of most 
modern aircraft 
technology 
By using modern aircrafts and engines, airlines can significantly reduce fuel burn. For 
instance, a new Boeing 737-800 with approx. 150 seats by Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) uses 
20% less fuel per seat kilometer than a (20 years older) MD-82 by SAS with the same 
capacity. New technologies that aim at a reduction of fuel consumption include riblet films or 
open-rotor engines. Furthermore there are currently also various experiments with synthetic 
fuels (e.g. Gas to Liquid fuels [GtL], hydrogen, etc.) which might lead to a more 
environmentally friendly fuel consumption. 
Table 1: Operative methods to reduce fuel consumption13 
 
If airlines want to avoid a decrease of passenger demand as a result of passing through 
additional costs onto their passengers, they have to search for new cost reduction 
potentials. Table 1 provides an overview of operative measures that can be taken to 
reduce fuel consumption, which – with a share of more than 25% of all operative costs – 
has become the major cost driver of the airline business.14 
 
Overall, since 1970 the fuel consumption per passenger-kilometre flown has been 
reduced by 40%.15 This development has been amplified by the relatively large price 
increases for kerosene in the last years, which gave lift to an implementation of a range 
of fuel saving measures at most airlines. Therefore, it is improbable to assume that 
savings of similar scale can be realized on the technical level within the near future, 
which would allow airlines to compensate the additional cost burden that results from the 
 
                                                
 
13 Cf. Scandinavian Airlines (2005), p. 50; cf. Cohn (2005), www.aviationpartnersboeing.com 
14 Cf. IATA (2007), www.iata.org 
15 Cf. Deutsches Verkehrsforum (2001), p. 12 
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inclusion of the airline industry to the European ETS. This underlines the pressure for 
airlines to find new ways to lower the costs per seat in order to stay competitive.  
1.1.2 Rising competition intensity and a decline in yields 
Besides the impact of rising fuel costs, as shown above, airlines also have to cope with 
a strong decline in yields due to an increased level of competition in the last decades. 
This change was first and foremost triggered by the market entry of Low-Cost-Carriers 
(LCC), as a reaction to the liberalization of the air transport market, which caused 
traditional Network Carriers (NC) to lower their fares in order to stay competitive.16  
 
LCC specialized on point-to-point routes where they have been able to significantly 
lower the production cost level by offering a simplified product. As these savings were 
partly passed on to the customers, LCC managed to expand the market for air 
transportation by addressing new segments with low fares that could not afford travelling 
by air before. A survey by the German LCC Hapag-Lloyd Express (now Tuifly) revealed 
that most of its passenger would not have travelled at all or would have used a different 
mode of transport without the availability of cheap tickets. Only 37% of passengers have 
switched within the air traffic market.17 This extension of the addressable market has 
generated a strong growth in passenger numbers during in the last years, which also 
resulted in a shift of market shares from Network carriers and charter airlines towards 
LCC (cf. Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 6: Development of passenger numbers and market share in Germany (2002-2008)18 
 
This trend can also be seen on a European Level where the market share of LCC is 
estimated to rise up to 33% or even 37% by 2010. Globally, in 2009 LCC already offered 
22% of the total seat capacity (this figure, however, similar to statistics on the passenger 
 
                                                
 
16 Cf. Alderighi et al. (2004), p. 24 
17 Cf. Hapag-Lloyd Express (2003), p. 6. 
18 Cf. Destatis (2009a) & Destatis (2009b), http://www.destatis.de; Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt (2009), http://www.adv.aero 
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to reduce their presence in unprofitable spoke markets by weeding out routes. However, 
due to the characteristics of a network, these small steps often resulted in a chain 
reaction, since missing transfer passengers from these spokes also decreased the load 
factor (and therefore usually also the profitability) of other routes.25  
 
To compensate for these traffic losses and to profit from extended network effects, many 
airlines have increased cooperation by means of interlining or code share agreements 
as well as by forming alliances.26 Within alliances airlines do not only profit from 
operational advantages (such as shared frequent-flyer programmes, increased routes 
offering, joint sales operations and improved negotiation powers towards suppliers) but 
can also increase their efficiency by weeding out redundant operations, i.e. deciding that 
a certain city is only connected through one of several hubs. However, due to risk of a 
potential alliance break up and the high costs of re-starting a formerly abandoned 
connection there has been reluctance among individual members of an alliance to give 
up a connection in many cases.27 Even in this case, as long as there is sufficient 
demand for two (or more) hub connections to a city, an alliance can still improve their 
network by streamlining their schedules in order to offer their travelers more frequencies 
to a destination.28 By offering more scheduled departures than a single airline, an 
alliance is also able to gain higher customer awareness for certain destinations, which 
finally also results in a higher attractiveness of the involved airlines.29  
 
In many cases, though, the advantages of alliances are not sufficient to sustain in the 
market, which has led to a wave of several mergers and acquisitions in the past years. 
“A merger potentially allows 100% consolidation, while in alliances integration is much 
more limited. In other words, mergers can better achieve the objective for which 
alliances were formed.”30 Prominent examples were the merger of Air France and KLM 
in 2004 or the purchase of Swiss Airlines (2005) and Austrian Airlines (2009) by the 
Lufthansa Group. In a recent survey among airline executives it was found that 88% 
expect further market consolidation steps in the future.31 Figure 9 gives an overview of 
the operated hubs as well as ownership and alliance linkages within the three largest 
European network carrier groups. 
 
 
                                                
 
25 Cf. Maurer (2006), p. 64 
26 Cf. Malanik (1999), p. 85; Malanik, at the time the General Manager Technical & Operation of the 
Association of European Airlines, even states that network carriers that operate a hub & spoke network and 
do not belong to any alliance are subject to an ‘existence-threatening competitive disadvantage’.  
Although there have been earlier alliance attempts (e.g. the Qualiflyer group, including Swiss, Austrian 
Airlines and Sabena), there has been a rise in importance at the end of the 1990s. For instance, the largest 
current alliance – the Star Alliance – has only been founded in 1997; Cf. Star Alliance (2010), 
www.staralliance.com  
27 Cf. Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 128 
28 Cf. Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 4 
29 Cf. Grosche (2007), p. 21 
30 Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 21 













































                  





































 to a sing
parture tim
 airline the
 one of the
times from 






, has led 










































l over four 
ct subsidia

























 turn into a
rs (who do
flight to the


































                  
 
33 Own analys
















                  
is, as at Janu
viations for e
line is only an
re 10: Overv
es of a 
, this can 
g options f
, based on








w in the int







































b in Madrid is












 to have am
ble time-ran
IATA Three-L













































1.1.4 Interim summary of challenges, chances and resulting 
business opportunities for European network carriers 
Since the liberalization of the European aviation sector in the 1990s network carriers are 
confronted with an intensified competition of their peers as well as from new entrants 
which operate as Low Cost Carriers. As a consequence, most carriers have reacted by 
offering more discounted tickets in order to stay competitive, which has led to a strong 
decline in passenger yields. Therefore, although the overall market size is growing by 
almost 5% per year, most network carriers failed to generate positive financial results 
during the last decade (except for 2007 which saw extraordinary high profits on a sector 
level). 
 
This situation has been aggravated by the fact that fuel costs, which are currently the 
largest single cost item in an airlines balance sheet, rose by more than 800% within the 
last 20 years. Aiming at more efficient operations, airlines have already achieved 
significant fuel burn reductions within the last years. In light of the expected cost 
increase as a result of the inclusion of the aviation sector in the European ETS by the 
year 2012, further measures will be required to keep the cost of flying at a level that 
does not endanger the expected (and, based on already concluded fleet extension 
programs, also required) market growth.  
 
Furthermore, as the market environment did not allow airlines to pass the incurred cost 
increase through onto their passengers, many carriers had to reduce their network by 
cutting unprofitable routes. However, since the quality of a network is decreased with 
every spoke that is removed, this has put small carriers at a disadvantage in the battle 
for transfer passengers, which are required to sustain hub operations. As a result, many 
small carriers have either ceased operations or were taken over by larger airlines. 
 
This consolidation wave led to the emergence of three important multi-hub networks in 
Europe. These networks allow airlines to streamline their operations and to offer transfer 
passengers more convenient travel options. One potential that has hardly been tapped 
by airline groups in a coordinated and large-scale manner, though, is the leverage of 
multi-hub networks in their product and yield management policies in order to achieve a 
higher load factor and therefore lower, more competitive unit costs. This issue will be 
addressed with the concept of flexible time-range tickets that are going to be presented 
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flights with sufficient ample capacity through price differentiation, this approach is still 
subject to the risk of a poor forecast quality. Since it is – especially if the forecast 
horizon is very long - more difficult to forecast the demand for a certain booking class on 
a particular day on a specific flight instead of only forecasting the demand from one 
destination to another on that day,37 an airline might accept a low-fare booking request 
(based on a too pessimistic forecast of business class bookings, which usually occur 
closer to departure) which then later on blocks a seat that might still have been sold at a 
higher rate.  
 
One way to achieve a better distribution of passengers onto several available 
connections (i.e. direct or indirect flights between the city of departure and the 
destination) who show different loading factors (based on booked passengers) would be 
the introduction of flexible time-range tickets. These tickets do not specify the actual 
flight routing at the moment of purchase and would be sold to time-insensitive 
passengers at a discount. This concept is based on the idea of supplier-driven 
substitution38 and has already been applied on an abstract level by scholars from the 
field of Operations Research (OR) to the airline industry. Gallego and Philipps define a 
flexible product as “a set of two or more alternatives serving the same market such that 
a purchaser of the flexible product is assigned one of the alternatives by the seller at a 
later date.”39 
 
For a passenger who books a flexible time-range ticket this would mean that at the time 
of booking, he or she would receive an earliest departure time as well as a guaranteed 
latest arrival time on the requested day of travel, while the routing would (for the 
moment) stay unspecified. A certain time prior to the travel day, the passenger would 
then be informed about the actual routing based on the final passenger figures in the 
suitable flights on the day of departure. In order to compensate the passenger for the 
incurred uncertainty this ticket would have to be priced at a discount in comparison to a 
regular, specified ticket.  
 
With regard to the mentioned example Bucharest – Gothenburg, Lufthansa could for 
instance build a flexible time-range ticket comprising all or several of the nine one-stop 
connections of the airline group. By selling this ticket, the airline would be able to win 
low-fare passengers without having to decide at the moment of purchase to which flight 
they will actually be assigned to. This assignment would then take at a later time, based 
on the available seats (based on much more accurate forecasts) as well as the marginal 
costs of transporting a passenger on the various flights (e.g. additional fuel costs, airport 
charges). For the passenger such a booking could look as described in Figure 12). 
 
 
                                                
 
37 Cf. chapter 3.3.2 for an extensive discussion of forecasting implications. 
38 Cf. Müller-Bungart (2007), p. 113 
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Figure 13: Theoretical setting of network-based overbooking with time-range tickets  
 
While the field of Yield Management has been subject to extensive research since the 
1970s, the presence of routing alternatives has only been considered within the last 
decade. 2001, Talluri has proposed a model for yield management that simultaneously 
incorporates seat inventory control and passenger routing.41 In 2004, Gallego and 
Philipps were the first to investigate the use of flexible products in a network 
environment. Using Linear-Programming they demonstrated that flexible products can 
be a viable mean to induce further demand and without cannibalizing revenues. 
However, they point out, that the an airline that introduces such a ticket type has to 
carefully select the right discount, as a too small discount would not be sufficient to 
induce further demand, while a too large discount would risk a cannibalization of other 
ticket revenues.42  
 
Three years later, Müller-Bungart has published a comprehensive overview over several 
potential application fields for flexible products. Although the focus is laid on the 
broadcasting industry, also an introduction regarding an application in the airline industry 
is given. First of all, applications from the field of air cargo are looked at. The focus on 
this sector can be explained by the fact that (unless there is a particularly short 
timeframe for delivery) cargo is insensitive to waiting times and additional handling 
activities. It can also easily be offloaded in case of oversales and can be transmitted 
using a different routing than originally planned.43 
 
 
                                                
 
41 Cf. Talluri (2001), p. 102 
42 Cf. Gallego / Philipps (2004), p. 321ff 
43 Cf. Mueller-Bunghart (2007), p. 85 
Applied research background 
Yield Management  
- Pricing 
- Overbooking  
- Demand smoothing  
- Short-term capacity control 
- Fare class control 
Airline network planning  
- Network design 
- Flight scheduling  
- Long-term capacity control 
Theoretical research background 
Customer choice models  
- Price elasticity  
- Value of time  
- Customer preferences 
(costs of uncertainty) 
 
Network theory 
- Network design theories 
- Quickest flow theories 
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context there will also be an extensive discussion of current load factor optimization 
methods, namely yield management and overbooking.  
 
Chapter three introduces the concepts of risk and uncertainty as well as theories which 
describe how consumers and corporations deal with such situations. The chapter ends 
with a presentation of postponement-strategies in production companies, since these 
build on the same principles as flexible time-range tickets, which also delay the 
assignment of customers to a specific product in order to decrease the involved demand 
risk. 
 
In chapter four currently used flexible products are presented. Where possible, a 
detailed description of the service process as well as the passenger response is 
provided in order to be able to grasp initial empirical evidence on the acceptance of 
specific product characteristics, which have an influence on the perceived uncertainty. 
This is followed by a presentation of existing studies about passenger preferences with 
regard to certain product attributes. Based on these findings, possible product designs 
for flexible products are displayed in a morphological box and examined, having both the 
demand side as well as the operational feasibility in mind.  
 
The aforementioned evaluation of possible designs is then, based on the results of a set 
of qualitative interviews, pinpointed to a set of specific product designs which are 
evaluated in a quantitative study which is presented in chapter five. To test the 
acceptance of the emerged flexible product designs, a conjoint measurement survey 
among a sample of travelers was conducted, during which respondents were confronted 
with a set of travel options for a determined origin-destination path, with different types 
of flexible time-range tickets being one of them. The results of this empirical survey were 
contrasted with results from similar studies to validate the results. Finally, based on the 
results, revenue implications as well as consequences for the network design are be 
discussed and recommendations for airline managers are presented. 
 




2 The business model of network carrier 
In order to be able to estimate the impact of an introduction of flexible time-range tickets 
in multi-hub networks, it is essential to understand the main characteristics of the 
business model of network carriers and the corresponding route network and yield 
management practices. Before focusing on network carriers, this chapter aims at 
providing an overview of the currently existing business models and their differences. In 
the following the strengths and weaknesses of the hubbing concept are introduced. 
Particularly, the impact of the increasing role of cooperation (e.g. in alliances) and 
consolidation processes on the operations of network airlines is examined. The chapter 
is closed by a presentation of relevant network carrier flight scheduling and yield 
management techniques.  
2.1 Characteristics of the network carrier business model 
With regard to commercial passenger airline operations three business models can be 
distinguished: network carriers, low-cost carriers (LCC) and charter airlines.48 While the 
first two operate scheduled flights that are offered to the broad public, the latter by 
definition offer non-scheduled services, primarily to touristic destinations. Furthermore, 
taking a narrow perspective, seats on charter flights are usually not directly sold to 
passengers but are distributed via tour operators only. However, during the last years 
the distinction between these models became more and more difficult, and many so-
called charter airlines (e.g. the Austrian airlines subsidiary Lauda Air) operate according 
to a fixed schedule and sell (at least a part of) their tickets via the internet or other 
channels directly to individual consumers.49 In the European market, the importance of 
charter airlines has constantly decreased during the last years, since many of their core 
routes have been taken up by LCC instead. Within only six years (2002-2008), for 
instance, the market share of charter airlines in the German market has decreased from 
24% to 14%.50 Based on this decreasing importance and the fact that, from a cost 
perspective, charter airlines are in many aspects very similar to LCC51, the following 
section will only focus on the two remaining business models, network carriers and low-
cost airlines.  
 
 
                                                
 
48 Some authors also cite regional airlines as a separate group (cf. Kummer (2006), p. 85 or Bieger, T. / 
Agosti, S. (2005), p. 41). However, since most regional carriers in Europe can only survive by operating 
feeder flights for network carriers they will not be treated as a separate group in this context. 
49 Cf. Kummer (2006), p. 82ff 
50 Cf. Destatis (2009a) & Destatis (2009b), http://www.destatis.de; Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt (2009), http://www.adv.aero;  
51 Remarkable differences can only be seen in the way charter airlines distribute their tickets (through 
intermediaries) and with regard to operations (i.e. charter airlines often only offer seasonal flights, following 
a more or less regular pattern). Furthermore it should be noted that charter airlines can also offer long-haul 
flights (which from a cost perspective, are very similar to the operations of network carriers, though). Cf. 
Cento (2009), p. 21 f 
22 
 
2.1.1 Characteristics and cost structure of network airlines 
When, due to the appearance of LCC, the academic literature was forced to once again 
distinguish various business models in the airline industry, a range of terms has been 
introduced to designate existing airlines that offered scheduled flights. However, as 
shown in Table 3, most of these terms are either outdated or misleading. From today’s 
point of view, the only constant differentiation criterion between LCC and ‘the other 
business model’ is the spatial and temporal network structure. Therefore in the following 
only the term network carrier will be used. 
 
Currently (mis-)used labels to designate network carriers 





In contrast to LCC (often also 
called ‘no-frills’ airlines), many 
network carriers originally offered 
or still offer more customer service 
(e.g. catering, lounges, etc.).52 
As a reaction to declining yields in their markets, many 
network carriers (for instance Austrian Airlines) have 
drastically reduced their pre- and in-flight catering (on 
short-haul routes), sometimes even below the level of 
so-called LCCs (such as e.g. FlyNiki).53 
Legacy 
Carrier 
These terms have been used to 
describe carriers with a long 
history, in contrast to the new 
market entrants (LCCs). 
With Southwest (the first LCC) operating for almost 40 
years the age of an airline as such cannot serve as a 





Flag carrier used to designate an 
airline that was (at least largely) 
owned by a state. In the USA, the 
term was used in a broader 
sense, also including airlines 
registered in a country. 
On the one hand, many former flag carriers have been 
privatized, thereby being owned by individuals or 
organizations of several countries. On the other hand, 
ownership or registration do not imply a particular 
network structure (e.g. Air Lingus, the Irish flag carrier, 
is currently operating according to a LCC model). 
Table 3: Misleading designations for network carriers that are used in the literature54 
 
In the course of this work, a network carrier is understood as an airline that operates the 
vast majority of its flight to and from one or several hub airports to or from a range of 
spoke airports in a temporarily coordinated way that allows passengers to make 
connections between the flights. As will be shown and explained more thoroughly further 
below (cf. chapter 2.1.2 & 2.2.4), running a hub & spoke network involves substantially 
higher costs than operating simple point-to-point network. This cost reduction potential 
gave ground to the emergence of the LCC business model. In order to understand the 
implications of the operational characteristics of this network type, first an overview of 
the various cost dimensions of network airlines will be given. Table 4 shows the main 
 
                                                
 
52 Other scholars (Bieger / Agosti (2005), p. 50) also include a global network as a condition for ‘full service’: 
“The goal of network carriers always has been to provide global air transport networks with complete service 
chains, seamless customer care, […] lounges and loyalty programs”. Again, though, there are numerous 
examples for network carriers that do not fulfill these conditions but still qualify as network carriers. 
53 Cf. Metzenbauer (2009), austrianaviation.net 
54 Cf. Holloway (2008), 47f 
23 
 
cost categories of airlines according to the ICAO accounting scheme.55 It differentiates 
between direct operating costs, i.e. all costs related to the operation of specific aircrafts 
(that usually also change if the aircraft type is changed), and indirect costs. 
 
Total cost structure of network carriers 
Direct operating costs (DOC) 
Category & (selected) cost components % of operating costs Tendency
Flight operations 35 
Cockpit Crew Salaries (8)   
Fuel and oil (11) 
Airport and en-route charges1 (7) 
Leasing of aircrafts (and crews in case of wet-lease) (9)   
Maintenance 11   
Staff costs (technicians)     
Spare parts     
Administration2     
Depreciation & Amortisation 7   
Aircrafts     
Ground equipment (buildings, etc.)3     
Amortisations of crew trainings, etc.      
Sum DOC  53   
   
Indirect operative costs (IOC) 
Category & cost components % of operating costs Tendency
Ground stations 11   
Ground staff   
Buildings, equipment, transports   
Handling charges (paid to 3rd parties)   
Passenger service 11   
Flight attendents salaries4     
Additional passenger costs (catering)   
Passenger insurance     
Sales 14 
Sales offices   
Commissions   
Other ticketing costs (e.g. CRS fees)     
General & Administration / other costs 11   
Sum IOC 47   
     
Total operating costs: 100   
Possible deviations from this structure: 1: Airport charges are often also accounted for in the section “ground 
stations”2: Could be counted under “General & Administration” 3: These costs are often also considered in the 
indirect cost section “ground stations” 4: Flight attendants could also be considered as a share of “Flight operations”. 
Table 4: Cost structure of network carriers according to the ICAO-convention56 
 
 
                                                
 
55 As noted by Doganis (Cf. Doganis (2002), S. 75.), there are no binding, airline industry-wide standards. 
However, all ICAO member states airlines have to report their financials according to the ICAO reporting 
scheme. This framework – which allows for international comparisons - will be presented in the following. 
56 Own compilation, based on Doganis (2002), p. 88 and IATA (2000), p. 12. 
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managed to be perceived as good value for money, which allowed them to gain an 
overall market share of approximately 30% in the European market within only 15 
years.65 If the differences in unit costs are compared against effectively sold seats (by 
looking at the costs per RPK), due to their high load factors, LCCs (e.g. Ryanair) are 
having a cost base that is up to even 70% lower than selected network carriers (e.g. 
Austrian Airlines, cf. Table 5).  
 
Comparison of cost structure (LCC vs. NC) 
Austrian Airlines Air Berlin Ryanair 
Business year 
(annual report) 1.1.08 - 31.12.08 1.1.08 - 31.12.08 1.4.07-31.3.08 








Mio.€ in % 
Cent / 
RPK 
Fuel costs 526 20% 2.79 874 26% 1.97 791 36% 1.50 
En-route charges 104 4% 0.55 228 7% 0.51 259 12% 0.49 
Airport charges 403 15% 2.14 710 21% 1.60 396 18% 0.75 
Leasing costs 281 11% 1.49 360 10% 0.81 73 3% 0.14 
Maintenance 172 6% 0.91 187 5% 0.42 57 3% 0.11 
Depreciation 86 3% 0.45 103 3% 0.23 176 8% 0.33 
Marketing & Sales 155 6% 0.82 89 3% 0.20 17 1% 0.03 
Staff costs 435 16% 2.30 446 13% 1.01 285 13% 0.54 
Catering 102 4% 0.54 124 4% 0.28 - - - 
other costs 387 15% 2.05 304 9% 0.69 122 6% 0.23 
Total  
(operating costs) 2,651 100% 14.03 3,425 100% 7.73 2,177 100% 4.12 
RPK (Mio) 18,890 44,310 52,783 
Load factor: 75% 78% 82% 
ASK (Mio) 25,130 56,480 64,370 
Table 5: Comparison of operating costs of selected carriers66 
 
To better understand the different cost levels, it is useful to distinguish between cost 
differences that are caused by network and operational characteristics that are inherent 
to the chosen business and network model as well as cost differences that are solely or 
at least predominantly caused by factors that are not related to the business model (cf. 




                                                
 
65 Cf. Destatis (2009a) & Destatis (2009b), http://www.destatis.de; Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt (2009), http://www.adv.aero; Mercer MC (2004), p. 3; cf. Blanken (2006), p. 15 
66 Based on annual reports by the airlines. Cf. Ryanair (2008), p.3ff; AirBerlin (2009), p. 56ff; Austrian 
Airlines (2009a), p.32ff; Austrian Airlines (2009b), p.3; Since Ryanair does not publish its average sector 
length, this value (which is essential to calculate RPK & ASK) was derived from an external source that 
used flight schedules and official sector lengths: Cf. AnnaAero (2008), http://www.anna.aero.com;  




Origin and sustainability of cost advantages enjoyed by LCC 










Serve mostly international, 
primary airports 
Fly to (less demanded) 
regional, secondary 
airports 
Lower aircraft fees, no 
congestion (less delays, 
faster turnarounds) 
6%   X   
Long turnaround times (due to 





Better fleet utilization 3% X     
Combination of short-, medium- 
and long-haul flights  
with opportunities to transfer at 
the hub 
Only short-haul point-
to-point flights, no 
transfers 
Lower complexity (e.g. 
yield management or 
scheduling), higher load 
factors, lower 
administration costs 
2% X     
Different aircraft types are 
required to operate the network 
Standardized fleet 
(usually only one 
aircraft type) 
Lower maintenance and 
training costs, easier crew 
rostering process, better 
purchasing conditions 
2%   X   
Two or even three class seating 
in aircrafts 
Single class seating, 
low seat pitch 
Lower costs per seat, 
better utilization of aircraft  16%     X 
Tickets are often sold through 
indirect channels (e.g. agents) 
Tickets are almost 
exclusively sold via the 
internet or call centers 
No commissions,  
lower complexity 9%     X 
Pre- & In-Flight service,  
 Frequent Flyer Programs 
No 'frills' offered to 
passengers for free 
Low service costs, 
additional revenues 6%     X 
Own ground operations at 
important destinations 
Ground handling is 
mostly outsourced 
Lower fixed costs, quick 
network changes possible 10%   X   
Long-serving staff, traditionally 
high salaries, low share of salary 
is performance based (<10%) 
Newly hired staff, lower 
salaries, large share of 
salary is performance 
based (>40%) 
Higher staff productivity, 
easier crew rostering (more 
flexible contracts) 
3%     X 
Total cost advantage in comparison to network carriers: 57% 
Table 6: Size, origin and sustainability of LCC cost advantages68 
 
As shown above, the majority of cost saving potentials are not unique to the low-cost 
carrier model (and the corresponding point-to-point traffic structure) but are rather the 
consequence of more efficient operations, a reduction in the offered customer service 
level as well as the employment of cheaper, and more flexibly deployable, staff. In 
reaction to the market entry of LCC, many NC have successfully adapted their cost base 
by picking up operational characteristics of LCC. With regard to short-haul aircraft 
utilization, Dennis, for instance, taking a sample of major European carriers reports an 
increase in the daily flying time from 7:40 hours to 8:31 hours in the period of 2000 to 
 
                                                
 
67 Due to the fact that low cost airlines often do not assign seats, they do not only shorten the check-in 
process but also motivate passengers to quickly enter the plane. Furthermore, by not offering passengers to 
enter the plane directly from the gate by means of jetways, but using busses instead, airlines can already 
process passengers at the gate and have them wait in the bus in case the plane is not finished. Finally 
letting passengers aboard while the plane stands on the apron also allows them to use both doors. 
68 Own illustration based on European Cockpit Association (2002), p. 9 and European Low Fares Airline 
Association (2004), p. 5. 
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2005.69 Other measures taken included a reduction of onboard catering,70 a smaller 
distance between seat rows (seat pitch),71 the establishment of newly founded 
subsidiaries with lower staff costs,72 efforts to harmonize aircraft fleets73 and a strong 
decrease in sales costs (by selling more tickets via the internet and decreasing 
commissions paid to travel agents).74 
 
On the other hand, many former LCC have evolved their business model by adding 
components of network carriers to their product, thereby applying a ‘hybrid’ model. 
Examples for added components include frequent flyer programs (e.g. AirBerlin or 
Germanwings), connecting flights (e.g. Southwest or Germanwings), in-flight 
entertainment (e.g. JetBlue) or the use of GDS-services to sell tickets (e.g. Easyjet).75 
 
Since, based on these developments, NC have been able to narrow the cost difference 
relative to LCC one could argue that the main difference is constituted by the fact that 
NC operate a hub & spoke network while LCC operate point-to-point routes.76  
2.2 The economics of hubbing 
As analyzed in the previous chapter, many of the cost differences between NC and LCC 
are mainly caused or at least influenced by the chosen network structure. The following 
section therefore aims at a comparison of the advantages and the disadvantages of the 
hub & spoke concept that is used by network carriers. 
2.2.1 Network configurations in the airline industry 
The configuration of a network is not only the main differentiation criterion between 
various business models but also the key determinant of costs and revenues. 
 
“The network is a key strategic factor of airlines, as it is the main driver for 




                                                
 
69 Cf. Dennis (2007), p. 320. Carriers that formerly had a very poor performance have even managed to 
increase aircraft utilization by 46% (Iberia, A319) in the same period. 
70 Cf. Metzenbauer (2009), austrianaviation.net 
71 Cf. Spiegel Online (2009), www.spiegel.de 
72 Lufthansa for instance has outsourced many short-haul flights to its subsidiary Lufhansa Cityline, which 
pays lower salaries than the Lufthansa Passage business unit, cf. Kolodziejczyk (2008), fr-online.de 
73 While Austrian Airlines, for instance, in 2003 still operated 15 distinct aircraft types (with Boeing 737-600 
and Boeing 737-800 only being counted as one type), the number of aircraft types has been reduced to 11 
in 2008. Cf. AEA (2004), p. 51 and AEA (2009), p. 20. 
74 Cf. Dennis (2007), p. 319. Lufthansa, KLM, Air France and British Airways, for instance, have even 
introduced a zero-provision scheme in 2005 (cf. Amadeus (2007), p. 6). 
75 Cf. Kretschmar (2008), p. 25; Entertainment & Travel (2008), p. 24; Klopphaus (2005), p. 348ff 
76 Cf. Cento (2009), p. 133 
77 Cento (2009), p. 29 
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especially airports that operate close to their maximum capacity often focus primarily on 
passenger traffic as a key revenue driver while cargo traffic is seen as a subordinated 
business field. 
 
With regard to the geographic position, hinterland and hourglass (directional) hubs can 
be identified. While the first one aims at bundling local passengers who are then 
transported further on long-haul flights (and vice versa), the latter one is used to bundle 
passengers arriving from one direction, who are then flown further into different cities in 
the area behind the directional hub (e.g. passengers who arrive from Europe in 
Singapore and are then flown further to other destinations that are located further east). 
 
Since it is the main aim of a hub to allow its passengers to transfer from one incoming to 
another outgoing flight, the temporal concentration of flights in so called waves is crucial 
for its success. As Berdy defines it, “a bank (or a wave) is the combination of arriving 
and departing aircrafts within a window of time.”90 Many European network carriers 
operate up to six waves per day on their hub.91 To ensure that passengers (and their 
luggage) are able to make their connection in time, airlines have to respect a certain 
Minimum Connecting Time (MCT) when making their flight schedules. At major hub 
airports, this time ranges between 25 (e.g. VIE) and up to 90 minutes (e.g. Paris 
CDG).92 Since an aircraft of a hub carrier usually has to wait on the ground until 
connecting passengers from other (incoming) aircrafts of the same wave are on board, 
long MCTs also reduce the time an aircraft is actually flying (i.e. its productivity).  
 
In order to improve the productivity of the aircraft, to lower the impact of land- and 
airside congestion and the resulting delays in the entire flight program and to achieve a 
more balanced usage of ground resources, several airlines have aimed at depeaking 
their hub operations. In order to decide which flights can be excluded from the time 
periods which are supposed to be depeaked, airlines have to distinguish between city-
pairs with high transfer volumes and valuable yields on the one hand (so called A-
segment) and markets with a low connection share and / or low yields on the other hand 
(C-segment). After this distinction is made, the schedule of the first group can be 
optimised with regard to an increased connectivity, while the latter can be deferred to 
off-peak times (thereby allowing for a higher productivity). Besides this increase in asset 
and staff utilization, the benefits of this concept, which is often also referred to as ‘rolling 
hub’, also derive from a reduced air- and landside airport congestion that is reflected in 
lower operating costs (less fuel costs as a result of requested holding patterns, less 
taxiing time on the ground) as well as reduced customer care costs (fewer 
compensation payments, less rescheduling efforts due to missed connections). A 
successful example for depeaking its operations is American Airlines. At Chicago Airport 
(ORD) the airline has been able to decrease its staff size by almost 5%, while reducing 
the required airline fleet by five planes. At the same time, depeaking has even improved 
 
                                                
 
90 Berdy (1998), p. 621 f. 
91 Cf. Maurer (2006), p. 405 
92 Cf. Vienna International Airport (2006), gb2006.viennaairport.com 
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the revenue situation, since the share of local passengers has gone up (at the expense 
of some transfer passenger who apparently did not tolerate the overall travel time 
increase on selected low-demand origin destination pairs). This shows that depeaking 
can be a viable strategy to increase the profitability of hub operations, especially if a 
carrier has to cope with capacity problems at its main hub and has a rather high share of 
local passengers at the same time (who profit from higher frequencies to main 
destinations due to the increased aircraft usage).93 
 
A special case of depeaking, which at first sight leads to a dilution of the bundling 
benefits of hubs, is the establishment of a reliever hub. This can be reasonable, if an 
airline is unable to expand at its main hub airport (e.g. due to a shortage of slots at 
peak-hours) or if it wants to tap the market potential of a different catchment area by 
offering a large route network directly from there. In this sense, also multi-hub systems 
(cf. also chapter 2.4) can be understood as special form of connected reliever hubs.  
 
The size of the local market (catchment area) as such can also serve as a discriminating 
factor in the classification of hub airports. Bourghouwt differentiates between traffic hubs 
(that register a share of passengers for whom the hub is either the origin or the 
destination of their travel of more than 60%) and wayports, i.e. hubs that primarily serve 
as transfer points.94  
 
Most carriers usually stable their aircrafts at their home base, even though this comes at 
the expense of the last departure wave not having any connection links as well as the 
first departure bank not having any feeder flights.95 However, if an airline is not able to 
address a large population in its catchment area and requires a high share of transfer 
passengers at its hub, it often stables its short-haul aircrafts overnight at spoke airports 
(night-stops), in order to allow for an early feeder flight that brings passengers to the hub 
(cf. Figure 21). This stabling at hinterland airports however comes at the expense of 
increased crew costs (e.g. lodging expenses) and reduced aircraft usage, since a crew 
has to observe certain rest periods before they can fly again.96 
 
                                                
 
93 Cf. Goedeking / Sala / Berger (2003), p. 3ff; Ott (2002), p. 26 f. 
94 Cf. Burghouwt (2007), p.15. One example for a hub airport with a low share of local passengers would be 
Zurich, where only 35% of all long-haul passengers are local passengers (cf. Moser (2009), www.zeit.de). 
95 Theoretically speaking, this kind of scheduling is only necessary if a continuous wave system is impaired 
by curfews (night flight restrictions). Within Europe, such restrictions are, however, not the exception but the 
rule.  
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to a hub 
Required flights to 
operate one wave to / 
from the hub 
Number of city-pairs that can 
be connected (including the 
hub as a destination) 
n n * 2 n (n+1) / 2 
2 4 3 
10 20 55 
50 100 1275 
100 200 5050 
Table 8: Exponential growth of connected city-pairs in a hub & spoke network99 
 
The more spokes are already connected to a hub, the larger the amount of additional 
city-pairs that result from adding an additional spoke. In reality though it has to be noted 
that due to the fact that some spoke airports might be (too) close to each other or flying 
from A to B via a hub would incur in unacceptably long travel times in comparison to a 
direct connection (e.g. in the case of backtracking) not all resulting connections make 
sense from a passenger perspective.100 
 
Offering a hub & spoke system also allows airlines to profit from economies of scale, 
i.e. a reduction in the costs per produced unit in case of an increase of the overall level 
of output. In an airline context, cost reduction potentials arise due to the distribution of 
fixed costs (e.g. airport facilities, general and administration expenses, fixed marketing 
and distribution costs or fixed maintenance costs) over a bigger number of transported 
passengers.101 Furthermore larger airlines (at least with regard to their market share at 
the hub airport) can also profit from lower purchasing prices due to an increased 
bargaining power (e.g. with regard to fuel or handling operations suppliers or the home 
airport as such).102  
 
Network airlines furthermore profit from economies of scope, i.e. a reduction in overall 
costs due to a joint production of a range of services (flights) in comparison to individual 
airlines that would operate the route network separately from each other. Additionally to 
this cost reduction effect (sometimes also called ‘economies of network size’), airlines 
can also draw upon demand economies of scope, which occur if the demand for a range 
of services is larger than the demand if each of the services would be offered by a 
separate supplier.103 This is also reflected in lower marketing costs. If an airline has a 
significant market share at the local hub and is already present in the relevant set of 
 
                                                
 
99 Cf. Doganis (2004), p. 255; Hanlon (2007), p. 126 
100 Hanlon (1999), p. 84 f. as well as p. 127 
101 Cf. Iatrou/Oretti (2007), p. 116 
102 This effect can even be amplified by joining an alliance. Cf. Kleyman / Seristo (2004), p. 98  
103 Cf. Button (2004), p.32; Button (2002), p. 180; Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 121. This increase in demand is 
one the one hand caused by the offer of a larger and better integrated route network, but is on the other 
hand also due to the fact that the resulting lower costs base can – if passed on in the form of lower fares to 
the passenger – induce additional demand. 
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potential air travellers, it has a significant advantage in comparison to a new entrant 
when it opens an additional route. 104 
 
Economies of traffic density occur due to an increase in the traffic on specific spokes 
that results from the consolidation of passengers (bundling) in the hub. This increase in 
the overall traffic volume allows a network airline to achieve higher load factors and to 
use larger (more efficient) aircrafts on routes which would – if only filled with local traffic 
– require smaller aircrafts with higher costs per seat (this effect is often also referred to 
as economics of aircraft size). 105 
 
“The traffic density on a route and the sector length(s) on that route will influence 
the size and type of aircraft chosen for that route. Aircraft type, and more 
especially the size of the aircraft, is a key determinant of unit costs. […] As a 
general rule, though there are exceptions, the larger an aircraft, the lower will be 
its direct operating costs per unit of output […]. In other words, other things being 
equal, the direct operating costs of aircraft do not increase in proportion to their 
size or their payload capacity.”106 
 
Besides cost advantages related to the operation of the aircraft as such (e.g. required 
flight deck107 and cabin crew or fuel burn do not increase proportionally to aircraft size), 
this advantage is amplified by the effect that larger planes do not require proportionally 
more ground handling efforts than smaller ones (e.g. required gate facilities and staff, air 
traffic management staff, baggage handling staff, maintenance, etc.).108 The impact of 
these advantages on unit costs (costs per seat mile) is illustrated in Figure 22. 
 
 
                                                
 
104 Cf. Hanlon (1999), p. 45  
105 This effect increases with the number of spoke flights that are consolidated in an arrival and departure 
wave. E.g. in order to achieve a load factor of 75% (only out of transfer passengers) on a route where an 
aircraft with 200 seats is used, an airline that operates 25 incoming flights would require six transfer 
passengers from each route, while an airline that operates 50 incoming flights per wave would only require 
three connection passengers per route. Cf. Holloway (2003), p. 387 
106 Doganis (2002), p. 105ff 
107 In practice, there are several airlines, though, where pilots flying larger aircraft also receive higher 
salaries (cf. Hansen / Wei (2003), p. 290f). This is on the one hand due to fact that it is traditionally often 
rather senior (i.e. more expensive) staff that flies larger aircrafts, while on the other hand, many network 
carriers have opened separate business units that operate smaller aircrafts with the aim of avoiding to pay 
newly hired pilots the salary of the main company’s flight deck crews (e.g. Lufhansa Cityline pilots earn 
considerably less than Lufthansa Passage pilots, cf. Kolodziejczyk (2008), fr-online.de; Tyrolean pilots earn 
approximately 25% less than Austrian Airlines pilots, cf. DiePresse (2007), diepresse.com). These 
subsidiaries however are often – based on contracts concluded with the labor unions of the main airline – 
not allowed to operate larger aircrafts. 
108 Cf. Iatrou/Oretti (2007), p. 125; For example, a Boeing 767-300 can accommodate almost 3 times as 
many passengers as a Boeing 737-400 but only consumes twice as much fuel as the latter. Cf. Doganis 
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aircraft, since for the same capacity provided in the market an increase of frequency can 
attract more passengers.”113 However, while a recent empirical analysis of US-markets 
has confirmed this relationship on markets where network carriers where competing with 
each other, it also revealed that the presence of LCC on analyzed city-pairs led to a 
weakening of the S-curve phenomenon. This is explained by the increased importance 
of the price as a decision criterion in these markets at the detriment of the importance of 
the offered frequency.114 
 
To describe a market situation where an airline has a significant market share (Iatrou 
and Oretti for instance define a threshold value of 60%)115 and the remaining market is 
served by various other (smaller) carriers, the term ‘fortress hub’ is used. Such a 
setting allows the dominant carrier to profit from extensive economies of scale, scope 
and density on its hub routes which can hardly be met by a new entrant.116 Furthermore, 
slot scarcity (at least during peak hours) deteriorates the chances of market entry by 
competitors. Even if a competitor enters the stage by opening a new route, the 
incumbent airline can react by lowering its fares on the selected route in order to keep 
its market share or to drive a competitor out of the market (so called predatory 
pricing).117  
 
Furthermore, hubbing also decreases the demand risks on various spokes in 
comparison to a point-to-point route, since it bundles several Origin-Destination 
itineraries on a specific flight leg, thereby decreasing the dependence on a particular 
O&D demand. As Barla & Constantatos specify, “the advantage of hubbing in the 
presence of demand uncertainty results from the fact that by pooling consumers, the 
H&S structure offers the flexibility to adjust the allocation of capacity across markets 
after the demand has been revealed.”118 
 
If an airline enjoys a monopoly-like position at its hub, it can charge customers higher 
fares on direct flights to and from the hub, which incorporate a so-called hub-premium. 
This premium can (among other factors) be explained by the absence of a strong 
competitor, the offer of a relatively high service quality (non-stop flights at a high 
frequency) as well as the value that customers derive from the fact that, thanks to the 
 
                                                
 
113 Hansen / Wei (2005), p. 325 or Holloway (2003), p. 442. It has to be noted though that especially at 
congested hub airports, it is often not possible to add additional frequencies due to slot scarcity.  
114 Binggeli / Pompeo (2006), p. 2 
115 Cf. Iatrou/Oretti (2007), p. 129 
116 Examples for dominant positions are Lufthansa (incl. Cityline) at Frankfurt Airport (who transport 60% of 
all passengers), Air France (incl. Regional) at Paris CDG (51%), KLM in Amsterdam (52%) or Turkish 
Airlines at Istanbul airport (74%, cf. Airline Business (2010b), p. 50f). 
117 Cf Doganis (2002), p. 257 or Pompl (2007), p. 233 and 440f. Predatory pricing is prohibited in the 
European Union, however, in practice it is difficult to legally examine whether a discount strategy is a regular 
competitive behavior or predatory pricing. Convictions in this field are therefore extremely rare and include 
in Europe for instance the case Germania vs. Lufthansa on the route Frankfurt – Berlin, in which the 
German anti-trust agency forced Lufthansa to raise its prices above a certain threshold value (cf. Forsyth et 
al. (2005), p. 176ff). 
118 Barla / Constantatos (2000), p. 177f 
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dominance of the hub airline, they can use their Frequent Flyer Program (FFP) benefits 
on a large set of routes. This reduces the likelihood that a passenger books a different 
airline, even though it might be cheaper than the dominant hub carrier.119 In a recent 
examination of the US market, it was found that hub carriers are able to charge fares 
that are 14% higher than those of competitors serving the same route. Of this markup, 
about one quarter was attributed to the value of FFP-benefits.120 The situation at fortress 
hub and the mentioned hub-premium has regularly been subject to the scrutiny of 
competition authorities since it is assumed to impede competition. While this might be 
true for the competition on flights to and from a hub (especially on hubs with a low 
penetration of LCC), one can also observe an increased competition between hubs with 
regard to city-pairs that are connected through several competing hub airports.121 
2.2.4 Disadvantages of hub & spoke systems 
Although hub operations come along with a range of advantages, these have to be 
weighed against several disadvantages which will be presented in the following in order 
to evaluate whether a hub & spoke network is a suitable structure in certain traffic 
situations. 
 
First of all, operating a hub & spoke network results in a relatively large complexity 
which in turn requires not only investments into hub facilities (e.g. transfer desks) and 
IT-systems but also substantially more coordination efforts, which result in additional 
staff needs and costs.122 In case of highly peaked hub operations airlines also have to 
cope with the fact that staffing has to consider peak-hour demand rates, which results in 
a low productivity in off-peak hours. Furthermore the increased complexity also 
increases the likelihood of errors, for instance with regard to luggage handling, where 
the transfer of baggage from one aircraft to another accounts for 52% of all mishandled 
bag incidents. As a result, while at a global level only 1.1% of all passengers do not find 
their luggage in time at the destination, this figure raises to up to 2.8% at some 
European network carriers (e.g. British Airways), which leads to additional handling 
costs.123 
 
To ensure a high connectivity, an airline first has to design its network, and must then 
schedule and synchronize the resulting amount of flights. This process includes the 
consideration of slot, aircraft and staff requirements, as well as an estimation of the 
attainable demand and the respective yield on all origin-destination pairs that are 
affected by a certain scheduling decision (cf. also chapter 2.4), making it a much more 
 
                                                
 
119 Cf. Hanlon (1999), p. 174 
120 Cf. Lederman (2008), p. 63 
121 Cf. Hanlon (1999), p. 175 
122 Austrian Airlines for instance operates a Hub Control Center at Vienna Airport that comprises about 30 
employees (cf. BörseExpress (2005), www.boerse-express.com).  
123 Cf. AEA (2009c), www.aea.be; Data from Q1 2008. At the end of Q1 (27.3.08) British Airways moved its 
flights to the new Terminal 5 at Heathrow airport, which has caused a lot of initial luggage problems. 
Although this worsens the statistics, the value is in line with the value from Q1 / 2007 where 2.5% of all bags 
were delayed. The overall volume-weighted AEA average is 16 mishandled bags per 1000 enplaned 
passengers. Causes for mishandled baggage are found in SITA (2010), p. 5f. 
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expensive task than the comparably simple scheduling process of Low-Cost-Carrier.124 
Moreover, since aircrafts have to wait for connecting flights, they achieve much lower 
utilization rates as compared to the continuous operation schedule of LCC. In 2004, for 
instance, aircrafts of the leading European LCC Ryanair, easyJet and Norwegian have 
in average been in the air for 11 h per day, while the airplanes of the network carriers 
British Airways or SN Brussels Airlines have only flown for 9,2 and 7,7 hours 
respectively.125 
 
Since a hub & spoke network substantially relies on allowing passengers to connect 
between flights, it is highly sensitive to delays, which can either be caused by 
congestion of land- or airside airport facilities (e.g. long queues at security checkpoints 
or tight runway capacity) during peak hours or flight disruptions. A major source of 
airside congestions are Air Traffic Control (ATC) delays, which are caused by a 
congestion of flight routes and approach paths and force aircrafts to fly holding patterns 
prior to landing (or – in the case of departing aircrafts - wait on the ground) in order to 
obtain a free slot. This problem intensifies, if irregular conditions (e.g. runway closure, 
bad weather, etc.) decrease the allowed air traffic flow rate below normal levels. While 
disruptions in other types of networks often only affect a small part of it, irregularities 
within a hub & spoke system can affect the entire operation due to so-called ‘knock-on’ 
effects (sometimes also referred to as ‘propagated delays’). This is on the one hand 
caused by the fact that a flight uses several resources (i.e. cockpit crew, cabin crew and 
aircraft)126 which are possibly foreseen to be used on multiple onward flights of the hub 
carrier, while on the other hand formerly unaffected flights might also be held back 
intentionally in order to allow delayed connecting passengers to reach it. 127 
 
 
                                                
 
124 Cf. Holloway (2003), p. 295 
125 Cf. Dobruzkes (2006), p. 250 
126 Since safety regulations require crew members to observe rest times after a certain duty time, excessive 
delays may force an airline to call in replacement crews to operate onward flights. 




Figure 23: Flight delays at European Hub Airports128 
 
Figure 23 shows the percentage of delayed flights at European Airports. Overall, around 
24% of flights have departed with a delay of more than 15 minutes (in average 42 
minutes). In the comparison of different airports it can be seen that due to the presence 
of coordinated arrival- and departure waves, which often pass on potential delays from 
one flight to another, especially hub airports with a high share of transit passengers (e.g. 
Frankfurt: 53%, Amsterdam: 42%, LHR: 35% and CDG: 32%) are subject to delays.129  
 
When examining those delay figures, one has to keep in mind though that many airlines 
deliberately plan longer block times130 in order to improve their on-time performance and 
the stability of their waves with regard to disruptions. This practice, which is often called 
‘padding’ or ‘buffering’, however decreases the attractiveness of certain connections to 
passengers (due to longer overall travel times) as well as staff and aircraft 
productivity.131 
 
Besides the lower productivity (due to lost time) delays also result in high costs due to 
additional fuel burn (e.g. because of holding patterns in the air or longer taxi times on 
the ground) as well as rescheduling and compensation costs of passengers in case of 
excessive delays or missed connections.132 On a European level, in 2008 ATC-delays 
 
                                                
 
128 Cf. AEA (2009a), www.aea.be 
129 Cf. Fraport AG (2009), www.ausbau.fraport.de 
130 Block time is the time after the aircraft has left its parking position at its departure airport (‘off-blocks’) 
until it has again reached its parking position at its destination (‘on-blocks’). 
131 See Holloway (2003), p. 435f; AhmadBeygi et al. (2008), p. 230 
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alone have resulted in costs of around € 900 million.133 On an individual airline level, 
Austrian Airlines, for instance, has incurred overall delay costs of approximately € 30 
million in 2005.134 
 
Since hub & spoke networks do “break-up” itineraries they also have a twofold impact 
on operational costs. First of all, since the hub in most cases is not located in the middle 
of the journey between two cities, flying via a hub leads to detour in comparison to a 
non-stop flight. A passenger who, for instance, flies from Vienna to Riga via Frankfurt 
travels 624km on the first and 1.275km on the second flight leg, thereby covering a total 
distance of 1.899km. This is 73% more than a passenger who takes a direct flight to 
cover the 1.100 kilometer between the two cities.135 
 
Second, the negative impact of an indirect itinerary is further amplified by the fact, that 
aircraft and crew operating costs do not grow proportionally to the distance travelled. In 
other words, as shown exemplarily with regard to the fuel costs of a Boeing 737-400 
airplane in Figure 24, the shorter a flight, the higher are its direct operating costs. 
This is among other factors caused by the fact that an airline always requires to take-off, 
climb, descent and land, causing a fixed cost burden, irrespective of the time an 
airplane spends in the cruise stage of the flight (with comparably low fuel burn). As can 
be seen, fuel costs on a flight over 463km (e.g. Vienna to Belgrade) amount to € 1.168, 
while the cost of fuel on a flight that covers twice the distance (i.e. 926 km, e.g. Vienna 
to Bruxelles) are only 59% higher (€ 1.861).  
 
                                                
 
133 Cf. Eurocontrol (2009), p. 10 
134 BörseExpress (2005), www.boerse-express.com; This number does not include the damage to the 
company’s reputation, which might also have a negative long-term effect on revenues. 




Figure 24: The impact of flight distance on fuel consumption136 
 
In addition, since airplanes only operate close to their maximum speeds when flying at 
cruising altitude, short flights also lead to lower average speeds, thereby decreasing the 
productivity of the aircraft as well as the flight crew (when expressed as output or costs 
per flown kilometer).137  
 
Finally the fact that a connection via a hub requires an additional LTO-cycle affects 
airline costs by raising the share of fixed costs per flight (e.g. aircraft-related airport 
charges, air traffic control charges related to take-off and landing or cycle-driven 
maintenance costs)138 and requiring the airline to pay additional marginal passenger-
driven flight costs, e.g. catering or passenger-related airport fees.139  
 
                                                
 
136 Own illustration, based on European Environment Agency (2007), p. 24 (fuel consumption values) and 
IATA (2010), www.iata.org (average fuel price for 2010, as at 22.01.2010). The costs of the LTO-cycle 
(€425) can be subdivided into taxiing out (22%), take-off (10%), climb (27%), descent (18%) and taxiing in 
(22%). Climb designates the flight from 3.000 ft (boundary of the LTO cycle) to cruise level (starting at 
31.000 feet). Descent is the flight from cruising altitude until an altitude of 3.000 feet (approximately 1.000 
meter) is reached.  
137 Cf. Holloway (2003), p. 370 f. Overall, the unit costs per ASK are, for instance on short flight of 500km 
with an Airbus A321 up to three times higher than on a long flight (3.500km) with the same type. Cf. Doganis 
(2002), p. 131 
138 Since legally required maintenance checks are either triggered by a certain number of flight hours, a 
certain time interval since the last check or a certain amount of flight cycles (usually following a ‘whichever 
comes first’ approach), carriers with short sector lengths are subject to relatively higher maintenance costs. 
Cf. Doganis (2002), p.93. 
139 At Vienna Airport for instance, the handling fee per passenger amounts to €15,52. However, to attract 
transfer traffic through Vienna, in case of transfer passengers the fee is lowered by €8. Cf. Vienna 
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2.2.5 Implications for intra-continental hub & spoke operations 
Offering intra-continental connections via their hub allows airlines to connect 
destinations with each other that do not show enough passenger demand to allow for a 
direct connection at reasonable prices. However, in case passengers also have the 
choice to select a direct flight (e.g. offered by a low-cost carrier), a connection via a hub 
is not only disadvantageous for the airline (due to an additional LTO-cycle, a longer 
flight distance and a reduced stage lengths) but is also considered inferior by the 
passenger due to longer travel times and the need to change flights at the hub. This 
leads to the dilemma that hubbing leads to an increase in costs in conjunction with a 
lower perceived customer value and thereby also a lower achievable yield. 
 
While until the liberalization of air traffic passengers often had no alternative to the 
connecting services of a network carrier in order to fly to a less demanded destination, 
this has changed with the growing offer of non-stop flights by LCC that due to the rising 
competition on trunk routes, now often already cover less demanded routes in their 
network (e.g. Ryanair offers direct flights from London to 16 cities in France, of which 
only one has a population of more than 500 thousand inhabitants).  
 
Apart from the resulting yield decrease for economy-class fares, European network 
carriers also suffer from a strong decline in the share of premium passengers on intra-
continental routes. While the amount of premium passengers on intercontinental long-
haul flights has been almost constant, the share of business-class passengers has 
decreased from 18% in 2001 to only 10% in 2007 (cf. Figure 25). In the light of tighter 
corporate travel budgets this trend has even been amplified by the global economic 
crisis in 2009. For this year, Austrian Airlines, for example, reported a share of business 
class passengers of only 8.9% on flights to Eastern Europe, which are primarily targeted 
at business passengers.140 
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Figure 26: Net result and operating ratio of European network carriers per region146 
 
Although these figures shed a negative light onto European flights offered by network 
carriers, the interlinked nature of transcontinental long-haul flights and a European 
feeder network make it impossible to make drastic changes in the European route 
structure without affecting the profitability of intercontinental operations.  
 
“To many full service EU airlines, the real value of short-haul routes lies in their 
ability to feed high-yield passengers onto their long-haul networks.”147 
 
This relationship is also expressed in the huge differences in load factors that are 
reported by European network carriers depending on the flight length. While European 
operations are subject to a load factor of approximately 70%, long-haul operations show 
a load factor of up to 83% (cf. Figure 27). Besides this difference between different types 
 
                                                
 
146 Own illustration based on AEA (2007), p. 11 
147 Hanlon (2007), p. 147. The dependence on a short-haul feeder network is even expressed more 
drastically by Cento, who states that “FSCs [Full Service Carrier] are stuck with the HS [Hub&Spoke] 
configuration to sustain the supply of intercontinental flights.” (Cento (2009), p. 104f). Lufthansa, for 
instance, reports that only 26% of its passengers on long haul flights are local demand, while the remaining 
74% are transfer passengers. At Air France – KLM (37%) or British Airways (59%) the share of local 
passengers on long haul flights is significantly higher, which can be explained by the fact that they operate 
out of larger catchment areas such as Paris, Amsterdam or London. As a result, an efficient feeder network 
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of operations it is also obvious that even if recent improvements are taken into 
consideration, the average load factor on short-haul routes operated by network carriers 
is still by around 13 percentage points below the load factors reported by leading 
European LCC such as Ryanair and Easyjet. 
 
 
Figure 27: Load factors of short- and long-haul operations of network carriers 148 
 
Based on these figures it becomes obvious that due to significant economies of scale, 
scope and traffic density, carriers that operate a large intercontinental network are in a 
better situation with regard to offering a short-haul network. Put in other words, without 
significant local traffic to or from the hub or revenues from routes with low competition 
intensity that allow for above-average yields,149 small network carriers that are (based on 
their limited network size) not able to feed enough transfer passengers to their long-haul 
network are at a large disadvantage to their larger rivals. 
 
In light of this development and the fact that the overall industry profit margin between 
1999 and 2008 was in average only 1.1 percent, many smaller network carriers have in 
the last years been subject to financial problems (Sabena, Swiss Airlines, Austrian 
Airlines, Alitalia, etc.) that resulted in them either exiting the market, reducing services or 
 
                                                
 
148 Own illustration based on AEA (2007), p. 5 & 15; Figures of 2007 only take into consideration the first 
nine months of the year. AEA = Association of European Airlines. 
149 One example for such routes would be operations to Eastern European countries which are (often due to 
missing traffic rights) not subject to severe competition by LCC. In this regard the routes from Vienna to 
Bucharest or Belgrade could serve as examples. While the network carrier Austrian Airlines had been able 
to generate substantial yields on these routes as long as it was only exposed to competition of network 
carriers from other countries, prices on both routes were subject to strong decreases after LCC (e.g. FlyNiki) 
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being purchased by a larger carrier.150 In many cases the consequence of network 
airline takeovers by other network carriers was a partial redundancy of overlapping 
networks that led to a diffusion of some of the advantages of hub & spoke networks. 
Therefore in the integration process of smaller carriers it has to be evaluated which 
routes should only be served from one hub in order to profit again from bundling 
economies.151 However, “to consider all these overlaps and related costs as cost 
savings potential would be too easy. This might also be the source for further revenues 
as long as the alliance partners exploit the s-curve effect jointly.”152 Furthermore it has to 
be taken into consideration that many of the larger European hub airports (e.g. London 
Heathrow or Frankfurt) are currently operating at maximum capacity during peaks hours 
which limits the potential for further traffic consolidations.153 Therefore the following 
chapters are intended to explore how airline alliances and consolidations affect the 
existing network structures, and whether flexible time-range tickets are a vital mean to 
turn multi-hub networks into an asset in the intra-continental competition against LCC. 
2.3 Airline cooperation, alliances and airline mergers 
In reaction to the growing importance of LCC, network carriers were increasingly looking 
for opportunities to cooperate with other carriers in an attempt to increase their market 
presence and to decrease operating costs. More specifically the following motives can 
be found as drivers for cooperation: 
• Improved market access and improved value proposition 
Cooperation allows airlines to offer routes in markets where they would 
otherwise either for legal reasons (e.g. missing traffic rights), missing production 
capacity (e.g. no suitable aircraft or slots available) or due to a poor market 
presence (e.g. unknown brand name, missing sales network) not be able to offer 
services. Thereby the involved airlines are able to extend their network and / or 
to offer their customers higher frequencies on existing routes.  
• Economies of scale 
By jointly using resources (e.g. handling desks at airports, IT-systems, 
maintenance facilities, etc.) airlines can spread fixed costs of these cost items 
over a larger output, thereby reducing the costs per transaction or produced unit. 
• Better bargaining position towards suppliers 
By joining forces, cooperating parties are able to increase their market power 
towards suppliers (such as airports or fuel suppliers). 
• Use of subsidiarity principle to increase overall efficiency or quality  
By assigning tasks to the cooperation party that is best suited to fulfill a task the 
efficiency and / or the quality of a process can be improved (e.g. according to the 
 
                                                
 
150 Cf. Tarry (2010), p. 28 
151 Cf. Dennis (2005), p. 183 
152 Auerbach / Delfmann (2005), p. 91 
153 Cf. Verkehrsrundschau (2007), www.verkehrsrundschau.de. During peak hours, London operates at 
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cover several months, the transaction usually does not involve any complex legal 
constructions but is executed according to market standards. 
 
A special type of a highly standardized cooperation is the provision of interlining 
services that are offered under the IATA-prorate regime. This allows travel agents that 
are authorized IATA agents to issue flight tickets that involve flight sectors which are 
operated by several carriers. These airlines do not need to have any close linkage, as 
long as they are both IATA members. The collected revenues are distributed to the 
involved carriers according to a detailed prorate scheme by the IATA clearing house.156  
 
The practice of selling seats on the flight of a cooperating carrier under one’s own flight 
number is referred to as code sharing. Depending on the degree of interlinkage, one-
way code sharing and (parallel) two-way code sharing can be differentiated. While in the 
first case, one airline can sell seats on a particular flight from another ‘operating’ carrier 
where it does not operate (often a complementary feeder flight), in the second case, 
both airlines operate flights on the same route and offer not only their own seats but also 
have the possibility to sell seats from flights of the competing carrier (e.g. Austrian 
Airlines and Air France share codes of all their Vienna – Paris flights).157 Since parallel 
code sharing allows both airlines to offset variances in demand more easily by deviating 
unexpected (excess) demand onto the other carrier’s flight, “airlines that choose […] 
partners serving the same route can both increase their load factors and reduce 
operations costs as a result of risk pooling.”158  
 
Depending on the agreed risk and revenue sharing various commercial models of code-
sharing can be differentiated: In a ‘free sale’ (also referred to as ‘free flow’) agreement, 
the partner airline has the opportunity to resell a certain amount of seats that it 
purchases from the operating carrier at a predetermined rate under its own pricing 
scheme. The demand risk is fully borne by the operating carrier. In a ‘blocked space’ 
agreement, the partner purchases a fixed number of seats from the operating carrier 
that it sells independently from the former. While in case of a ‘hard block’ the partner is 
not entitled to return unused seats, a ‘soft block’ agreement allows the partner to give 
back unsold seats under certain conditions. By entering a blocked space agreement the 
selling party hopes to increase overall sales through the marketing of the buying party, 
 
                                                
 
156 Cf. IATA (2008), p. 1ff; Since passengers prefer online journeys (connections with the same airline) 
higher than interline connections (involving two distinctive airlines), the latter are usually also displayed after 
the former in computer reservation systems (cf. Bailey / Liu (1995), p. 474). To respond to these customer 
preferences and to benefit from the resulting CRS ranking mechanism, many carriers use code sharing as a 
mean to turn interline connections into ‘virtual’ online connections. Furthermore, since airlines prefer 
entering a market on their own or through a partner (e.g. code-share flights) “there is less incentive to offer 
joint interlineable fares. Interline fares are now often more expensive than fares charged for online travel.” 
(Hanlon (2007), p. 192).As a consequence, the importance of classical interlining has drastically declined 
during the last years (cf. Hanlon (1999), p. 134 ff.).  
157 Cf. Conrady / Sterzenbach / Fichert (2009), p. 280; Hanlon (2007), p. 173; Pompl (2006), p. 140  
158 Cf. Chen / Chen (2003), p. 31. Having examined time-series of parallel intercontinental code-sharing 
flights, Chen / Chen found an increase in the load factor as a result of parallel code sharing that was not 
found (to the same extent) in the case of complementary code sharing. A more thorough presentation of the 


































160 Cf. Star Al





















at 57% of 
p mileage 
heir own i
                  


























it from a dr









            
7; Conrady / S
 of Austrian A
For the sake 
, in which air
. While this ty
ardly used in 
 by airline fra
ng and sales 
ys or Contact
), p. 11 















 all global p
 9: Global a
nces can b
















the USA or th
nchising, i.e
tasks (as wel
 Air) that ope






























 were the rou
ss pool agre
cide about sc
ation is still pr
e EU anymor
. the practice 



























ers do not 
ply that th







nd risk in man
 routes for the



























na to Cairo (E
e mentioned
city as well a
 parts of Asia
 (2002), p. 39
isor (e.g. Luf
y cases) for a



























 as another 
s a revenue 
 and the 
), but has to 
thansa) takes
 franchisee 




























discarded in favor of the option where the traveler can collect more miles for his private 
account. Since the accruable miles usually increase in a non-linear way FFP provide 
travelers with a growing incentive to stay within an alliance, thereby making it more 
difficult for other alliances to enter a certain market.162 On the cost side, alliances enable 
airlines to profit from economies of scope due to a joint offer that can be produced at a 
lower cost than it would be the case if two airlines separately offered the same routes at 
the same frequencies. Furthermore, by bundling traffic in alliance hubs, airlines profit 
from economies of scale and density. From a competition viewpoint it can be noted that 
alliances decrease competition on routes that are served by several alliance members, 
while they at the same time increase the competition between alliances.163  
 
Given the multi-faceted advantages of joining an alliance, not being part of an alliance is 
in many cases seen as a competitive disadvantage. It is therefore not surprising that 
almost all European network carriers have joined one of the major alliances during the 
last years.164 
2.3.3 Horizontal airline mergers 
Although airline alliances, due to high entry- and exit costs usually involve a long-term 
commitment of their members, there is a residual risk of carriers exiting the alliance that 
limits the achievable degree of integration. Prominent examples for alliance changes 
include Austrian Airline’s move from the Qualiflyer Group to the Star Alliance in 2000 or 
the recent switch from Skyteam to Star Alliance made by Continental Airlines.165 While 
alliances aim at achieving a strong standardization on the visible aspects of the product 
(e.g. customer service, frequent flyer programs, etc.), in many cases more internal areas 
such as revenue management or network planning are managed individually (cf. Figure 
28 that shows the degree of integration of various types of IT-systems in alliances). 
 
 
                                                
 
162 Cf. Hanlon (2007), p. 86ff 
163 Cf. Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 122ff; Jasvoin (2006), p. 20 
164 Cf. AEA (2009b), files.aea.be; Out of 33 passenger airlines that are members of the Association of 
European Airlines only some smaller carriers (e.g. AeroSvit, Air Malta, Cyprus Airways, Icelandair, Jat 
Airways, Luxair, Olympic Airlines, Ukraine International Airlines) as well as one carrier that has more and 
more evolved into a LCC (Aer Lingus) have so far refrained from joining an alliance. 




Figure 29: Degree of IT-integration of airline alliance members166 
 
This missing integration can to some extent be explained with the high investment costs 
of an IT-platform transfer (and the required staff training), which – although they would 
be outweighed by the synergy gains within the entire alliance – are in many cases too 
large to be justified based on the expected savings of one carrier. Another example 
where the remaining risk of alliance changes prevents airlines to realize joint savings is 
the refusal to weed out redundant operations, i.e. to decide that a certain city is only 
connected through one of several alliance hubs in order to profit from economies of 
scale and density. Due to the high costs of re-starting a formerly abandoned connection 
(which would be necessary in case of changes in the alliance structure) there has been 
reluctance of individual airlines to give up a connection in many cases.167 These 
examples illustrate the need for airlines to establish a common bottom line, e.g. by 
founding a joint venture,168 acquiring shares of the partner airline or by fully buying the 
company), in case they want to reap benefits resulting from a strong integration in the 
area of network planning and yield management. Together with a lift of many regulatory 
restrictions regarding airline ownership (e.g. ‘substantial ownership’ or ‘effective control’ 
clauses in bilateral air transport agreements)169 in the course of the European market 
 
                                                
 
166 Cf. Pandit (2009), p. 7;  
167 Cf. Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 128 
168 Joint ventures that also involve revenue sharing became very common for transatlantic services. The first 
joint-venture that has been granted antitrust immunity was founded by Northwest Airlines and KLM in 1993. 
A more recent example is the joint venture “Atlantic Plus-Plus" that has been founded in 2009 and includes 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, United Airlines and Continental Airlines (cf. Handelsblatt (2009), handelsblatt.com). 
169 Section 5 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement that forms an annex to the Chicago 
convention of 1944 states that “each contracting State reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate 
or permit to an air transport enterprise of another State in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial 
ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a contracting State” (ICAO (1944), p. 3). This so-
called “effective control” or “substantial ownership” clause has been integrated into many bilateral air service 
agreements, thereby preventing airlines to merge in case this would result in a loss of traffic rights that are 
tied to the ‘nationality’ of one of the carriers. However, as the European Union starts to replace individual 
member states in newly negotiated bilateral air service agreements as contracting partner (e.g. in case of 
the ‘open skies’ agreement signed with the USA) and airlines are finding ways to keep national ownership 
up in case of a merger (e.g. by setting up a foundation in the country of the purchased airline) the 
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liberalization, this situation has resulted in a range of mergers and acquisition during the 
last years.  
 
“A merger potentially allows 100% consolidation, while in alliances integration is 
much more limited. In other words, mergers can better achieve the objectives for 
which alliances were formed.”170 
 
Recent examples of significant mergers include the consolidation of Air France and KLM 
into a new holding company Air France-KLM in 2004, the merger of Northwest and Delta 
in 2009 (which led to the extinction of the Northwest brand) and the purchase of Swiss 
Airlines and Austrian Airlines by Lufthansa in 2005 and 2009 respectively. 
 
In a survey among airline executives it was found that 88% expect further market 
consolidation steps in the future.171 Expected consolidation steps include the total 
takeover of Brussels Airlines by Lufthansa (currently Lufthansa holds 45%), the – 
already initiated - merger between British Airways and Iberia, a takeover of the Czech 
Airline CSA by Air France-KLM and the purchase of Scandinavian Air Systems and the 
Polish LOT by Lufthansa.172 As a result of the ongoing and expected market 
consolidation several airline groups see themselves confronted with the operation of 
(partly) overlapping networks, which results in a significant optimization potential in the 
areas of network planning and yield management, which will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
2.4 Network design and scheduling in multi-hub networks 
2.4.1 The basics of network design and scheduling 
Given the long-term implications of a selected network design (for instance due to the 
resulting fleet requirements) this planning step lies at the core of an airline’s strategy. It 
aims at maximizing the profitability of the entire network and comprises three phases: 
• In the network development phase (that usually covers a planning horizon of up 
to five years) an airline evaluates the market potential of various Origin-
Destination pairs (passenger numbers, expected yields, customer preferences, 
competitive situation, etc.), decides which markets it wants to cover and initiates 
the required fleet adaption steps (e.g. order of long-haul aircrafts).  
• In the actual flight schedule planning phase an airline decides about offered 
itineraries,173 departure and arrival times, frequencies, the assigned capacity (i.e. 
the preliminary assignment of an aircraft type) and its pricing approach in 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 
the ownership settlement in the case of the purchase of Austrian Airlines by Lufthansa in 2009, cf. ORF 
Wien (2008), oesterreich.orf.at). 
170 Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 21 
171 Cf. Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 194 
172 Cf. Sobie (2010a), www.flightglobal.com 
173 This also includes the question whether the market potential of a particular O&D and the cost structure of 
the airline justify the establishment of a non-stop link or whether an indirect connection should be offered. In 
the latter case, the geographic position of the hub has to be taken into consideration in order to be able to 
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this outcome, airlines assess the flight plan based on the forecasted revenue of all 
established O&Ds and the involved operational expenses. Once an airline has decided 
for a flight plan, the operational details (e.g. specific aircraft & crew assignment, slot 
organization, revenue management of fares, etc.) are taken care off. 178 
2.4.2 Challenges for network planning in multi-hub airline networks 
As a consequence of alliances and mergers, airline groups are confronted with partly 
overlapping networks. In case a fully integrated airline operates several hubs in 
geographic proximity this results in a duplication of its network. “Network duplication 
may appear when an airline ends up competing with itself across duplicated hubs.”179 As 
a consequence many authors consider closing or downsizing of hubs as the resulting 
necessity of this development.180  
 
The resulting hubbing strategy that allows airlines to reap the benefits of a central traffic 
consolidation by bundling flights at a single hub is designated by Jäggi as a ‘stand-
alone’ strategy.181 However, due to capacity constraints at major hub airports, the extent 
to which airline groups that want to maintain their current traffic volume can reduce the 
extent of network duplication by shifting traffic to one hub is limited.182 To overcome 
these limitations, many airlines have opted for a ‘reliever strategy’, in which two hubs in 
close proximity are selected in order to be able to grow despite capacity limitations at 
the main hub (e.g. Lufthansa with Frankfurt and Munich Airport or British Airways with 
London Heathrow and London Gatwick). 
 
In addition to these strategies that focus on no more than two hubs, Jäggi also presents 
a third option. The ‘ubiquity strategy’ emphasizes the value of a multi-hub network, if the 
demand flow structure of the network in combination with the local competitive situation 
restricts airlines to close down individual routes or hubs in case they want to maintain 
their overall market share. As Jäggi concludes, multi-hubs can be advantageous if they 
allow airlines to shorten the travel time between two spoke airports due to a more direct 
routing via a regional hub in comparison to the routing through a central hub (that often 
involves a considerable detour). To assess, which strategy is meaningful in a particular 
environment, the demand patterns in a network should be analyzed.183 
 
Having examined various network economies, Coyne and Dye have identified three 
common usage patterns that can also be identified in airline networks (cf. Figure 31).  
 
 
                                                
 
178 Cf. Jasvoin (2006), p. 35 
179 Burghouwt 2007, p. 28 
180 Cf. Dennis (2005), p. 183; Burghouwt 2007, p. 28  
181 Cf. Jäggi (2000), p. 235 
182 Cf. Auerbach / Delfmann (2005), p. 91 & Verkehrsrundschau (2007), www.verkehrsrundschau.de. During 
peak hours, London Heathrow airport operates at 99.8% of its capacity (Frankfurt 98.5%). 
183 Cf. Jäggi (2000), p. 267f 
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their network in a way that various O&Ds are always routed via the nearest hubs. By 
minimizing the involved detours, airlines can thereby not only improve the overall travel 
time (which results in a more attractive product to time-sensitive travelers) but can also 
reduce the average sector length. Since smaller stage lengths allow for a shorter Hub 
Repeat Cycle (i.e. the elapsed time between the start of two consecutive waves) this 
allows airlines to increase the number of waves that can be realized at their hubs.187 
2.4.3 Optimized scheduling in multi-hub airline networks 
In the case there is sufficient demand to justify a connection of a spoke city to several 
hubs of an airline group or an alliance, the partners can improve their product offering by 
streamlining their schedules in order to increase the overall number of available 
frequencies or to improve the temporal distribution of available flights to a destination.188  
 
Often, the presence of additional hubs with population catchment areas that differ from 
those of the primary hub is even a prerequisite for adding additional frequencies. While 
there might for instance not be enough local traffic from a small spoke airport to one hub 
in order to justify two daily connections (which would require a certain number of high-
yield passengers that have the hub as the start or the end point of their journey), it might 
be economically reasonable to also offer a connection to a second hub (with a different 
catchment area and therefore also additional high-yield passengers that are willing to 
pay more for the resulting direct flight than transfer passengers that only use the flight 
leg as a part of their connection journey).189  
 
By offering more scheduled departures than a stand-alone airline, an airline group is 
also able to gain higher customer awareness for certain destinations, which finally also 
results in a higher market share of the involved airlines.190  
 
                                                
 
187 Cf. Jäggi (2000), p. 113 & 259 
188 Cf. Iatrou / Oretti (2007), p. 4 
189 This pooling of demand risk across several hubs has for instance been named by Air-France KLM as a 
key factor that buffered the impact of the financial crisis in 2008. “A cornerstone of the profitable growth 
strategy in recent years, the dual hub system between Paris and Amsterdam is currently acting as a shock 
absorber thanks to the diversity of the transfer flows which are not all exposed to the crisis in the same way. 
It also provides an immediate solution for passengers whose direct flights have been suspended.” (Air 
France KLM (2009), p. 16). 
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customer, at the right time, and for the right price.”198 Having the airline industry in mind, 
Gallego and van Ryzin define YM more specifically as “the practice of using booking 
policies together with information system data to increase revenues by intelligently 
matching capacity with demand”.199  
 
The introduction of YM has led to considerable changes in the airline industry. American 
Airlines, which has been one of the first airlines to apply single-leg YM, has been able to 
generate additional revenues of approximately $500 million in the first year after the 
introduction of a more differentiated fare structure.200 In general it is estimated that YM is 
able to raise the revenues of an airline by 4-5% per year. 201 Table 10 shows the 
preconditions which have to be fulfilled in order for Yield Management to be an 
appropriate tool and their characteristics in the airline industry. 
 
Prerequisites for using YM and corresponding airline industry characteristics 
1. Relatively fixed 
capacity 
Although it is possible to adjust capacities in the long run by 
assigning another aircraft for a specific flight, this option is 
only feasible within major constraints in the short-run  
2. Ability to segment 
markets 
Airline customers can be divided into addressable market 
segments (e.g. business and leisure customers) 
3. Perishable inventory 
Seats which are unused at the moment of departure cannot 
be sold anymore and represent spoiled inventory. 
4. Products are sold in 
advance 
It is possible (and usual) to purchase airline tickets prior to 
departure. 
5. Fluctuating demand 
Airlines face peak-hours (e.g. Sunday evening) and strong 
seasonality (e.g. summer season). YM can be used to even 
out demand fluctuations through price stimuli. 
6. Low marginal sales 
costs but high marginal 
capacity change costs 
While it is very costly to change capacity (e.g. by changing 
aircrafts or by using a larger aircraft) the marginal costs of 
transporting an additional passenger in case of ample 
capacities are very limited. 
Table 10: Prerequisites for using YM and corresponding airline industry characteristics202 
 
Yield Management builds upon the concept of price discrimination, originally introduced 
in 1920 by Arthur Pigou, who distinguished between three degrees of discrimination. 
First degree discrimination is given, if a firm charges every customer an individually 
negotiated price which reflects the customer’s willingness to pay. In the case of second 
degree discrimination a firm makes several tariffs available to its customers, which entail 
 
                                                
 
198 Kimes (1989), p. 348 
199 Gallego / van Ryzin (1997), p. 24 
200 Cf. Smith et al. (1992), p. 31 
201 Talluri / van Ryzin (2005), p. 10; the authors initially declare that they treat Yield Management („the 
traditional airline term“) and Revenue Management as synonyms (cf. p. 2). Since this work addresses a 
problem of the airline industry the term Yield Management will be used exclusively in the following. 
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passengers book at short notice and require a high degree of flexibility and comfort. In 
return they show a relatively high willingness to pay (especially if they do not pay the trip 
themselves). On the other hand leisure travelers are willing to make sacrifices regarding 
time of travel or comfort in order to get a cheap ticket. 206 Although this main criterion is 
still valid, recent research argues that this categorization is not detailed enough and that 
there are more segments that can and should be distinguished207 (cf. also chapter 
4.3.1). In order to efficiently skim the available consumer surplus of customers with a 
higher willingness to pay, airlines use so called rate-fences. These barriers result in a 
self-assignment of customers to fare classes that match their booking habits and 
requirements. Rate fences can, for instance by means of an inacceptable advance 
booking period, prevent business customers from selecting a discounted Economy 
Class fare. Overall airlines usually offer up to 26 main booking classes as well as a large 
number of subclasses that often follow a standardized IATA scheme (cf. Table 11).  
 
Fare Code 
designators Cabin class 
Temporal 
availability 















• First Class  
(A, F, P, R),  
• Business Class  
(C, D, I, J, Z) 
• Economy Class  
(B, E, H, K, L, M, 
N, Q, S, T, V, W, 
X, Y) 
• Seasonal  
(e.g. H=High, 
K=shoulder, L=Low)
• Part of week 
(e.g. W=Weekend) 
• Part of day  
(e.g. N=Night) 
E.g. ticket types: 
• AN = Non Refundable 
Advance Purchase  
• FL = restricted to certain 
flight numbers 
• UU = Standby Fare  
E.g. passenger types: 
• IN = Infant 
• ZZ = Youth Fare 
Y = taxes 
included 









(restricted to certain flights) 
Y  
(incl.taxes) 
Table 11: Recommended IATA booking class designation scheme208 
 
Rate fences that distinguish various booking classes consist either of physical (e.g. 
business class seats) or non-physical (e.g. rebooking options) separation mechanisms. 
As shown in. Figure 37, the majority of currently used rate fences can be classified as 
non-physical differences. In this context, the uncertainty regarding the actual routing in 
case of flexible time-range tickets would constitute an additional non-physical rate fence. 
 
 
                                                
 
206 Cf. Shaw (2007), p. 24ff 
207 Cf. Teichert / Shehu / von Wartburg (2008), p. 227f 




Figure 37: Physical and Non-Physical rate fences209 
 
As shown above many (non-physical) rate fences actually deliberately lead to a 
deterioration of the product ‘air travel’, by limiting its availability or the involved flexibility 
in order to make it unattractive to passengers with a high willingness-to-pay. This 
practice, which is by some authors also referred to as ‘damaged goods phenomenon’, 
ensures that the persons who value a seat on a particular flight the most actually can 
obtain it by paying more than others, thereby leading to an efficient distribution of seats. 
Furthermore, by better skimming the consumer surplus of high-yield passengers, airlines 
can also offer seats to customers with a lower willingness-to-pay which in the long run 
benefits all traveler segments, since it allows airlines to reduce the costs per seat (by 
using larger aircrafts) or to increase the offered service frequency.210 
 
                                                
 
209 Adapted from Friesen (2008), p. 98 











Non-physical differences Physical differences 
• Changes / refund possible? 
• Amount of change / refund fees 
• Advance Purchase Fares 
• Place of purchase 
• Temporal / local special offers 
• Min. / maximum stay requirements 
• Saturday night stay requirement 
• Specially priced return-flights 
• Bookings with specified time and 
routing in contrast to unspecified time-
range tickets or standby tickets 
Date / period of consumption 
Degree of transport reliability 
Ticket flexibility 
Date and place of booking 
• Booking class (e.g. business) 
• Seat density and seat comfort 
• Seat position within the plane 




• Discounts for students, children, etc. 
• Corporate discounts 
• Special conditions for members of 
frequent flyers programs 
• Volume-based corporate discounts 
Segment membership 
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Number of Y-Class 
bookings (n-th passenger) 
… 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 … 
Chance of at least this 
many Y-Class passengers 
… 50% 49% 47% 44% 40% 35% 30% … 
Expected marginal revenue  … € 250 € 245 € 235 € 220 € 200 € 175 € 150 … 
Table 12: Expected marginal seat revenue calculation219 
 
While this approach produces valid results in a single-leg situation, it might lead to 
inefficient allocation of seats in a network environment. This is due to the fact that a 
customer request for a connection journey might be disregarded since its EMSR on one 
of the legs is smaller than the expected revenue of a point-to-point traveler on the same 
leg, although the total revenue contribution of the connection passenger might be higher 
(under the assumption that there is ample capacity on all involved flight legs).220 This 
shortcoming led to the development of so-called origin and destination revenue 
management systems (ODRMS) in the early 1990s. In these systems the customer 
value with regard to the entire network is considered.221 Although the move towards an 
ODRMS poses several challenges to the IT-landscape (drastic increase of data 
requirements), most network airlines nowadays use this type of YM since it is able to 
increase revenues by up to 3% in comparison to a single-leg system. To account for the 
overall network contribution of a passenger a threshold price (so called bid price) is 
used, which corresponds to the estimated marginal costs to the network which are 
caused by the consumption of the next incremental seat on a certain flight. If the 
revenue of a multi-leg journey exceeds the sum of the bid prices along the requested 
itinerary, a respective booking request is accepted.222 Bid prices represent the 
opportunity costs of having to deny another request with a higher network yield. They 
are therefore again based on forecasted origin-destination (O-D) demand and also 
consider different fare classes. Since capacity gets scarcer the closer the departure 
date, bid prices usually rise as time elapses, leading to a consecutive closure of low-fare 
booking classes.223 
 
                                                
 
219 Cf. Boyd (2007), p. 47 
220 More specifically, in a two leg itinerary (e.g. A-B, B-C) three cases can be distinguished that require 
different treatment. In case there is sufficient capacity on both legs, a simpler, leg-specific, yield 
management would be sufficient to reach an optimal result. For this reason, many airlines restrict the use of 
ODRMS to flights with an expected load factor of more than 80% (cf. Sterzenbach / Conrady / Fichert 
(2009), p. 376f). If one of the involved flight legs is subject to large demand, ODRMS outperforms leg-based 
YM-approaches by giving priority to a connecting passenger (with a higher overall yield) over a local 
passenger that only flies on the congested segment, even though the leg-based contribution of the latter 
might be higher. If both flights legs are highly demanded an ODRMS would favor local passengers (with a 
higher per-leg contribution) over connecting passengers in order to maximize the total yield. 
221 Cf. Maurer (2006), p. 353 
222 Cf. Talluri / van Ryzin (2005), p. 82. The effective ODRMS improvement number is dependent on the 
network and the demand structure as well as the prevailing load factor (the higher, the better the 
improvement).  
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several tickets for the same day or travelers with flexible ticket that shortly before 
departure rebook).226 
 
To forecast the No-Show rate, airlines primarily use flight specific data (e.g. historic 
booking and No-Show data of previous flights), while newer approaches also 
incorporate passenger specific information to improve the forecast quality. Table 13 
shows Passenger Name Record (PNR) based forecast parameters and their expected 
influence on the no-show rate. 
 
 
                                                
 
226 Cf. Shaw (2007), p. 170 
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Causal factor Possible characteristics Influence 
Passenger 
direction 
outbound / return 
If a passenger has already been a no-show on 
the outbound flight, he or she is most probably 
also not going to be present on the return flight.227 
Fare rules Changeable / refundable 
If a ticket can still be changed or refunded after a 
no-show, the probability of a no-show increases. 
Type of travel 
Domestic / international / 
intercontinental 
Non-Stop / connection 
flight (n-th leg) 
For instance, due to late arrivals of incoming 
feeder flights, the probability for no-show behavior 
on the second leg of a connection flight is higher 




Single person / group 
booking 
Members of a group booking usually show a 
lower probability of becoming a no-show. 
Point of Sale Sales channel, country 
The behavior of people who book via the internet 
is different from those who book via a travel 





Food requests, special 
assistance requests, 
seat reservations 
Passengers who have invested some time in 
configuring their booking are more likely to appear 




Short / long 
Early bookers who purchased very cheap 
discount tickets (that cannot be amended) are 




No status / Frequent 
Flyer 
Frequent Flyers are less likely to act as no-shows 
than people who only fly very seldom. 
Table 13: Passenger Name Record (PNR) based no-show rate forecast parameters228 
 
In an empirical study of PNR-based forecasting Lawrence et al. showed that the 
frequent flier status, the destination, as well as the type of travel (e.g. connection flight) 
had the highest influence on the actual no-show behavior.229 
 
                                                
 
227 Cf. Smith/Tsai (2005), p. 5 ; Lawrence et al. (2003), p. 5; Looking on the first flight segment of return 
flight bookings in the USA, Garrow & Koppelman found that 6% of all bookings resulted in no-shows. This 
number rose to 10% when the second leg (i.e. the return flight) was analyzed. The increased no-show-
probability on return flight is also caused by the practice of “back-to-back ticketing”, i.e. the purchase of two 
complementary return flights with the intention of only using the first segment of each ticket, instead of 
buying a single return ticket. This is reasonable from the customers perspective, if the cost of two discount 
tickets is lower than the price of the return ticket that would correspond to the real demand (e.g. if a 
customer would like to return on the same day). To incorporate this behavior in their forecast processes, 
many airlines have introduced automated data cleaning mechanisms that detect “back-to-back” bookings 
and eliminate the respective return flight reservations. Another issue that leads to higher no-show rate on 
the return flight is the practice of airlines to rebook passengers with changeable tickets onto an earlier flight 
in case they arrive too early at the airport  (cf. Garrow / Koppelman (2004a), p. 402). 
228 Cf. Smith / Tsai (2007), p. 5f; Garrow / Koppelman (2004b), p. 239 
229 Lawrence et al. (2003), p. 5. Since the authors looked on reservations (and not only on issued tickets) 
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In 2007, US-airlines have denied boarding to 686.000 passengers, which corresponds to 
0.12% of all flown passenger segments (one-way flights). Given the considerable extent 
of hubbing which prevails in the USA, one has to bear in mind that this corresponds to a 
higher percentage of affected passengers, though. Of these passengers, 91% have 
voluntarily accepted to be left behind (in exchange for an offered compensation). Only in 
the remaining 9% of cases passengers were denied boarding against their will.231 
According to a report of the European Parliament, in 2005 around 1.1 million 
passengers were denied boarding on flights within or out of the EU, which corresponds 
to a rate of 0.16%.232  
 
If no volunteers are found, usually passengers that have checked in the latest are 
‘bumped’ (because their luggage is often not yet loaded), a procedure which would 
concern especially valuable business travelers who often check-in much later than 
occasional leisure travelers. Since these passengers usually pay higher fares denying 
boarding to these time-sensitive passengers would put future revenues at risk, as they 
might consider other airlines for their upcoming travel arrangements. Therefore to avoid, 
that valuable frequent flyers are affected of this procedure, based on passenger lists 
with customer relationship data, airline agents often do register valuable customers 
proactively even before they arrive at the check-in counter, if a flight appears to be 
heavily overbooked. 
 
To profit from overbooking, airlines have to manage the trade-off between achieving 
additional revenues through higher load factors and the costs of denied boarding (i.e. 
compensation payments as well as the potential long term reputation damage). The 
optimal overbooking rate should therefore be set at the point, where the achievable net 
revenues, i.e. the gross revenues of sold tickets minus the expected overbooking costs, 
are the highest (cf. Figure 41). 
 
 
                                                
 
231 Cf. U.S. Department of Transportation (2008), p. 39 
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presented during the forthcoming chapters are risk pooling (i.e. combining the forecast 
of several flights) as well as a shortening of the forecast horizon (cf. chapter 3.3.2.). 
2.5.3 Temporal peak-load balancing with Yield Management 
In the course of forecasting the total demand for a particular flight based on historical 
data, airlines have to cope with the problem of strong deviations of the demand of 
particular flights in comparison to the average demand on a route. In empirical studies of 
demand time series of individual routes a relative standard deviation of 20% to 40% has 
been found.236 
 
Besides an overall year-to-year growth in European air travel237 airlines are also 
confronted with a strong seasonality in their business. While there are demand peaks 
during the summer months, airlines face demand slumps during the winter (with the 
exception of holidays such as Christmas or Easter). If, for example, all flights to and 
from Vienna are considered, passenger figures in January are 17% below the monthly 
average, while the figures of May exceed the average passenger volume by 12% (cf. 
Figure 42). To complicate things further, there are also differences on the route level. 
While touristic routes (e.g. Vienna-Antalya) are subject to heavy demand in the main 
holiday season, other routes that are mostly flown by business or connecting 
passengers (e.g. Vienna – Ljubljana) experience an inverse development (with August 
actually being the second weakest month). Smaller deviations can be found on routes 
that combine leisure and business travel, such as Vienna – London. Besides the 
underlying demand, the reported passenger figures are of course also influenced by the 
available capacity, which depends on the offered frequencies and the utilized aircrafts, 
as well as the chosen pricing strategy. In case an airline decides to maintain the offered 
capacity upright during the winter and to use discounted tickets to fill its seats, it can 
even out major demand differences at the expense of the average yield per seat 
(compare for instance the almost constant demand numbers on the Route Vienna – 
London Luton, which has been exclusively served by the LCC Easyjet, in contrast to the 
more fluctuating demand on the competing network carrier flights to London Heathrow). 
 
                                                
 
236 Cf. Belobaba (2006), ocw.mit.edu 
237 From 2006 to 2007, for instance, the amount of passengers flown within, from or to the European Union 




Figure 42: Differences in monthly passenger figures on various routes238 
 
Besides these monthly differences there are also strong differences in the demand for 
flights depending on the weekday. As shown in Figure 43, Passengers that travel for 
business purposes usually fly during the week with a peak on Friday, where 19% of all 
flights take place. On these days, there is strong preference for morning and evening 
flights. Leisure travelers also fly on the weekend, again with a peak on Friday afternoon 
and another one on Sunday evening. To match these demand differences, many airlines 
reduce their frequencies to typical business destinations during the weekend and 
employ the respective aircrafts on touristic routes instead (e.g. by operating charter 
flights on Saturday). 
 
 
                                                
 







Deviation of monthly passenger figures from average 
monthly volume












Figure 43: Distribution of passenger demand onto weekdays239 
 
If several flights to one destination are offered per day, these are usually subject to 
strong intra-day differences in demand. Besides the differences that result from the 
wave structure of an airline (e.g. more passengers fly on feeder flight in case of large 
inter-continental flights in a particular wave), there are also strong differences in the 
demand for various departure times by business travelers. In order to be able to attend 
business meetings throughout the day, business travelers show strong preferences for 
early morning flights. If the destination allows a return on the same day and the airline 
offers at least a so-called “double daily” service, a second peak can be observed on 
evening flights.240 Table 15 shows the availability of various fare classes on a set of 
seven flights offered by Austrian Airlines and its partner Brussels Airlines from Vienna to 
Brussels on a weekday. As indicated in red, there are fewer seats available on the 
morning and the evening flights then on the remaining mid-day flights. 
 
 
                                                
 
239 Cf. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, cited in: Jasvoin (2005), p. 11 
240 Cf. Garrow / Jones / Parker (2007), p. 283. In this paper, the ‘ideal departure times’ for domestic US 











Flight times  
and capacity 
Class Economy Business Cheapest 
available 
fare 
Type Discounted (D.) Full (F.) D. F. 
Departure Arrival Seats Fare O E L V Q H T K M B S W Y D J C





0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 4 6 6 € 202  
7:05 8:50 159 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 9 0 0 9 5 5 8 € 202  
9:55 1:45 164 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 4 6 8 € 103  
13:50 15:35 100 0 9 9 9 9 9 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 7 € 77  
17:30 19:15 159 0 1 1 7 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 9 9 8 7 9 € 92  
18:20 20:15 97 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 4 4 4 € 127  
20:35 22:30 164 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 6 8 8 € 92  
Table 15: Availability of fare classes on various flights of one day241 
 
In the described volatile demand environment, Yield Management also serves as a tool 
to balance demand across several flights by giving price incentives. In the case of the 
variations on the flights from Vienna to Brussels, for instance, the less attractive 
afternoon flights (e.g. 13:50 => 15:35) are available for almost one third of the price of 
the heavily demanded morning flights. By decreasing prices for low-demand flights, 
some passengers are shifted away from peak-load flights (cf. the application of peak 
load balancing in case of weekly variations shown in Figure 44). 
 
 
                                                
 
241 Cf. Own analysis based on the fares quoted on the booking website of Austrian Airlines on 11.04.2010 
(i.e. two weeks prior to departure on 27.04.2010). Availability for various booking classes based on 
SeatCounter (2010), www.seatcounter.com (since airlines do not disclose the exact fare availability 
numbers beyond the last nine seats, the numbers constitute the minimum amount of available seats in each 




Figure 44: Peak-load balancing with yield management242 
2.5.4 Pricing of different itineraries of one O&D 
The fact that one the one hand, both, LCC and network carriers nowadays in many 
cases offer several different itineraries on a particular O&D within a certain time frame, 
and that on the other hand due to the widespread distribution of the internet potential 
customers can easily compare the fares of the offered flight alternatives, challenges the 
appropriateness of the assumption of most classical one-leg YM models, namely that 
the demand for a certain fare class of a particular flight is exogenous and independent 
from the demand for other classes or other flights. In order to better predict the 
phenomenon which Belobaba called ‘horizontal shift’, i.e. the booking of a seat in the 
same booking class on a different flight of the same airline due to the unavailability of 
the originally requested seat,243 recent YM concepts also aim at incorporating customer 
choice models: These models allow them to assume which flight alternative a customer 
would most likely choose, based on the offered prices of all flights at each of the 
considered time points of the selling horizon.244  
 
If different routing alternatives (e.g. direct flight, connection flight through hub A or 
connection flight through hub B) are available, yield management aims at increasing the 
overall profit by pricing the separate options differently, based on the expected demand 
and the marginal costs of the prevailing alternatives. One of the first authors to 
incorporate routing alternatives in a YM model has been Talluri. In his ‘Route-Set model’ 
(that he first presented as a working paper for USAir in 1993) he assumes that a fraction 
 
                                                
 
242 Own illustration 
243 Cf. Belobaba (1989), p. 190 
244 Cf. Zhang / Cooper (2005), p. 415f; Cf. Carrier (2007), p. 47ff, In modern YM systems such as PROS‘ 
O&D Solution tool, the demand for various flight itineraries and fares (also referred to ‘Origin-Destination 
















of the customers is indifferent with regard to the route they take in order to get to their 
destination as long as the travel times and the quality are (almost) the same. He 
concludes that “large airlines with multiple hubs and alternative routes” can use the 
Route-Set model to reach “significant revenue enhancements, with almost no 
deterioration in the level of service, and a manageable increase in computational 
costs.”245 This revenue gain is attained since simultaneously managed multiple routings 
allow airlines to use price differentiation as a mean to deviate passengers onto flights 
with a relatively low load factor.  
 
Taking the idea of routing control one step further, Gallego and Philipps presented a YM 
model that allows airlines to offer an unspecified ‘flexible product’ besides the existing 
set of specific products. As already mentioned in the introduction and further elaborated 
in chapter 4, flexible (sometimes also called ‘opaque’) products do not provide the 
customer with all product details (e.g. routing itinerary) at the time of purchase, which 
allows the airline to flexibly shift demand to low-demand itineraries at a later point in time 
(where more precise demand forecasts are available).246 Later works on this topic 
already mention that one way to make the incurred uncertainty more tangible to the 
consumer is “controlling […] the departure time windows for flights”247, an idea which 
serves as the basis for the proposed conditions of flexible time-range tickets (cf. chapter 
4.4). 
2.5.5 Challenges for Network Carrier Yield Management 
Given the relatively long tradition of using RM in the airline industry, ”customers seem to 
be used to the fact that they are charged different fares for the same flight and that they 
will receive specific benefits if they accept certain restrictions.” 248 However, due to the 
increased fare differentiation measures that were made possible by more advanced IT-
systems, many airlines have increased the usage of price discrimination during the last 
years to an extent that was in many cases no longer accepted by passengers who 
considered it unfair that the passenger sitting next to them only paid a fraction of their 
fare price. 
 
“Some efforts to take advantage of varying demand elasticities between market 
segments are also justified […]. However, it is now clear that in the past, Legacy 
carriers have taken these measures too far.”249  
 
Therefore, to some extent the popularity and the increase in market shares of LCC in 
comparison to network carrier can be attributed to their use of restriction-free pricing 
 
                                                
 
245 Talluri (2001), p. 102; Cf. also Müller-Bungart (2007), p. 117 
246 Cf. Gallego / Philipps (2004), p. 321ff 
247 Jiang (2007), p. 131 
248 Kimes (2002), p. 21 
249 Shaw (2007), p. 193. This discomfort of passengers is also described by Kimes (2002, p.21): “A 
customer who pays more for a similar service and cannot perceive a difference in the service may view the 
situation as unfair. If customers view yield management as unfair, the increased revenues resulting from 
yield management may be short-term.” 
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(RFP) schemes, which allow travelers to book and combine one-way flights without 
being restricted by rate fences.  
 
To stay competitive against the restriction-free pricing (RFP) models of LCC many NC 
have selectively relaxed their rate fences by offering more discount tickets on routes 
where they face intense price competition. An example for this behavior can be seen 
with regard to the offering of so-called “Red Tickets” (discount fares) on selected direct 
flight routes from Austrian Airlines (cf. Table 16). Besides the differences in the fare level 
as such, there is also a strong dependence between the intensity of competition and the 





(from Vienna to) 
Total number 
of daily flights  
(carriers) 
Offered fare  
(Economy Class return fare incl. all 















105min travel time 
1 
(OS) 
No Red Tickets available; Cheapest fare 590,63 € 
Restrictions: min. stay: 6 nights or Saturday night 
Barcelona (ES) 
150min travel time 
3 
(OS, NE) 
Red Tickets available; Cheapest fare: 151,34 € 
Restrictions: min. stay: 2 nights or Saturday night; 
Bucharest (RO) 
105min travel time 
7 
(OS, RO, NE) 
Red Tickets available; Cheapest fare: 98,13 € 
Restrictions: min. stay: 1 night 
Berlin (DE) 
70min travel time 
12 
(OS, LH, AB) 
Red Tickets available; Cheapest fare: 98,29 € 
Restrictions: NO min stay rule applicable! 
Table 16: Intensity of competition and the availability of discount fares250 
 
In markets with a higher penetration of LCC (e.g. USA, UK or Ireland), many airlines 
were even forced to go further in their reactions to the pricing strategies of new-entrants 
and started to adopt RFP on some routes.  
 
“In markets where simplified fares become commonplace, other carriers must 
follow this direction in order to remain competitive.”251  
 
As a result three different pricing strategies can currently be observed on the market: 
• Pure RFP as applied by LCC as well as hybrid airlines (e.g. Air Berlin) and some 
network carriers (e.g. British Midland, Air Baltic or Air Lingus).  
 
                                                
 
250 Own analysis based on the fares quoted on the website of Austrian Airlines on 07.12.2008 (i.e. two 
months prior to departure). Departure date: 10.02.2009, return date:  18.02.2009. OS = Austrian Airlines; 
NE = Sky Europe; RO = Tarom Romanian; LH = Lufthansa; AB = Air Berlin.  
251 Ratliff / Vinod (2005), p. 304f. This transition often becomes necessary because traditional yield 
management techniques no longer work properly in addressing the high-yield segment and the airlines see 
themselves confronted with selling the majority of their seats in discount fare classes. As the responsible 
yield manager at the airline British Midland puts it, “the objective of the change was to help halt the decline 
in traffic, stimulate new volume and steal market share from other carriers. In addition, it was hoped that the 
new fares structure would reduce the polarisation of class mix from 70 percent in the bottom three classes 






• Selective use of RFP and classical rate fences. Examples include the former 
European flag carriers British Airways or SAS as well as many US network 
carriers, which sell their short-haul seat inventory on a RFP-basis while still 
maintaining some rate fences on long-haul flights.  
• Classical revenue management of return flights is still used by the majority of 
network carriers. However, as shown above, the use of rate fences is often 
strongly diminished on routes where NC face competition by LCC. 
 
This typology is likely to permanently change in the future towards a less restrictive 
pricing scheme. “At this point, it seems unlikely that the FSNCs [Full-Service Network 
Carriers] can re-impose the degree of price discrimination they once enjoyed.“252 While 
this gives more freedom for consumers that appreciate the possibility to join flights from 
different carriers in order to build their ideal round-trip, it impedes airlines in segmenting 
the market by means of traditional rate fences (e.g. Saturday night rule, minimum or 
maximum stay requirements, etc). The lack of these fencing mechanisms would for 
instance allow a business traveler, who requires a flight that returns on the same day, to 
purchase the same outbound fare as a leisure traveler, who spends the weekend at the 
destination, as long as they both book at the same time. As a result, it is likely to 
assume that the move to RFP-schemes is not going to stop but rather to speed up the 
decline of yields, which has triggered the development of new YM-methods. In a RFP-
environment, the main questions to solve are, how large the available booking class 
should be and when it should be closed (either after a specified amount of bookings or a 
certain number of days prior to departure).253  
 
RFP also has an impact on the demand forecast models that form the basis of YM since 
it “led to a violation of the assumption of independence of demand between fare classes, 
which is implicit in most commonly used forecast systems.”254 Newer approaches 
therefore aim at extending the data sources that are used in the forecasting process to 
actual booking requests, which can be seen as a representation of the overall market 
demand. By comparing the conversion rate of a particular flight (i.e. actual bookings 
relative to the number of booking requests) to average conversion rates of similar flights 
an airline can also determine whether the offered fare for a specific flight is too low or 
too high (which would be the case if an unusually low conversion rate is observed).255 
 
                                                
 
252 Tretheway (2004), p. 8 
253 Cf. Donelly / James / Binnion (2004), p. 11 
254 Zeni (2007), p. 312. While in the classical YM system, a traveler with certain date and time requirements 
(e.g. return flight on the same day) was forced to buy a corresponding tariff class, irrespective of the 
demand in other fare classes, in a RFP-scheme where fare classes are consecutively filled up (starting with 
the cheapest) the accuracy of the forecast for the most expensive fare class depends on the forecast quality 
of all underlying classes. If airlines that extensively use low fares as a marketing tool do not adjust their 
forecasting models (that are usually based on historical data) they might even be subject to the so-called 
‘spiral-down effect’. This effect occurs, if customers that would have been ready to buy high fare classes (if 
necessary) switch to low fares, which then results in an underestimation of high-yield demand in the next 
period (based on historical data). If this leads to an adjustment of the offer of low-fare seats, the spiral-down 
effect amplifies further, since even more travelers with a high willingness-to-pay are then able to purchase 
low-fare tickets. 
255 Cf. Zeni (2007), p. 314 
84 
 
Other levers for revenue improvement are more accurate overbooking policies which 
can be realized based on the fact that RFP leads to a lower No-Show rate (for instance, 
by not incentivizing customers to buy a return ticket in order to get a cheaper fare, if they 
only need an outbound flight) that allows to improve the forecast quality.256 However, 
“even with advanced Revenue Management methods, it may not be possible to 
completely overcome the significant yield losses associated with a move from restricted 
to unrestricted fares.“257 
 
In order to be able to maintain their revenue situation in the new RFP environment, 
network carriers are looking for new approaches to target the low-cost segment without 
risking a cannibalization of high-yield revenues, or as Garrow puts it in a review of 
current changes in the YM landscape: “Conceptually, the fundamental question of 
interest is to determine whether it is possible to stimulate new leisure demand by 
designing a product for highly time-flexible travelers that is sold via the Internet.”258 In 
this environment, flexible time range tickets are one possible solution to address the 
yield management challenge currently faced by network carriers, which, after a 
theoretical overview of risk handling strategies in the following chapter, is presented in 
chapter 4. 
 
                                                
 
256 Cf. Donelly / James / Binnion (2004), p. 16 
257 Ratliff / Vinod (2005), p. 304f 
258 Garrow (2009), p. 252 
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3 Decision making under risk and uncertainty 
In a normal purchasing situation, a consumer evaluates the ascribed utility of the desired 
product with the quoted price – if the monetary value exceeds the price the product will 
be purchased. In many cases though, the attainable utility cannot be fully assessed at 
the moment of purchase, which forces the consumer to make assumptions about the 
expected utility. Flexible products are a special case, where consumers are by definition 
of the product forced to make a purchase decision under uncertainty, since it is not 
clear, to which of the available product alternatives they will ultimately be assigned. 
Therefore in order to be able to better understand the behavior of consumers when 
confronted with uncertain outcomes, the purpose of the following chapter is to provide 
an overview of existing theories of the decision making process under risk and 
uncertainty. After a short clarification of relevant terms, first the issue of consumer 
decisions and second the subject of corporate risk management will be addressed. 
3.1 Basic terminology 
According to Webster’s Dictionary, the term ‘uncertain’ designates something that is “not 
certain to occur”, with certain being defined as something “fixed” or “known”.259 By some 
scholars the term has further been divided into knowledge and choice uncertainty, with 
the first describing a lack of information about available alternatives, while the latter 
refers to situation where a person is uncertain about which alternative to choose.260  
 
The term ‘risk’ originates from the Italian and means ‘to hazard something’. It is used to 
describe the possibility of deviations from an expected, but uncertain, outcome. 
Interestingly though, usually only negative deviations are defined as risk.261  
 
An early attempt to clearly distinguish uncertainty and risk has been made by Knight in 
his monograph “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit”.  
 
“The essential fact is that ‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of 
measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; 
[…] It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall use 
the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable (sic!) one that it is not in effect 
an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term ‘uncertainty’ to cases of 
the non-quantitative type.“262 
 
As this definition builds upon the measurability of an uncertainty – or put differently, 
upon its probability of occurrence – Knight also proposes a distinction of three kinds of 
probabilities: 
 
                                                
 
259 Merriam-Webster’s (1994) 
260 Cf. Urbany/Dickson/Wilkie (1989), p. 208 ff. 
261 Cf. Wolke (2008), p. 1. or Mugler (1979), S.45ff.  
262 Knight (1933), p. 19f 
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• A priori probabilities can be logically derived (e.g. there is a 50% chance that a 
thrown coin lands on one specific side)  
• Empirical probabilities can be measured ex-post (e.g. the average probability of 
rainfall in a certain area in a specific year) 
• Estimates are given without any valid empirical or logical basis and rely on 
judgments of the individual.263 
 
As Knight indicates with the term ‘empirical probabilities’, risk can be considered 
differently, depending on whether a single event or a series of events is looked at.  
 
“The fact is that while a single situation involving a known risk may be regarded as 
‘uncertain’ this uncertainty is easily converted into effective certainty; for in a 
considerable number of such cases the results become predictable in accordance 
with the laws of chance, and the error in such prediction approaches zero as the 
number of cases is increased. Hence it is simply a matter of an elementary 
development of business organization to combine a sufficient number of cases to 
reduce the uncertainty to any desired limits. This is, of course, what is 
accomplished by the institution of insurance.”264 
 
This already indicates a fundamental information difference regarding uncertainty 
between consumers and corporations. While consumers – unless they are more often 
confronted with comparable situations of uncertainty or have access to statistical data 
about the probability of occurrence – have to rely on individual judgments, corporations 
can in many cases of alleged uncertainty build upon their own experiences from 
previous cases in order to empirically judge the probability of occurrence. This allows 
the latter to manage risk more actively than consumers can do. 
 
Other approaches towards a classification of uncertainty build upon the type of 
reasonably imaginable outcomes. While still accepting uncertainty, such a classification 
allows an economic agent to select appropriate simulation techniques in order to 
properly assess an incurred uncertainty. According to the possible futures, Courtney for 
instance distinguishes between a single view of the future, several possible alternatives, 
a range of outcomes or true uncertainty where no alternative can be excluded (cf. Figure 
45).265 
 
                                                
 
263 Cf. Knight (1933), p. 224f 
264 Knight (1933), p. 46 
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accept the presence of preferences, the ability of the consumer to (selectively) recall 
prices and the possibility that a decision making process spans over a long time, 
involving several phases (instead of an instantaneous reaction).273 
 
Two scholars that used hypothetical choice experiments to challenge the classical utilty 
maximizing principle were Kahnemann & Tversky. In several experiments they have 
asked a large number of students to decide between a safe win of a certain value x and 
a risky prospect with a higher expected value y (e.g. 50% chance to win an amount that 
is more than twice as high than x). They found that instead of a rational selection of the 
higher expected value y, most respondents decided in favor of the safe prospect x, 
thereby showing risk averse behavior.274 Other experiments have confirmed that when 
confronted with a 50%-50% chance of losing or gaining money, most respondents reject 
the offer, as long as they cannot win at least twice the amount that they might lose.275 
 
Based on these findings, Tversky and Kahneman developed the prospect theory to 
explain customer behavior in a situation of uncertainty. They assume that customers 
compare expected utility gains or losses of a new alternative in comparison to the status 
quo that defines the reference level for all considered product attributes. Through 
several experiments they demonstrate that people tend to overweight certain outcomes 
relative to outcomes which are only highly probable, a phenomenon which they call 
“certainty effect”.276  
 
“Many decision problems take the form of a choice between retaining the status 
quo and accepting an alternative to it […]. The advantages of alternative options 
will then be evaluated as gains and their disadvantages as losses. Because losses 
loom larger than gains, the decision maker will be biased in favor of retaining the 
status quo.”277 
 
These assumptions result in a concave curve for gains and convex curve for losses 
which originate at the reference point.  
 
 
                                                
 
273 Cf. Simon (1957), p. 198ff; Pohl (2004), p. 74 
274 Cf. Kahneman/Tversky (1979), p. 263f 
275 Cf. Shermer (2007), p. 40 ff. 
276 Cf. Kahneman / Tversky (2000), p. 20 




Figure 47: Schematic value function based on the prospect theory278 
 
Based on the prospect theory therefore, in order to be accepted by an individual 
customer, the price discount of flexible time-range tickets has to be valued higher than 
the fact that exact travel details are unknown at the moment of purchase.  
3.2.3 Risk management of consumers 
As pointed out above, people tend to act risk averse. In a confrontation with a risky 
situation, consumers will make assumptions about the probability of occurrence and the 
potential damage in order to decide whether they will pursue or stop an activity. When 
looked at more specifically, one can therefore on the one hand distinguish the case 
where a risk is tolerated, i.e. the expected gains make it worth to put risk reducing 
measures in place in order to be able to pursue an activity, while on the other hand there 




                                                
 
278 Adapted from  Kahneman / Tversky (1979), p. 279 
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(e.g. emotions, motivations and attitudes) or cognitive ones (e.g. perception, learning, 
decision-making, remembering).284 
 
The role and the weight of the various components differ according to the type of a 
purchase decision. In contrast to simple, repeated or impulsive purchases, more 
complex products (such as an airline ticket) require an extensive decision process which 
mostly relies on cognitive components.285 In a complex purchasing decision, a consumer 
will be confronted with a perceived risk to choose the wrong alternative. As already 
pointed out above, this risk can be conceptualized by a consumer by evaluating the 
potential damage resulting from the selection of the wrong alternative and the probability 
that this damage actually occurs. Potential damage could be of financial (e.g. too high 
price), functional (fear that the purchased good does not serve the expected purpose), 
psychological or social (lack of appreciation by others) nature.286  
 
The larger the perceived risk, the more willing is a consumer to search for additional 
information. Since this results in additional costs for the consumer (time costs) 
companies should aim at providing their potential customers with the relevant 
information as simply as possible. Relevant information sources are among others sales 
materials (e.g. company website) and conversations, advice from friends, 
advertisements and independent information sources such as magazines or internet 
sources.287  
 
If even through an extended information search, the perceived risk cannot be lowered 
below an individual tolerance limit, consumers will apply risk reduction techniques. 
These can either aim at reducing the feared negative consequences or at abolishing the 
suffered insecurity. Possible measures would be the purchase of (smaller) sample 
packages prior to purchasing a large amount, the selection of a product that is certified 
by a third party (e.g. in Germany the TÜV-seal of quality), the purchase of a known 
brand product or even the selection of the most expensive available alternative. 
Companies can furthermore decrease perceived risk by offering guarantees or return 
rights to their customers.288 
 
In case that the consumption of a product takes place at a later point than the purchase 
(as it is usually the case with airline tickets), a consumer might even suffer of cognitive 
dissonance, after a purchase. In this case he or she questions the purchase of the 
selected alternative, which might ultimately result in a cancellation of the purchase. 
Therefore, especially in situations with a high perceived risk, companies should aim at a 
reduction of customer uncertainty also after the purchase (e.g. by assuring customers 
that they have selected a great product).289 
 
                                                
 
284 Cf. Kroeber-Riel / Weinberg (1996), p. 49 
285 Cf. Kroeber-Riel / Weinberg (1996), p.359 
286 Cf. Kroeber-Riel / Weinberg (2003), p. 395 ff. 
287 Cf. Kroeber-Riel / Weinberg (1996), p. 295 
288 Cf. Bänsch (1996), p. 77; Kroeber-Riel / Weinberg, p. 400 
289 Cf. Kroeber-Riel / Weinberg (1996), p. 184ff 
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3.3 Corporate risk management  
3.3.1 Introduction to risk management  
Since companies regularly have to take decisions which affect their future, they are also 
confronted with risk and uncertainty. However, as they are able to spread their risk over 
several cases (which based on the law of large numbers makes it easier to quantify it) or 
can invest more time into forecasting the future, they can in many cases determine the 
probability of occurrence better than consumers. Therefore, in the following chapter the 
focus will be laid on situations of risk (in contrast to decisions under true uncertainty)  
 
Risk management is a process that supports companies in evaluating anticipated 
revenues with associated risks in order to enhance the decision making process. By 
clarifying the components and the complexity of certain risks it provides companies with 
a viable basis to handle risks more effectively.290 Figure 49 illustrates the main steps of 
the risk management process. 
 
 
Figure 49: Risk management process291 
 
As shown above risk management consists of four successive, but interlinked phases: 
1. Risk identification consists of the systematic registration of risks, their potential 
damage as well as possible interdependencies.  
2. Risk assessment includes the evaluation of the detected risks by assessing their 
probability of occurrence as well as their potential effects.  
3. Risk handling designates all actions taken by a company to optimize their risk 
exposure. The goal of this step is not to eliminate risks but rather to reduce the 
degree of risk exposure to an acceptable residual risk level. As described below 
 
                                                
 
290 Cf. Gleißner (2008), p. V 
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3.3.2 Forecasting as a basis for managing operational risks 
Several processes in the airline industry are heavily depending on a good forecast of 
passenger demand.295 While on a strategic level, network planning builds upon 
projected Origin-Destination demand for various fare classes, on a tactical and 
operational level Yield Management requires as accurate as possible forecasts to 
allocate capacity units (seats) to arriving booking requests in order to maximize the 
overall revenue. In the following, the main applied forecast methods to cope with 
demand uncertainty will be presented. In most cases a combination of quantitative 
(mostly naïve) and qualitative forecast methods are employed. 
 
“The term naïve may be applied to any forecast obtained solely from historical 
values of the variables to be forecasted.”296 
 
Therefore the simplest available “forecast” method would be an unchanged projection of 
the last observation of a variable for future points in time. More complex methods do not 
only rely on a single observation in the past but do take several data points into 
consideration, e.g. by building a moving average of past observation values. Further 
advanced time-series analysis methods do also consider trends and seasonality by 
incorporating adjustment factors (see example below). Due to the fact that they are 
building upon several (additive or multiplicative) components, they are referred to as 
component models. An additive component is used if a trend is rather constant in 
absolute numbers (e.g. the number of worldwide airline passengers grows by an 
additional 100 Mio. passengers each year), while a multiplicative component can be 
used to accommodate the fact that certain periods always show a different level in 
proportion to a changing absolute base number (e.g. an airline always transports 1,4x as 
many passengers in July than in an average month).297  
 
ݔොt+i = (at + i*bt) * s 
 
with: ݔොt+i = forecasted value at = base value (e.g. last observation) 
i = forecasted periods  bt = absolute trend adjustment factor s = multiplicative seasonality 
 
If there is an influence of several independent (exogenous) variables onto the 
dependent (endogenous) variable, a multivariate forecast model should be used. To 
obtain valid results, the variables entering a model should have a logical, i.e. causal 
relationship to the forecasted variable (e.g. the presence of state holidays is assumed to 
positively influence the demand for flights on these days). In order to be able to forecast 
future values of the dependant variable, the input variables should either be already 
available at an earlier point of time (e.g. holidays are usually known several months or 
even years ahead) or at least be easier to estimate than the target values. The most 
prominently used multivariate forecasting method is linear regression analysis, which 
 
                                                
 
295 Cf. Doganis (2002), p. 208: “Forecasting is the most critical area of airline management” 
296 Chrisholm / Whitakter (1971), p. 8 
297 Cf. Winters (1960), p. 327ff; Hansmann (1983), p. 47f; Schlittgen / Streitberg (1984), p. 9 
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assumes a linear function between the weighted input factors and the predicted variable 
(see example below).298  
 
xt= a0 + b1y1t + b2y2t + . . . + bnynt + et 
 
with: xt = value of dependent variable at time t a0 = (any) constant term  
b1, b2, bn = parameters y1, y2, yn = independent variables et = error term 
 
By comparing the correlation between the predicted and the actual value (usually 
denominated by the coefficient of determination, r2) the goodness of fit of the model can 
be calculated, telling the researcher how much of the variance of the dependent variable 
is explained by the independent variables. The initial calibration of the model is done via 
a trial of several weight parameters with the aim of minimizing the sum of squared error 
terms of the entire regression function (method of least squares).299 
 
To assess the quality of a forecast (or the forecast error) a range of metrics can be 
used, of which two widely used ones, the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) and the Mean 
Squared Deviation (MSD), will be presented in the following. While in both cases the 
deviations between estimator and actual value are scrutinized, with the latter more 
weight is given to large deviations (since the residuals are squared, large errors receive 
proportionally more attention than small ones). To present the forecast error as a 
relative measure, the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) can be used.300 
 
MAD = ଵ் ∗  ∑ | ݔ௧ − ݔො௧|௧்ୀଵ  MSD = 
ଵ
் ∗ ∑ ( ݔ௧ − ݔො௧)ଶ௧்ୀଵ  
MAPE = ଵ் ∗ ∑ |
௫೟ି௫ො೟
௫೟ |௧்ୀଵ  
 
with: ݔොt = forecasted value (estimator) xt = actually observed value 
 T = total number of forecasted periods t=1 = first forecasted period 
 
High forecast accuracy is of great importance for airline revenue management. Having 
examined data from several high-demand flights of US airlines, Lee reports an increase 
of 0,5% - 3% in average revenues for every 10% increase in forecast accuracy.301 These 
findings were also confirmed in a simulation study by Belobaba and Weatherford. 
 
“The greatest impacts were observed when the fare class demand forecasts 
proved to be inaccurate. Demand forecasting errors of 25% for each fare class, 
not an outrageous magnitude in yield management practice where the demand for 
 
                                                
 
298 Cf. Hansmann (1983), p. 126ff; Chrisholm / Whitakter (1971), p97 
299 Cf. Schlittgen / Streitberg (1984), p. 16 
300 Cf. Hansmann (1983), p. 15 
301 Cf. Lee (1990), p. 255 
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a single fare class can be of the order of 10-20 passengers, were simulated to 
have negative revenue impacts of 1-2% or more on the highest demand flights.”302 
 
Two factors which have a strong influence on the forecast error are the forecasted time 
span as well as the spatial and temporal aggregation level of the forecast. In a survey 
among 160 managers from the US that were responsible for demand forecasts, Cox & 
Mentzer found a strong correlation between forecast horizon, aggregation level and 
forecast error. This has also been confirmed by Fildes and Beard who conducted 
several case studies with British manufacturing companies (cf. Table 17). Although with 
higher MAPE-error figures, results following the same logic were also obtained in 
studies dealing with the airline303 or the hotel industry.304 
 
Mean absolute percent errors of forecast 
 forecast period 
Aggregation level < three months < two years > two years 
Product group 10% (10%) 15% (10%) 20% (15%) 
Product line 11% (12%) 16% (12%) 20% (19%) 
Product 16% (16%) 21% (20%) 26% (27%) 
Values from a survey of US companies (Cox / Mentzer), values in brackets from a British study (Beard / Fildes). 
Table 17: Influence of aggregation level & forecast period on forecast error305 
 
If companies require a forecast for individual items as well as item groups, often a 
hierarchical forecasting process is used. Within such processes, two distinct approaches 
can be distinguished, namely the bottom-up as well as the top-down approach. 
• In the bottom-up process, the demand for individual segments (e.g. specific 
Stock-Keeping Unit, a single day or a single sales entity) is forecasted and later 
on aggregated to a cumulative forecast of the demand for the superordinate 
entity. 
• If the demand of forecasted products follows similar patterns, in order to reduce 
the time and the costs involved with individual forecasting, companies can apply 
a top-down approach. In this case aggregate demand is predicted and later on 
disaggregated on the basis of historical segment proportions to produce a so-
called derived forecast for each segment.306 
 
Based on these fundamental characteristics of forecasts several risk reduction 
strategies (e.g. postponement) have been built up which will be presented in the next 
section. Furthermore these characteristics also form the basis for the cost reduction and 
 
                                                
 
302 Belobaba / Weatherford (2002), p. 820 
303 Cf. Sa (1987), p. 81 
304 Cf. Kimes (1999), p. 1106f. Having examined the group arrival forecast accuracy of hotels, Kimes found 
that “the MAPE averaged 40% at two months before arrival, dropped to about 30% at one month before 
arrival, and decreased to 10-15% on the day of arrival.” 
305 Cf. Cox / Mentzer (1984), p. 33; Beard / Fildes (1992), p. 9 
306 Cf. Caniato et al. (2005), p. 480 
98 
 
demand induction potentials that come along with the use of flexible tickets in the airline 
industry, which will be presented in more detail in chapter 4. 
3.3.3 Presentation of selected demand risk reduction strategies 
Due to its intangible nature, passenger air transport clearly qualifies as a service. 
However, with regard to another quality, which is often attributed to services, namely the 
inability to store a service, the picture is not that clear cut. Traditionally, taking a narrow 
perspective, transport is considered as a non-storable product. 
 
“Transport services are […] perishable. In other words they cannot be stored.”307 
 
While this might hold true for the actual transportation process as such, there is more 
flexibility regarding the possibility to store transport objects (i.e. goods, passengers or 
news). With the exception of express goods it is normally unproblematic to store 
transport goods if this allows for a more efficient transportation. Within limits the same 
can be said of passengers, who are often willing to accept waiting times in return for a 
cheaper fare.308 Since the concept of flexible time-range tickets also builds upon this 
option to temporarily “store” customer demand, in the following section the main 
functions and benefits of storage (inventory management) as well as the strategy of 
postponement will be discussed. It will be shown that both concepts are effective 
measures to reduce demand risk. 
3.3.3.1 Risk reduction by means of inventory Management 
The main purpose of holding inventory is the ability to deal with unexpected changes in 
customer demand or disruptions in the supply chain, i.e. to bridge time disparities 
between actual and desired in- or outflow of goods.309 A broader overview of various 
functions of inventory is given in Figure 51.  
 
Figure 51: Inventory functions310 
 
Besides the already mentioned adjustment and security function (by means of a so 
called safety stock) the following benefits can be identified: 
 
                                                
 
307 Gubbins (2003), p. 111 
308 Cf. Kummer (2006), p. 61f 
309 Cf. Simchi-Levi / Kaminsky / Simchi-Levi (2003), p. 45 



















• Cost reduction: By storing goods, companies are able to purchase larger 
quantities from suppliers (at lower prices) and can achieve larger production or 
transportation lot sizes, which in turn results in lower costs per unit (economies 
of scale) 
• Speculation function: If a company expects price changes in relevant markets 
(e.g. higher price for supply goods) it can build up inventory to hedge against or 
even profit from this development. 
• Production function: In some cases, products have to be stored for technical 
reasons during the production process (e.g. fermentation, desiccation, or 
ripening). 
• Sorting function: In case various components sequentially share a production 
step, it can be necessary to temporarily store some, in order to reduce setup 
costs.  
• Provision function designates the situation, where product storage and 
presentation to the customer are happening at the same time (e.g. supermarket 
shelves).311 
 
When serving a geographically widely dispersed range of customers, a company has to 
decide whether it operates a central warehouse, several regional ones or a mixture of 
these models. Thereby the trade-off between increased transportation costs in case of 
central warehouse location (due to in average longer transport for customer shipments) 
and larger inventory management costs in case of several warehouses has to be 
managed. If the demand of various market regions is independent of each other, a 
supply chain that uses several warehouses would in total also require a larger safety 
stock than a company that uses a single, central warehouse. The difference can be 
calculated by multiplying the required safety stock of one location with the radical of the 
number of warehouses.312 
 
ܵ௡ = ଵܵ ∗  √݊ 
 
with: ܵ௡  = total safety stock with n warehouses S1 = safety stock with one warehouse 
 n = total number of warehouses  
 
This effect is also referred to as risk pooling and forms the basis for the postponement 
concept, which will be presented in the subsequent chapter. 
 
“Risk pooling suggests that demand variability is reduced if one aggregates 
demand across locations because, as we aggregate demand across different 
locations, it becomes more likely that high demand from one customer will be 
offset by low demand from another. This reduction in variability allows a decrease 
 
                                                
 
311 Cf. Stölzle / Heusler / Karrer (2004), p. 15ff; Kummer/Grün/Jammernegg (2006), p. 217 
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The selection of a suitable production layout depends on the industry, the product as 
well as the demand situation. Factors which have an influence on the position of the 
customer order decoupling point can be grouped into market-related, product-related 


























In case a quick delivery is required by the market, the DP should be set at a later 




The lower the demand volatility, the better the forecast quality, which allows 
producing goods based on forecasts (MTS). Factors which impact volatility are the 
absolute size and the frequency of customer orders (regularly occurring small 




The more a production process is based on individual customer specifications (e.g. 
design and construction of a house) the earlier the DP, the more generic a product 
(e.g. noodles) the later the DP. 
Seasonal 
demand 
If seasonal demand peaks can be anticipated, it makes sense for a company to 
produce certain products (which usually are MTO or ATO) already in seasons of 
low demand (MTS), in order to achieve a more leveled plant utilization throughout 



















If the customization offered is wide and enters the product at early production 
stages, an MTO policy is necessary, whereas if customization enters at a very late 
production stage ATO may be more appropriate. 
Material profile 
The structure of the material flow (e.g. linear, convergent, divergent or mixed)317 
has an impact on the production design. For instance, with a diverging material 
profile, often an ATO strategy is used where a generic pre-product is produced 




If the overall production lead time is too long in comparison to customer 
requirements, the relative lead time of each process step can be analyzed in order 

















The decoupling point can only be positioned in between clearly distinct production 
process entities, which restricts for instance the possibility to separate various 
steps in an automated, uninterrupted production line. 
Flexibility and 
setup times 
A MTO-setup can only be implemented, if the incurred lead time is satisfactory to 
the customer (which e.g. requires fast setup times). Resources with sequence 
depending setup times are usually positioned upstream the value chain, since an 
order-based sequence might return suboptimal utilization results. 
Table 18: Factors influencing the customer order decoupling point position318 
 
Two often related factors are the demand-driven product diversification and the 
corresponding modular product design as a viable strategy to answer this requirement. 
Following a similar logic than the order decoupling point, the product differentiation point 
 
                                                
 
317 Cf. Kummer / Grün / Jammernegg (2006), p. 143. In a linear design, one final product is made out of one 
raw material (e.g. wire production). In a convergent setup, one final product is made out of several raw 
materials or pre-products. The term divergent describes a production layout where several final products are 
made out of one pre-product. 
318 Cf. Olhager (2003), p. 320f 
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indicates, at which point generic pre-products are changed into specific end-products. 
Since – as shown above - it is easier to forecast the demand for an entire range of final 
products that rely on a generic production input than forecasting the demand for a 
specific product it is in the interest of the firm to move the product differentiation point as 
close to the customer as possible in order to reduce demand uncertainty. This concept 
was first introduced under the name of postponement by Alderson in the 1950s. 
 
“The principle of postponement requires that changes in form and identity occur at 
the latest possible point in the marketing flow; and changes in inventory location 
occur at the latest possible point in time.”319 
 
Bucklin later on specified that the concept of postponement is opposed by the strategy 
of speculation, where a specified product is forwarded to the end of the value chain. Due 
to possibly lower production costs based on a planned (and therefore usually to some 
extent optimized) production schedule, speculation can be a sound strategy in markets 
with rather constant demand patterns. Looking at distribution chains and having total 
costs in mind, Bucklin argued that postponement as a strategy is only able to transfer 
risk, not to avoid it. However, since some parties (e.g. retailers or even consumers) 
might be able to bear the remaining demand risk at lower cost, there can be overall 
efficiency gains through postponement.320  
 
Nowadays postponement is used in several parts of the production process, including 
purchasing, manufacturing, logistics and the management of distribution channels 
(especially with regard to the location of inventory).321 In each case, benefits are derived 
from a reduction of uncertainty by a delayed specification of products (cf. Figure 53). 
 
 
                                                
 
319 Alderson (1957), p. 424 
320 Cf. Bucklin (1965), p. 24; Pfohl (2004), p. 122 
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4 Flexible time-range tickets as a new measure to 
increase the overall load factor 
In the context of this work, flexible time-range tickets are understood as flight tickets that 
indicate a time-frame during which a transportation process will take place without 
specifying the exact flight times and the involved itinerary at the moment of purchase, 
but only at a certain time prior to the actual departure. The following sections aim at 
giving an overview of currently used types of flexible products in relevant industries 
before a discussion of the feasibility of the concept of flexible time-range tickets in the 
airline industry takes place. During this preliminary evaluation, current studies of 
passenger demand characteristics will be presented which – together with a qualitative 
pre-study (cf. chapter 5.1) - set the ground for the generation and examination of 
empirical research hypotheses in chapter 5. 
4.1 Examples for flexible products in the airline industry 
In the form of ‘Standby-Tickets’, flexible tickets that do not specify all travel details at the 
time of purchase have a long tradition in the airline industry. Besides this ticket type, 
which has lost its significance during the last years, there have only been very few 
attempts to use flexible products in order to increase the overall demand for an airlines 
flight program, namely Freedom Air’s Fare Choice offer which has later been continued 
by Air New Zealand, Lufthansa’s ‘Surprise and Fly’, Condor’s ‘Joker Fliegen’ as well as 
the Blind Booking Program of the Lufthansa subsidiary Germanwings. 
4.1.1 Standby-Tickets 
Standby tickets are one-way tickets that give the passenger the right to travel in case 
that there is ample capacity. If no seats are available in the desired flight, the passenger 
can either wait for the next available flight or get the ticket costs reimbursed. Due to the 
fact, that seats for a flight are a perishable resource, standby tickets serve as a viable 
mean to fill otherwise unused capacity. As long as standby-tickets cover all passenger-
related costs they are profitable and allow airlines to exploit the market of spontaneous 
leisure travelers.326 
 
A special case of standby-tickets where the so-called “Shuttle Services”, operated by 
several airlines on dense routes along the US-American East Coast (e.g. Washington to 
New York), which did not require passengers to hold a fixed reservations. Nevertheless, 
passengers were guaranteed a seat on one of the hourly flights, independent of how 
many other travelers showed up. This was achieved by a back-up plane that was rolled-
out in case the scheduled flight was full. Due to a reduction in (high-yield) demand as 
well as the high cost of keeping back-up capacity, this service was abandoned by Delta 
(the last airline operating the shuttle) in 2005.327  
 
                                                
 
326 Cf. Shaw (2007), p. 196 




Apart of some examples (e.g. AirTran in the USA)328 there are today hardly any 
companies that offer standby-tickets to regular passengers (although standby tickets are 
still used very much for airline employees). This is due to the following reasons:  
• Extensive use of standby-tickets resulted in hub airports being overcrowded with 
passengers waiting for a flight with available seats for several hours, resulting in 
the fact that airport operators raised concerns about this type of ticket. 
• Cost-conscious business travelers purchased a standby-ticket in addition to their 
fully flexible (and refundable) economy ticket. If there were enough seats they 
then travelled with their (much cheaper) standby-ticket and afterwards applied for 
a refund of their unused economy ticket. 
• There were cases of standby-passengers that placed additional bookings under 
a false name over the phone in order to block capacity without a passenger 
actually showing up, thereby increasing their chance to be carried on their 
desired flight. This phenomenon has decreased though, since airlines nowadays 
often require tickets to be instantly paid with credit cards. 329 
• Traditionally, since standby-fares did not guarantee travel within a certain time, 
they were unattractive to time-sensitive travelers. However, due to the 
propagation of the internet and the emergence of travel portals that reveal how 
many seats are still available on a particular flight it is now possible for travelers 
to pretty well assess their chances of receiving a seat on their desired flight. 
Since these travelers would normally buy a regular ticket, standby-tickets in this 
case would result in a cannibalization of revenues. To avoid this effect, airlines 
would have to restrict standby-tickets to well booked flights, while flights in off-
peak times should be filled with Yield Management techniques (i.e. price 
promotions) instead. 
 
The presented arguments show that although standby-tickets could help to increase the 
load factor of specific flights, they are not compatible with currently used yield 
management methods, in which fares rise as the departure date approaches, with the 
most expensive tickets sold minutes prior to departure (cf. Figure 54).  
 
                                                
 
328 AirTran, a US-based LCC that operates a fleet of 136 short-haul aircrafts, offers Standby-tickets to young 
passengers aged 18-22. The tickets do not guarantee a seat on the selected day, however, in case no seat 
was available, passengers get a full refund (cf. Airtran 2010, www.airtranu.com). 
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offered flexible product, with conversion rates too staying below the average values 
reported by other airlines (9-14%).335 
 
An analysis of the online click-stream data of the Freedom Air website has shown that 
the propensity to actually purchase a ticket was strongly correlated with the offered 
discount. Although changes in the pricing policy by the airline during the examination 
period impaired the comparability of various observations, it became obvious that as a 
result of the strong imposed tariff restrictions passengers also expected a significant 
discount in comparison to the lowest regularly available fare in the requested travel 
period. Only if consumers were confronted with a discount rate of 40% or more the 
purchase propensity was found to be larger than 1% (cf. Figure 57). 
 
 
Figure 57: Purchase propensities as a function of the offered discount factor336 
 
Once a customer booking was accepted by the Interactive Price Response System 
(IPRS), this event did not immediately trigger a booking process at the traditional airline 
booking system, but resulted in an interim storage of the request at a database of the 
IPRS. To ensure that the airline is able to accommodate the flexible booking, the IPRS 
regularly checks the remaining capacity on the flights during the time window of the 
customer. If capacity becomes too scarce or the notice period of the customer starts, the 
IPRS then places a booking on the flight with the largest amount of free seats at the 
main booking system by means of an Application Programming Interface request and 
informs the customer of the assigned flights accordingly (cf. Figure 58).  
 
                                                
 
335 Cf. Lee / Garrow / Post (2009), p. 6 (overall traffic volume) and 12 (search & purchase data): cf. 
Nielsen/Netratings (2005), p. 1. The best conversion rate has been observed at the LCC Southwest, where 
14% of all customer visits have resulted in bookings. 
336 Cf. Lee / Garrow / Post (2009), p. 16f. The unexpectedly high level of conversions at the 10% discount 
level has been explained by the authors by the fact that the airline initially has strongly limited the amount of 
offered discount which resulted in many customers (even after extensive searches for higher discounts) only 
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one out of 17 European destinations. Only five days prior to departure, the passengers 
were then informed about the actual destination via email. By restricting the offer to 
outgoing flights on Friday or Saturday and return flights on Sunday or Monday, the 
airline made clear that the offer was targeted at leisure travelers that want to spend a 
weekend at a European metropolis.343 
 
In 1999, the offer has been extended to intercontinental flights for a price of DM 999 
(€500) for two persons. Similar to the European offer, passengers were able to decide 
about the travel time as well as the desired continent (North America or Asia) and were 
then assigned to a specific flight five days prior to departure.344 
 
A few months after the introduction, the airline stated that approximately 30-60 bookings 
(with a strong upward trend) per week were received through its ‘Surprise and Fly’ 
booking tool.345 While this at first seems a very low response to the offer, one has to 
keep in mind that in 1998, only 10% of the population had access to the internet at their 
homes, a group out of which approximately 20% had an AOL subscription, which was 
necessary to purchase a ‘Surprise and Fly’ ticket. Furthermore, a survey among internet 
users also revealed that at the time only 13% used the internet as a shopping 
channel.346 
 
Although the airline does not offer ‘Surprise and Fly’ anymore, Lufthansa has in 2009 
introduced a ‘trip finder’ feature on its website, which again addresses a price-sensitive 
traveler group by allowing users to search for cheap flights without having to specify a 
destination or precise travel dates. Travelers can enter their maximum budget as well as 
a suitable time-range for their travel and are then offered suitable flights and 
destinations by the airline (cf. Figure 60).  
 
                                                
 
343 Cf. AOL TimeWarner (1998), www.timewarner.com 
344 Cf. Krohn (1999), www.zeit.de 
345 Cf. Schambach (2010), www.schambach.de 
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On the technical side ‘Blind booking’ was realized as an additional booking interface by 
the IT companies 2e and Sigmazen (the same company that also installed Freedom 
Air’s Fare Choice module). The system automatically retrieved the availability of flights 
and placed final bookings using the Navitaire NewSkies booking systems Application 
Programming Interface (API).353 
4.1.3.4 Condor’s ‘Joker Fliegen’ 
In March 2010, the German charter Airline Condor added the feature “Joker Fliegen” to 
its website. Similar to Germanwings’ Blind Booking concept, customers can select their 
flight dates (the system always requires the purchase of a return flight) as well as a 
travel theme, which comprises either short-haul or long-haul destinations In case a 
customer wants to avoid a certain destination, he or she can exclude up to eight 
destinations by paying a small surcharge (e.g. €19 for each excluded long-haul 
destination). Directly after the booking is completed, customers are then informed about 
the actual flights that they will take. To compensate the customer for the incurred 
uncertainty, the flights are heavily discounted (e.g. a ticket for the theme ‘long-haul 
flights’ which comprises destinations such as the Seychelles, Phuket or Las Vegas is 
sold at €298, which is roughly 50% cheaper than regular fares to these destination).The 
facts that on the one hand the travel date is not allowed to be more than two months 
ahead of the booking date and that on the other hand the ticket is subject to availability 
(i.e. is not available on all possible departure dates), indicate that the airline primarily 
uses the tool as a mean to sell otherwise unused capacity.354 
4.2 Examples for flexible products in the tourism industry 
While being relatively new in the airline industry, flexible products have already been 
used in the entertainment business355 as well as in the tourism industry for a longer 
period. One can distinguish between flexible products where the customer is assigned to 
a specific option instantly after completion of the booking, as well as products where the 
customer is only assigned shortly prior to the consumption of the purchased service. 
4.2.1 Assignment of the customer to a specific product after 
completion of the booking 
During the last decade, the internet gave rise to several online booking platforms, who 
serve as intermediaries between customers and hotels. Next to traditional online travel 
agencies (e.g. Expedia or Opodo), companies such as Priceline, Hotwire and 
Travelocity managed to rapidly gain market shares by also offering flexible products on 
 
                                                
 
353 2e Systems (2007), www.2e-systems.com 
354 Condor (2010), https://jokerfliegen.condor.com 
355 Other leisure activities which use flexible tickets are theatres. The Thalia theatre in Hamburg for instance 
allows customers to buy a subscription for several audiences on a particular day of the week, without 
knowing which performances they will actually see. After the program is published, customers can then 
exchange unwanted shows against others by paying a fee (cf. Thalia (2009), http://www.thalia-theater.de). 
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to sell “top secret flights”, where the customer is only informed about departure and 
arrival city, the flight duration, the travel dates and whether the flight is direct or indirect 
at the moment of purchase. According to the platform, the uncertainty regarding the 
operating airline, the actual departure and arrival airports (in case there are several 
airports serving a destination) and the actual flight times is reimbursed with a discount of 
up to 22% in comparison to fully specified tickets.360  
 
Even more flexibility is required when a flight is booked via Priceline’s Name Your Own 
Price tool, since the airline does not even specify, whether the flight is non-stop or 
involves a connection: 
 
“Your trip will start between 6am and 10pm on your travel dates. Although we 
always look for non-stop flights first, Priceline flights may make up to one 
connection each way. Your exact flights and times will be shown to you once your 
purchase is complete.” 361 
 
All presented platforms resell distressed inventory from airlines, without designating the 
actual carrier. By means of hiding some flight details, the product is clearly targeted 
towards a very price-sensitive target group. Thereby it is ensured that the operating 
airline does not cannibalize its own sales channels, where it can still simultaneously 
offer the same seats for a higher price. While it is generally accepted that flexible 
products can potentially expand the addressable market of airlines by targeting new 
customers, airline managers have also raised concerns that selling inventory through 
these channels, in the long run decreases the perceived importance for flight 
characteristics other than the price and therefore lead to an overall price decline. Based 
on market models, though, Shapiro and Shi state that opaque tickets can even lead to 
an increase in revenues since they allow airlines to maintain or even increase their 
prices of non-opaque, i.e. regular, products.362 
4.2.2 Assignment of customers to a specific hotel after the arrival at 
the destination – the case of “Glückshotels” 
The German provider Neckermann (part of the Thomas Cook plc) offers flexible 
products under the brand name “Glückshotels” or “Roulette Hotel”. Customers can 
decide for a date, a holiday destination and a hotel category at the moment of booking 
their trip. After the arrival at the destination airport, they are then informed about the 
actual hotel where they will be accommodated (cf. Figure 63). 
 
                                                
 
360 Cf. Last Minute Network Limited (2010), lastminute.com; Since most flights that are offered depart from 
London, hiding the actual departure airport prior to purchase, leaves it open from which out of the five 
airports around London (Heathrow, Gatwick, City, Stansted & Luton) the flight will leave, thereby resulting in 
significantly more uncertainty than this would be the case in cities with only one airport (e.g. Vienna).  
361 Cf. Priceline (2010b), www.priceline.com; At a later stage of the booking process, the conditions are 
explained in more detail, stating that layovers will not be longer than three hours and that the passenger is 
guaranteed to arrive at the latest at 12:30 a.m. of the following day. Furthermore, as it is also the case with 
flexible tickets booked on other platforms, the ticket cannot be amended and does not allow collecting 
frequent flier miles. 
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4.3.1 Structure and characteristics of passenger air travel demand 
Given the strong diversity of customer needs within consumer markets, it is usually not 
economically meaningful for a company to aim at covering the entire market with its 
product range. Therefore in developed markets a company’s marketing strategy usually 
includes decisions regarding which customer groups should be targeted (segmentation 
and targeting) and how these groups should be served (differentiation and positioning).  
 
In the process of segmentation, companies analyze the market in order to identify 
(relatively) homogenous customer subgroups with similar product requirements that 
allow for a specific marketing approach in order to address them. An effective 
segmentation requires the segments to be measurable (i.e. based on market research 
data a company should at least be able to estimate the size as well as the 
characteristics of a particular segment), accessible by means of communication 
measures, substantial (i.e. large enough to outweigh the costs of a differentiated 
approach towards this segment), differentiable (i.e. the identified segments should 
dispose of different product requirements and / or preferred communication channels) as 
well as actionable (i.e. the company has the required resources to address an identified 
segment).  
 
To distinguish segments, one can on the one hand use demographic, geographic or, 
psychographic criteria (with the latter usually requiring a combination of the former in 
order to be able to practically address the segment) or, on the other hand, rely on 
documented usage or purchase criteria in order to identify segments with differing 
criteria. 365 In the airline sector, traditionally the main segmentation variable has been the 
journey purpose, which with regard to Yield Management practices has been deducted 
based on the selected flight dates as well as flexibility and service requirements. 
However, since airlines nowadays are able to evaluate more personal customer data (on 
the one hand due to the rising amount of internet bookings where more data can be 
collected than with other sales channel and on the other hand due to the growing 
importance of frequent flyer programs), this allows them also to integrate more person-
specific customer characteristics in their segmentation practices (cf. Table 19 for an 
overview of possible segmentation criteria in the airline passenger market). 
 
 
                                                
 









Corporate travelers Usually do not pay their flights themselves 
Independent 
business travelers 
These travelers comprise self-employed or 
small companies employees who require 
similar service characteristics than corporate 
travelers but have tighter budget constraints.  
Leisure 
Holiday 
Holiday travelers usually require additional 
expenses such as hotel or transfer. 
Visiting friends and 
relatives (VFR) 
Travelers have no additional expenses at their 
destination, therefore even people with low 
income can afford flights 
Pilgrimage, medical 
treatment trips, etc. 
The mentioned traveler groups are often not 
flexible with regard to dates and less price 




Frequency, schedule of flights 
and punctuality 
Time-sensitive travelers value several possible 
flight alternatives as well as an on-time arrival. 
This for instance allows business travelers to 
fly in for a meeting shortly before it begins and 
leave soon after it has ended 
Seat accessibility and ticket 
flexibility 
For some travelers, it has a distinct value to be 
able to rebook a ticket shortly before the  
planned travel (which requires the airline to 
manage capacity in a way that some free 
seats on alternative flights are preserved)  
Frequent flyer benefits 
For some passengers the opportunity to earn 
miles on a flight (or to profit from dedicated 
FFP benefits) can outweigh a price difference 
In-flight & airport service  
Although the role of in-flight service has 
decreased during the last years, there are still 
many travelers that consider this criterion in 
their purchase decisions (especially on long-
haul flights). Airport service (e.g. airline 
lounges), is important if customers have to 
cover long transfer times at an airport. 
Length of journey 
Travelers usually exhibit different service 
expectations for short or long haul flights. 
Table 19: Traditional air passenger demand segmentation criteria 366 
 
Several studies have dealt with passenger segment characteristics. Doganis, for 
instance, presents the preference structure of four key segments (‘holidaymaker two 
weeks’, ‘weekend trip’, ‘routine business trip’, ‘emergency business trip’) with regard to a 
few characteristics that basically confirms the main trends outlined in Table 19. What 
 
                                                
 
366 Cf. Shaw (2007), p. 24ff 
122 
 
stands out, however, is the fact that holidaymakers that were asked to rate the 
importance of various features (incl. price, seat availability, frequency, in-flight 
amenities, etc.) on a scale from 1 (not essential) to 5 (very essential) in average 
described the price to be very essential and did not consider any of the remaining 
features to be more important than two. On the other side, business travelers 
considered frequency as very essential, with the price only playing a minor role. 367 This 
finding was also confirmed in a different study, during which business travelers were 
asked to rank product features according to their importance. While the convenience of 
the schedule was ranked first, the price was only ranked on the eighth out of 12 
positions.368 
 
Meffert and Bruhn present the results of a segmentation study among airline travelers 
who were flying on private purposes that allocated 75% of all travelers into a price-
oriented segment, while 15% mainly focused on service quality (i.e. seat pitch, catering 
and in-flight entertainment) and the remaining 10% valued flexibility (i.e. good onwards 
connections and high flight frequency) the highest.369  
 
The predominance of the price among leisure travelers is equally apparent when 
travelers that travel with low-cost airlines are questioned. Based on a recent survey 
among almost 788 passengers of the LCC Ryanair at Frankfurt-Hahn Airport, Schröder 
found the ticket fare price to be the most important factor in the tourist’s decision making 
process. 65% of respondents rated this criterion as very important, followed by the 
destination (63%), the time gain by using the airplane (55%) and the total costs of travel 
(47%). The definite flight time was only rated as very important by 42% of respondents, 
with 8% even choosing the opposite side of the scale (“did not matter”).370 In line with 
these results, a study among passengers at Barcelona’s Girona airport (which is again, 
predominantly used by LCC) found that 88.5% of all passengers considered the price as 
the (by far) most important decision criterion for their flight. However, the differing 
valuation of other characteristics allowed the authors to further distinguish three 
segments within this group. The largest segment (45.5%), though, were again price-
sensitive travelers who, when asked to rate the importance of product attributes on a 
five-point scale, rated the price in average with 4.86, with the second and third most 
important attributes related to the flight (valuation of closeness of the airport to 




                                                
 
367 Cf. Doganis (2002), p. 189 
368 Cf. Doganis (2002), p. 239 
369 Cf. Meffert / Bruhn (1997), p. 108 
370 Cf. Schröder (2007), p. 159 
371 Cf. Martinez-Garcia / Royo-Vela (2010), p. 235. Within the “price-sensitive” segment young people 
(especially students) as well as well educated people were overrepresented in comparison to the sample 
average. The second largest group (“Destination and flight conscious travelers”) differed in so far, as these 
passengers valued travel duration higher (3.90).  
123 
 
Newer articles, however, argue that the currently used segmentation criteria (especially 
flight class and journey purpose) are no longer appropriate. To discover new segments 
Teichert et al. have conducted a Choice-Based conjoint analysis among a sample of 
5.800 frequent flyers. The results indicate that there five distinguishable customer 
segments (cf. Table 20): 
 
Segment Important features Predominant characteristics  (above sample average) 




and frequent flights 
(schedule) 
• Several flights per week 
• Male 
• Decision-making & booking outsourced 
• University degrees 
• Leadership positions 
2 – Comfort 
(19%) 
Catering, flexibility 
• Several flights per month 
• Elderly customers 
• Male 
• Prefer personal care in the booking process  
3 – Price 
(9%) 
Price  
• 2-4 flights per year 
• No leadership responsibilities 
4 – Price / 
Performance 
(33%) 
Price & punctuality  
• Entrepreneurs 
• Lower / middle Management 
• Booking made by corporate travel agent 
5 – Catch All / 
Flexibility 
(20%) 
Balanced across all 
features 
• Several flights per month 
• Avoid face-to-face bookings 
Table 20: Alternative airline customer segmentation372 
 
Although Teichert et al. are right in differentiating the traditional segmentation across 
business and leisure travelers into more segments based on their relative valuation of 
the price in comparison to other features such as flexibility, comfort or punctuality, their 
proposed segmentation does not reveal unexpected results. As a main point, one can 
take out though that entrepreneurs or employees of smaller companies nowadays act 
more like price-conscious leisure travelers than classical business travelers. 
4.3.2 The choice of a particular flight  
The previous chapter has shown the results of segmentation studies, which cluster 
consumers based on their revealed or stated preferences with regard to certain 
attributes. In the following, the consumer choice decision with regard to several flights 
will be analyzed in more detail. In order to better understand the influence of flight 
characteristics such as schedule attractiveness, itinerary (non-stop or indirect) and flight 
duration, which would be strongly touched by flexible time-range tickets, several studies 
focusing on these aspects will be presented and discussed. 
 
                                                
 
372 Cf. Teichert (2008), p. 227ff 
124 
 
4.3.2.1 Individual choice model models in airline revenue management 
Predicting consumer choices with regard to transportation alternatives has always been 
of huge interest to (public) transport planners and other industry participants. A major 
advancement in this field has been the introduction of discrete choice models in order to 
forecast travel mode choices (of inhabitants of the San Francisco Bay Area) by Daniel 
McFadden in 1974.373 Other scholars who were building upon classical rational choice 
utility models in order to forecast transport mode decisions were Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
in 1985.374 In 1987 Peter Belobaba adopted these thoughts and translated them into 
airline revenue management environment. Since from the passenger perspective, flying 
from A to B is in most cases not an end in itself but rather a mean to move to a desired 
location, the demand for flights can in the vast majority of cases be understood as 
derived demand. As a consequence, the “travel itself imposes costs or disutilities which 
must be incurred to realize the benefits of the trip.”375  
 
When confronted with several flight options, an individual is going to evaluate the 
available alternatives based on his or her preferences and the nature of the trip. In this 
process, the decision maker is going to value the disutilities attached to various 
characteristics of a flight, such as the departure time or the ticket price.  
 
“The price of a travel option is therefore not simply the monetary cost of the ticket. 
Various travel options can involve additional disutilities and monetary costs 
associated with the timing of the travel components of the trip, as well as the value 
of the time actually spent travelling”.376 
 
Since the benefit of a trip is (aside from the arrival time) independent from the disutility 
of the available flight alternatives, the question, whether or not a person is going to 
travel is decided by comparing the benefit of the trip with the costs of the available 
transport alternatives. The choice set for an individual consumer is composed of all 
alternatives, which do not create larger disutility than the achievable benefit at the 
destination. Within this choice set, the customer is going to evaluate the distinctive 
product attributes of the offered alternatives in order to select the flight with the lowest 
incurred utility. Since it is usually not possible to examine all possible alternatives, the 
consumer is in most cases not able to make the optimal choice, but is going to select the 
“alternative providing the lowest perceived disutility from among those considered, 
given feasibility and availability of that alternative.”377 
 
In the analysis of consumer choice decisions, one has to keep in mind though that it is 
usually not possible (or feasible) to incorporate all decision-variables of a consumer in a 
model. Therefore, the ‘random’ utility concept accepts a certain deviation from the 
 
                                                
 
373 Cf. McFadden (1974), p. 303ff 
374 Cf. Ben-Akiva / Lerman (1985), p. 40ff 
375 Belobaba (1987), p. 43 
376 Belobaba (1987), p. 43 
377 Belobaba (1987), p. 51 (original accentuation by P. Belobaba) 
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expected behavior, which does not imply an irrational behavior but rather demonstrates 
the lack of the researcher to include all decision variables. As a result this approach 
clarifies that that expected behavior can only be predicted with a certain probability.378 
4.3.2.2 The value of travel time and travel reliability 
Since different travel itineraries and modes usually imply different trip duration, 
passengers also have to include the expected travel time in their decision process. 
However, since the actual trip duration in most cases differs from the scheduled or 
expected duration, passengers usually also have to incorporate the expected reliability 
of published trip durations. Unreliable services can either lead to the inclusion of buffer 
time, which in return results in a higher overall expected trip duration, or can force the 
customer to select an earlier alternative in case an on-time arrival is essential. 
 
Research on the value of travel time has a long tradition.379 Besides its role in 
forecasting customer choice, the value of travel time savings (VTTS) is also highly 
relevant in determining the benefit of infrastructure improvements in the course of a 
cost-benefit analysis. With regard to planned infrastructure development projects, 
assessing the VTTS is usually based on Stated Preference surveys, since the absence 
of the planned route does not allow for an analysis of Revealed Preference data. In a 
recent Swiss study for instance, survey respondents were asked to select their preferred 
trip in a conjoint analysis setting including car and rail offers. Based on the exhibited 
preference structure, the researchers were then able to monetarily asses VTTS (cf. 
Table 21). 
 
Value of Travel Time Savings (car & public transport, Switzerland, 2006) 
Trip purpose:  Business Commuters Leisure Shopping 
VTTS for public transport  
(€ per hour) 
mean € 16.01 € 12.04 € 7.57 € 8.33 
Var. € 1.12 € 0.25 € 0.11 € 0.33 
Std.dev. € 1,06 € 0,50 € 0,33 € 0,58 
VTTS for car travel  
(€ per hour) 
mean € 17.59 € 12.11 € 11.97 € 11.34 
Var. € 6.98 € 0.33 € 1.33 € 0.89 
Std.dev. € 2,64 € 0,58 € 1,15 € 0,94 
Table 21: Value of travel time savings according to the trip purpose380 
 
The results show substantial differences in the willingness-to-pay for travel time savings 
according to the purpose of the trip, with business trips showing a VTTS which is more 
than twice as high as the VTTS in the case of leisure trips. This is in line with the finding 
 
                                                
 
378 Cf. Ben-Akiva / Lerman (1985), p. 58 
379 De Vany, for instance, has already in 1974 published a paper on “The Revealed Value of Time in Air 
Travel” based on data from 1969. At the time, the price of one hour was found to be $7.28 – which would 
correspond to approximately $43 in current terms. This rather high value also reflects the fact that flying at 
the time was almost exclusively limited to people with a high income (cf. De Vany (1974), p. 81). 
380 Cf. Axhausen et al. (2008), p. 184. The original values have been converted from Swiss Francs to Euro 
using the average exchange rate from 2006, which is the year of the underlying field work (0.6358, cf. 
Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com). 
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that the willingness-to-pay is higher in case of larger incomes, since these respondents 
value their own time higher than respondents with a low income. Furthermore, the VTTS 
was found to increase with longer travel distances. Respondents with a yearly income of 
€130,000 (category mean) were assessing the VTTS on longer car trips (>250km) on 
business purpose with approximately €70 per hour, which is 4.4 times higher than the 
average of all business trips.381  
 
As already observable in Table 21 the VTTS does not only differ between different travel 
purposes but also between different modes of transport. On the one hand, this is driven 
by the fact, that certain modes of transport (e.g. air travel) are not equally used by all 
income groups; on the other hand this is also influenced by the different characteristics 
inherent to various modes of transport. While passengers travelling by car for instance 
place a high value on flexibility, passengers using the airplane usually consider the 
achievable time savings as critical in their transport mode decision (on short haul 
routes). As a result, air travel VTTS are significantly higher than those of other modes of 
transport. This is also confirmed in a meta-analysis of 90 different VTTS studies. In 
order to normalize the values from different countries, the authors expressed the VTTS 
as a percentage of the average hourly wage rate. On average, an hour of air travel time 
is valued 76% higher than the average VTTS of all analyzed studies (cf. Table 22). 
 
Differences in the valuation of time across modes of transport 
Mode of transport Number of studies 
Average VTTS  
(% of wage rate) 
Standard 
deviation 
Airplane 4 146 82 
Bus 8 57 49 
Car 70 82 69 
Train 8 77 44 
Total 90 83 67 
Table 22: Differences in the valuation of time across modes of transport382 
 
While there are many studies on the value of time regarding car travel, empirical data 
covering other modes of transport are rare. Two of the most recent studies that also 
feature air transportation include the Norwegian value of time study from 1997 as well as 
a Europe-wide analysis from 2002. The actual values of time from these studies are 
depicted in Table 23.  
 
 
                                                
 
381 Cf. Axhausen et al. (2008), p. 182 
382 Cf. Zamparini / Reggiani (2007), p. 386 
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Valuation of the time spent for air travel 
Study Business travel Leisure travel 
Norwegian Value of Time Study (1997)383 € 44.20 € 20.41 
Austrian VTTS estimates for air travel, 
HEATCO project (2002)384 € 39.11 € 12.91 
US study (2004)385 € 55.52 € 15.81 
Table 23: Valuation of the time spent for air travel  
 
In their travel decisions, consumers also have to take into consideration that there might 
be a difference between the scheduled (or expected) and the actual travel times. This 
affects the disutility of travelling in two ways.  
 
First of all, arriving earlier than expected results in excess time at the destination, which 
in many cases cannot be used in a pleasant or productive way. Even worse, arriving too 
late at the destination may lead to more severe consequences if other scheduled events 
(e.g. a connecting flight or a scheduled meeting) have already started. In an 
experimental Stated Preference survey among British car drivers, Bates et al. found that 
the respondents were willing to pay up to € 1.82 in order to decrease the average 
deviation between expected and actual arrival times by one minute (in case of late 
arrivals).386 
 
Besides the decrease in utility resulting from the loss of usable time, research also 
indicates that uncertainty as such is unattractive to travelers.387 
 
“Travelers place some sort of value on […] on the uncertainty induced by 
variability per se […]. This may be result of the anxiety or stress caused by 
uncertainty, or additional cognitive burden associated with planning services, 
including, in the case of scheduled services, pure irritation associated with failure 
to run services as advertised.”388 
 
 
                                                
 
383 Cf. Ramjerdi et al. (1997), p. 54 and p. 88. For business and leisure trips the values for in-vehicle time for 
trips beyond 50km were used. With regard to business trips the data from wave 1+2 was considered. The 
Norwegian values were converted to Euro using the average exchange rate between Norwegian Krone and 
the ECU in 1997 (0.1252, cf. Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com). 
384 Cf. HEATCO (2002), p. S9f. For private trips the value for „Other – Long Distance” was selected. 
385 Cf. Garrow / Jones / Parker (2007), p. 280. The original values (from the NL model) were converted to 
Euro using the average exchange rate between US Dollar and the Euro in 2004 (0.805, cf. Oanda (2010), 
www.oanda.com). 
386 Cf. Bates et al. (2001), p. 225; The original values were converted from British Pound to Euro using the 
average exchange rate in 2001 (1.609, cf. Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com). 
387 Cf. Lia / Hensher / Rosea (2010), p. 385; In their meta-analysis the authors present various examples 
where the Value of Reliability (measured as average lateness, with early-arrivals being counted as ‘on-time’ 
arrivals) is even higher than the VTTS, which implicates that the uncertainty of being (in average) one hour 
late is valued more severe than actually travelling one hour more. 
388 Cf. Bates et al. (2001), p. 194 
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In customer choice models this is absolute disutility level is often modeled by means of a 
binary variable that indicates whether the arrival is expected to be on schedule or not. 
4.3.2.3 The importance of a fit between desired and offered departure time 
When searching for a flight, consumers in most cases have ideal departure and arrival 
times in mind that best fit their travel purpose. In reality, if regular public flights are used, 
it is, however, very unlikely that these times will be exactly met by a scheduled flight. 
The difference between desired and offered departure times is defined as ‘schedule 
delay’.389 Obviously, the larger the observed schedule delay, the higher is the perceived 
disutility of a particular flight. Looking on the purpose of the trip, Koppelman and 
Proussaloglou also showed that the impact of schedule delay is higher for business than 
for leisure travelers. This is mainly driven by the fact that business travelers exhibit 
higher time costs than leisure travelers (cf. also chapter 4.3.2.2).390  
 
Of particular interest, though, is the finding that the disutility of a schedule delay follows 
a non-linear function, i.e. passengers usually accepts a departure within a certain time 
range at a low disutility, before the perceived disutility strongly increases after an 
inflexion point has been reached. In the course of modeling the disutility of schedule 
delay based on large datasets, Koppelman et al. in 2008 found that the best 
representation is given by means of an S-shaped curve, which means that once a 
certain schedule delay is reached, the marginal disutily increase becomes slower again. 
Since a differentiation between early schedule delay (i.e. the flight leaves earlier then 
preferred) and late schedule delay did not improve the model quality with regard to 
explaining customer behavior, the disutility function can be illustrated by an S-shaped 
curve which is mirrored along the ideal departure time (cf. Figure 64).391  
 
 
                                                
 
389 Cf. Koppelman / Proussaloglou (1999), p. 195 
390 Cf. Koppelman / Proussaloglou (1999), p. 195ff; This also explains the benefit of a high flight frequency 
for business travelers. With increasing frequency, the difference between desired and actual departure time 
narrows, which improves the attractiveness of the flight program as a whole. Other studies also suggest that 
travelers put more emphasis on avoiding schedule delay on the outbound than on the return flight (cf. 
Garrow (2009), p. 250). 
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Valuation of a non-stop flight itinerary 
Trade-Off relation  





Visiting friends and 
relatives (VFR) 
No connection vs. one connection € 49.32 € 21.89 € 21.16 
Table 24: Valuation of a non-stop flight itinerary 396 
 
The results show that especially business travelers are willing to pay a premium for a 
direct flight (besides their willingness-to-pay for shorter travel times). This tendency is 
also confirmed by a Swiss study among 2,791 passengers at Zurich airport in 2003, 
which found an average willingness-to-pay for an Intra-European non-stop flight of € 128 
(business travelers) and €90 (leisure travelers). The values for intercontinental travel 
were in average 35% higher. In contrast to the US-study, the data from Zurich also 
includes the benefit of a shorter travel time (with connections resulting in a prolonged 
travel time of 3h in average).397 
 
This finding is also reflected in the fare structure of airlines. A study of Canadian air 
fares in 2006 found that one-stop connections of one O&D were in average sold at 
discount of 15% in comparison to non-stop flights. 398 
4.4 Ex-ante evaluation of possible designs of flexible time-
range tickets 
The previous chapters have provided an overview of existing flexible products as well as 
the characteristics of air travel passenger demand. Based on this input and the 
presented commercial opportunities and constraints in multi-hub networks, the following 
chapter aims at further specifying the idea of flexible time-range tickets (which has 
already been shortly introduced in chapter 1.2) in order to be able to evaluate potential 
product designs in the empirical part (cf. chapter 5). 
4.4.1 Evaluation of various product characteristics and selection of 
features for the empirical investigation 
Flexible products aim at serving the low-cost segment of air travel passengers without 
(extensively) cannibalizing existing revenues and under consideration of operational 




                                                
 
396 Cf. Hess et al. (2007), p. 230. The original values were converted from US Dollar to Euro using the 
average exchange rate in 2001 (i.e. 1.117, cf. Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com). 
397 SIAA (2003), p53f quoted in: Heitmann (2005), p. 68. The original values were converted from Swiss 
Francs to Euro using the average exchange rate in 2003 (i.e. 0.658, cf. Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com). 
398 Cf. Gillen / Hazledine (2006), p. 16 
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Design element Options 
Flexible component 
Destination  
(e.g. Blind Booking) 
Flight times  
(e.g. Freedom Air) 
Flight times and flight 
type (e.g. Air New 
Zealand mystery breaks)
Degree of uncertainty 
regarding the flight 
times 
Time-range of several 
days possible (e.g. 
Freedom Air) 
Time-range of several 
hours (up to one day) 
possible (e.g. Blind 
Booking, Priceline) 
Time-range of a few 
hours possible (e.g. 
classical Standby-tickets 
on high frequency route) 
Degree of uncertainty 
regarding the type of 
the flight 
Only non-stop flights  
(e.g. Blind Booking) 
Only flights including a 
connection 
Either non-stop or 
connecting flight (e.g. 
Priceline, Hotwire, etc.) 
Degree of uncertainty 
regarding the airline 
Only one specified airline 
possible (e.g. Blind 
Booking, Freedom Air) 
Several specified airlines 
possible (e.g. Hotwire) 
No information given 
(e.g. lastminute top 
secret flights) 
Prior notice period 
with regard to flexible 
component 




One week prior to 
departure (e.g. 
Freedom Air) 
One day prior to 
departure (e.g. Air 
New Zealand 
Mystery Breaks) 
At Check-In  
(e.g. classical 
Standby-tickets) 
Table 25: Potential product characteristics of flexible tickets399 
 
In the following the listed options are going to be evaluated from a demand as well as a 
supply perspective in order to design a flexible product which can then be presented to 
potential buyers in the empirical part of this study. 
 
With regard to the flexible component it can be noted that an uncertainty regarding the 
destination strongly limits the addressable target group of a flexible product. The 
company Germanwings, for instance, has in July 2009 only sold about 1.9% of its 
inventory by means of its flexible product Blind Booking, even though it directly 
promotes the product on the homepage of its website, which serves as the company’s 
main booking channel.400 Given the fact that the LCC Germanwings – especially in July - 
predominantly attracts price-sensitive leisure travelers and that the absolute fare level in 
July has in the last years constantly been the highest of all months of the year401, which 
increases the attractiveness of the fixed priced offer “Blind Booking”, it is reasonable to 
assume that the share of travelers using this offer in other months is significantly lower. 
Due to this limited applicability as well as the evident empirical evidence (based on the 
already available implementations of flexible products that hide the destination) this 
approach will not be further examined in the empirical part of this study.  
 
On the other hand, the low sensitivity of price-sensitive travelers to schedule delay (cf. 
chapter 4.3.2.3) indicates that there is a segment of travelers that is willing to accept an 
 
                                                
 
399 Own compilation 
400 Cf. Rodrian (2010), http://www.abendblatt.de & Germanwings (2009), www.germanwings.com 
401 Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) 
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uncertainty regarding the actual flight times and flight types in return for a cheaper 
fare, which serves as the basic rationale for the assumption that flexible time-range 
tickets are able to gain a larger acceptance than flexible products that leave the 
destination open at the time of purchase. However, since preceding research has shown 
that both the value of time (cf. chapter 4.3.2.2), as well as the inconvenience of making 
a connection between flights (cf. chapter 4.3.2.4) still do play an important role in the 
selection process of leisure travelers, these components will be included in the empirical 
study in order to determine their relative value in the customer choice decision. 
 
The wish to fly with a particular airline can either derive from different safety standards, 
benefits resulting from the membership in a frequent flyer program (FFP) or other 
personal preferences (e.g. catering). Since this work is focusing on European airlines, 
which generally share high safety standards as well as rather similar service standards, 
airline loyalty can mostly be attributed to the chance to earn miles in a FFP. Koppelman 
and Proussaloglou find that customers are willing to pay between € 8 (occasional leisure 
travelers) and € 87 (high-frequency business travelers) in order to fly with an airline that 
belongs to their FFP.402 While this shows that business travelers place emphasis on 
flying with a particular carrier, it also shows that occasional low-cost travelers do not. 
This indifference towards the actual airline among price-sensitive airlines is also 
confirmed by more recent studies - which also emphasize that this decrease of loyalty is 
especially prominent among online airline customers.403 Since European airlines that 
form multi hub networks are – de facto – in all cases part of the same FFP, passengers 
using a flexible time-range ticket could be guaranteed to fly with a safe airline that allows 
them to collect miles, which would even further diminish the relevance of flying with a 
particular airline. As a consequence, this factor is not going to be particularly modeled in 
the choice experiment in the empirical part. Instead, passengers will be told that the 
flight would be operated by a safe airline of a known airline group that offers an average 
level of in-flight services. 
 
The moment at which the formerly unspecified flexible product component is 
specified by the supplier can be pinpointed as a fundamental structural difference 
between the presented flexible products. While most products (e.g. Germanwings’ Blind 
Booking, Condor’s Joker fliegen, Lufthansa’s ‘Surprise and Fly program’, Priceline, 
Hotwire and Travelocity) inform the customer directly after the booking process of the 
assigned product alternative, only flexible products such as Freedom Air’s Interactive 
Price Mechanism, Air New Zealand’s Mystery Breaks, classical standby-tickets as well 
as Roulette Hotels postpone the assignment time. While the former can serve as a price 
discrimination strategy that allows providers to effectively serve low-cost segments 
without having to cannibalize revenues from classical booking channels, it is only the 
latter type of products that allow companies to benefit from the risk pooling advantages 
described in chapter 3.3.3.2. Therefore, while it is obvious that a postponement of the 
 
                                                
 
402 Cf. Koppelman / Proussaloglou (1999), p. 199. The original values were converted from US Dollar to 
Euro using the average exchange rate in 1994 (0.84518, cf. Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com), which has 
presumably been the year of data collection. In a second step the values were adjusted for inflation. 
403 Cf. Teichert / Shehu / von Wartburg (2008), p. 238 or Garrow / Jones / Parker (2007), p. 284 
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assignment is required in order to increase the capacity utilization of all flights in a multi-
hub network, it has to be examined how different notice periods affect the perceived 
uncertainty of customers. For this reason, the notice period will be modeled as a factor 
in the empirical study. 
 
In order to make sure that the concepts which are going to be examined in the empirical 
part are feasible solutions, the following section aims at briefly giving an overview, 
whether the proposed concepts would be applicable from a legal as well as an 
operational perspective.  
4.4.2 Compliance of the proposed flexible time-range ticket concepts 
with current legislation 
Since many consumer protection regulations in the airline industry are based on the 
flight times as an integral part of the contract with the passenger, it is worth examining, 
whether a postponement of the assignment of the customer to a specific flight is in line 
with current laws. 
 
Already now, many airlines use clauses in their Conditions of carriage (CoC), which 
enable them to change the flight times of a customer after the booking has been 
completed (cf. as one of several available examples, Lufthansa CoC, Article 9.1.1):  
 
“The flight times shown in timetables may change between the date of publication 
and the date you actually travel. We do not guarantee them to you and they do not 
form part of your contract with us.”404 
 
After a complaint by a Ryanair customers, whose flight times were significantly changed, 
the County Court of Cologne405 has ruled that according to the German Civil Code (§§ 
305ff), flight times must form a compulsory element of a transportation contract, which 
forced many airlines to adopt their conditions in order to comply with the law.406 In the 
case of Lufthansa this case is regulated by paragraph 9.1.2. of their CoC, which reads 
as follows: 
 
“[…] If, after you purchase your Ticket, we make a significant change to the 
scheduled flight time, which is not acceptable to you, you will be entitled to a 
refund […].”407 
 
With regard to flexible time-range tickets, this accentuates the need to be absolutely 
clear to the customer regarding the assignment of flexible departure and arrival times 
which by definition are going to change once that the customer is assigned to a specific 
flight alternative in order to comply with these regulations. 
 
                                                
 
404 Lufthansa (2010a), www.lufthansa.com 
405 County Court Cologne, 29.01.2003, 26 O 22/02. 
406 Cf. Zandke-Schaffhäuser (2007), p. 146f 
407 Lufthansa (2010a), www.lufthansa.com 
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4.4.3 Evaluation of the feasibility of an integration of flexible time-
range tickets in the airline process landscape 
4.4.3.1 Integration into currently used software systems 
In order to be able to sell flexible time-range tickets, airlines would have to make sure 
that their current IT-landscape is able to process them. 
 
In contrast to many LCC who almost exclusively sell their inventory through their own 
website, which serves as an interface to a simple Computer Reservation System (CRS), 
network airlines traditionally use sophisticated Global Distribution Systems (GDS) to 
offer and sell their tickets. In Europe, the largest GDS provider is the company 
Amadeus, which in 2007 had a market share of 55% (followed by Galileo, Sabre and 
Worldspan with 23%, 14% and 8% respectively).408 GDS allow external sales agents to 
access and sell the inventory of an airline through a standardized interface, thereby 
increasing the customer reach of airlines and speeding up the sales process.  
 
Currently used GDS platforms by default do not allow the user to accept a booking 
request without specifying the flight routing. If a passenger is rebooked at a later 
moment, either a currently available (usually higher) booking class has to be chosen or 
a formerly availably booking class has to be opened manually, which results in high 
transaction costs. Therefore it has to be noted that presently used GDS do not support 
an implementation of flexible time-range tickets.409 Recent product developments, such 
as the Amadeus-developed ‘trip-finder’ tool, which allows passengers to search for 
flights based on their budget instead of having to specify date and destination, indicate, 
though, that GDS-vendors too are aiming at enabling airlines too offer more innovative 
products.410  
 
This move can also be understood as a response to the rising importance of the 
internet, which allows airline to sell directly to the customer via their website at a fraction 
of the costs that occur when tickets are sold through a GDS. As a result, the role of GDS 
has strongly decreased during the last years.411 While in 2000, still 80% of the revenue 
of airlines has been made through traditional travel agencies with only 1% of tickets 
being sold through the internet,412 in 2009, for instance Lufthansa has already sold 25% 
of its ticket via its own website.413 Many airlines have even – at least temporarily - 
restricted certain discount fares to their websites (partly also to overcome the limitations 
 
                                                
 
408 Cf. Lovell (2007), p. 18. The market share is measured as the percentage of all GDS bookings. Amadeus 
was founded by several European airlines in 1987 in order to establish a European CRS. Today still 
approximately 45% of the shares of Amadeus IT Group SA are owned by Air France, Lufthansa and Iberia. 
409 Cf. Expert interview Oswald (2009) 
410 Cf. Sobie (2010b), www.flightglobal.com 
411 Cf. Alamdari (2002), p. 341. In the year 2000, airlines that were selling tickets through GDS in average 
paid between 2-4% of the sales volume as a transaction fee to the GDS-vendor. This considerable amount 
can be saved if bookings are directly entered into the airlines reservation system (through the companies 
website). If airlines do not operate their own CRS and only use their website as an additional access point to 
the GDS, they cannot totally avoid GDS fees but often profit from a reduced rate. 
412 Cf. Alamdari (2002), p. 341 
413 Cf. Sobie (2010b), www.flightglobal.com 
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of CRS with regard to selling ancillary services such as paid seat assignments or lounge 
access). To give travel agents again access to the entire range of available tickets, 
GDS-providers gave airlines incentives (in the form of cheaper booking fees) if they 
enter so-called “full-content agreements”, which do not limit the availability of tickets.414  
 
Not only that from the cost perspective an airlines own website is the best channel to 
sell low-fare tickets, a survey among 996 airline ticket buyers in 2007 has also shown 
that “the higher the level of respondents’ price consciousness and sale proneness, the 
higher the probability of them adopting Internet as their retail channel.”415  
 
In conclusion, there are three main arguments, why a flexible time-range ticket should 
primarily be sold via the website of an airline that wants to offer it. First of all, since 
classical GDS at the moment do not support more sophisticated ticket forms, the airline 
would have to use its own website as a sales channel from a technical point of view. In 
order to transform the reservations into confirmed bookings at a later time, a middleware 
system (cf. the IT architecture used at Freedom Air’s Interactive Price Response System 
as shown in Figure 58) could be used. Second, since flexible products are priced at a 
discount in comparison to specified tickets, it is also economically sound to only offer 
them through the cheapest sales channel, i.e. the company’s website. Finally, the 
internet is also the retail channel which is preferred by price-conscious customers, which 
form the key target group of flexible products. 
 
An analysis of the capabilities of current Yield Management systems shows a similar 
outcome. Although current procedures do not foresee flexible products, this deficit could 
be bypassed by means of connected middleware systems. Given the huge 
developments in computational power as well as more and more advanced algorithms 
applied in the field of airline operations optimization, it is also reasonable to assume that 
a joint management of fares and capacity across several airlines is not hampered by 
insufficient computational power.416 However, since there is nowadays often only little 
coordination between revenue management departments within recently formed airline 
groups (e.g. between Austrian Airlines and the respective department at Lufthansa), the 
main challenge lies in the organizational alignment of various departments as well as in 
the introduction of common IT-platforms and data standards.417 
4.4.3.2 Passenger and luggage handling 
The main process steps of passenger handling are the check-in at the airport, safety 
and (where needed) passport controls as well as the boarding of passengers and 
luggage. With regard to flexible time-range tickets there would in most cases be no 
change to existing routines, with the exception of the check-in process as well as 
eventual passport controls. These cases will be shortly discussed in the following.  
 
                                                
 
414 Cf. Pilling (2009), p. 31 
415 Yua (2008), p. 68 
416 Cf. Snowdon / Paleologo (2008), p. 20-1 




An examination of check-in times at Frankfurt Airport revealed that the check-in process 
usually lasts between 1.6 and 2.2 minutes per passenger.418 If passengers who have 
purchased a flexible time-range ticket are only informed about their flight times at the 
check-in counter, it is likely that they will have additional questions with regard to the 
assigned routing, the involved carriers and the (potentially) incurred waiting times, which 
could result in longer process times and therefore also increased costs. This cost 
increase would counteract the efforts taken by airlines in the last years to promote self-
service channels such as kiosks at the airport or web check-in. According to an analysis 
done by a vendor of self-service-terminals these terminals are able to reduce the check-
in costs from $3.68 using human agents down to $0.16 per process.419 Since an 
assignment of passengers holding flexible time-range tickets to a specific flight only at 
check-in would eliminate the possibility of an online check-in airlines would at least have 
to offer self-service terminals which are able to process these passengers in order to 
avoid low-fare passengers causing additional costs during manual check-in 
processes.420 Based on these arguments, an assignment of passengers to a specific 
flight only at check-in cannot be recommended from a cost perspective. 
 
With regard to the design of flexible time-range tickets it has to be ensured that travelers 
have all relevant travel documents that are required on each of the potential flight 
alternatives. In a European context this for instance means that all potential hubs should 
be located in the Schengen area (since travelers from outside of the European Union 
are usually given a visa that entitles them to travel in the entire Schengen area and not 
only in the final country of their trip). 
 
                                                
 
418 Cf. Barckhausen (2009), http://www1.tu-darmstadt.de 
419 Cf. Kis Kiosk (2005), www.kis-kiosk.com 
420 Cf. Klein / Klingler (2009), p. 61f 
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5 Empirical analysis of the acceptance of flexible time-
range tickets  
The preceding chapters have presented the challenge of network carriers to (profitably) 
compete with LCC on routes where they face direct competition. Furthermore, it has 
been shown how flexible products could be used in a multi-hub environment in order to 
address price-sensitive travellers. Based on existing studies about the characteristics of 
demand, the potential design of flexible time-range tickets has been narrowed down. 
The following chapter now aims at reviewing customer behaviour in greater detail by 
means of an empirical study in order to be able to evaluate certain product 
characteristics of flexible time-range tickets and quantify, how many customers would be 
willing to purchase the respective products. The empirical study is divided into a 
qualitative pre-study and a cross-sectional confirmatory study.  
 
First, in an explorative study several in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted. The 
respondents were selected based on theoretical sampling, i.e. the purpose of the 
sampling was not to generate representative results for a certain population but to 
increase the marginal information gain of each interview. The study aimed at identifying 
customer preferences and restrictions regarding the design of flexible time range tickets 
which play a major role in determining the acceptance these tickets.  
 
Second, a large scale online survey was conducted. Besides testing the importance of 
potential product components (e.g. information time, knowledge of potential routings) the 
main aim was to determine which customer segments would be attracted by flexible 
time-range tickets. Furthermore the acceptance of various ticket conditions shall be 
examined. Overall this follows the classical setup of an explorative study that aims at 
generating hypotheses, which are then empirically tested in a quantitative study.421 
5.1 Qualitative study of flexible time-range tickets 
5.1.1 Design and objectives of the pre-study 
Given the lack of existing research with regard to the possible design and the 
acceptance of flexible time-range tickets, there are no given theories which provide a 
possible explanation of consumer behavior in this situation and might be empirically 
tested. Therefore, as a starting point of the empirical research of this dissertation, a 
qualitative survey has been conducted to develop customer typologies and generate 
research hypotheses. The main research objective at this stage was to find out, who 
accepts or rejects flexible time-range tickets, why people do so, and how the ticket could 
be designed in order to achieve a high acceptance. Special emphasis was given to the 
potential fears of customers with regard to the actual routing as well as the question, 
 
                                                
 
421 Cf. Diekmann (2008), p. 188 
138 
 
which information is required at certain points of the booking process (and the time prior 
to departure) and how this information should be conveyed. Prior to the discussion of 
these research aspects, the interviewees were given an explanation of flexible time-
range tickets that included a concrete example to illustrate the concept. 
 
In total eleven non-standardized, face-to-face interviews were conducted in July 2009.422 
In order to capture as much individual and qualitative information as possible, the 
interviews did not follow a strict structure but only a rough guideline (cf. appendix 1) and 
allowed the respondents to focus on certain parts that were of higher importance to 
them.423  
 
The selection of respondents did not aim at obtaining a representative sample but rather 
to maximize the marginal information gain of each additional interview. This approach of 
‘theoretical sampling‘ has been introduced by Glaser and Strauss in 1973 and aims at 
revealing specific categories and properties in order to develop theories of behavior.424 
 
“Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides 
what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as 
it emerges.”425 
 
Theoretical saturation was reached after eleven interviews with a diverse group of 
respondents (cf. Table 26). This means that the marginal information gain of additional 
interviews was deemed to be insignificant, thus no more samples were taken.426 
 
 
                                                
 
422 Personal face-to-face interviews were selected to allow respondents to ask questions in case the 
procedures of the researched ticket type were not clear. Cf. Diekmann (2006), p. 443 ff; More information 
about the interview process is provided in Nernst (2009).  
423 Cf. Atteslander / Cromm (2003), p. 120 ff.; Diekmann (2006), p. 371 ff.; To include new points that came 
up during the first interviews, the guideline was also slightly adjusted. 
424 Cf. Glaser / Strauss (1973), p. 62 
425 Glaser / Strauss (1973), p. 45 











































































































































































































5.1.2 Results of the exploratory pre-study 
During the qualitative interviews, the respondents were asked about their acceptance of 
flexible time-range tickets (and its determinants), their information requirements and 
potential fears. 
5.1.2.1 General acceptance and its determinants 
Quite unexpectedly it turned out that the vast majority of the respondents (9 out of 11) 
would accept flexible time-range tickets in their relevant set. The respondents rejecting it 
stated their preference for reliable airlines and the desire for fixed arrangements at the 
beginning of their holidays as main reasons. However, with regard to the remaining 
persons, many respondents made their acceptance dependent on certain conditions.  
 
First of all the purpose of the trip was a clearly stated criterion with regard to the 
suitability of flexible time-range tickets. Unanimously respondents stated that the 
attached uncertainty with regard to the precise arrival time is unsuitable for business 
trips, since they cannot arrange a meeting time with business partners in advance. 
Furthermore when travelling on business purpose, the respondents valued their time too 
high in order to spent it unproductively at airport gates while waiting for a connecting 
flight (which might be the case if they are assigned to a routing that involves a transfer). 
On the other hand, the concept was attractive to leisure travelers, especially when 
thinking of longer travel periods.  
 
Personal characteristics, such as age or air travel experience as well played a role in 
determining the likelihood of an acceptance of the concept. While younger respondents 
expressed a positive, flexible attitude towards flexible tickets in case they allow them to 
save money, some older respondents considered it problematic to only receive their 
arrival time shortly prior to departure, because this would make it more difficult to 
arrange transport from the airport to the final destination or their hotel (which they, 
especially in case their mobility is impaired, strongly rely upon). Furthermore the 
interviews indicated that people who fly often, are (with regard to private trips) more 
likely to accept the new ticket type. 
 
Some respondents also linked the attractiveness of the ticket to the size of the travel 
group, since the disutility of longer travel times was considered to be smaller if the time 
is spent together with friends or relatives.  
 
Finally the acceptance of the respondents was in all cases connected to the achievable 
saving in comparison to a fully specified booking. Many interviewees said that they 
would outweigh the expected additional time consumption with the monetary saving. If 
they consider the overall potential travel time as too long they would refrain from 
selecting the ticket. Interestingly, in the decision process, besides the relative saving 
that can be achieved many respondents also said that they would only consider the 
ticket if the amount saved exceeds a threshold amount (in one case €20 were stated), 
thereby considering it a viable alternative especially in case of flights where regular 
tickets are rather expensive. 
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5.1.2.2 Information requirements and desired product characteristics 
During the interviews the potential customers were told that when booking a flexible 
ticket they would be informed about price, origin & destination as well as the earliest 
departure and the latest arrival time. Beyond these points many respondents asked for 
additional information concerning the following points: 
• Knowledge of possible routings  
In order to better be able to assess the value of flexible time-range tickets, 
several respondents asked for more details with regard to the flights that are in 
the set of possible alternatives (involved airlines, possible transfer airports, flight 
times, etc.). On the one hand this was asked by frequent flyers that due to bad 
experiences wanted to avoid certain airlines or airports, while on the other hand 
this issue has also been very important to people who seldom fly and place 
special emphasis on selecting an airline that is renowned for high safety and 
quality standards. Some respondents even indicated that they would pay a small 
surcharge to either exclude certain undesired airports or airlines, or to add 
preferences for certain routings. 
• Frequent Flyer Program (FFP) 
For members of a FFP, it is important to know, whether they can collect miles on 
the flight to which they will be assigned. One interviewee suggested that the 
selling airline should award a certain amount of miles irrespective of the actual 
routing.  
• Single Point of Contact 
In case of problems or questions, potential passengers would like to know whom 
to contact. Ideally in the eyes of many respondents, this should be the airline that 
has accepted the booking, not necessarily the operating carrier. 
• Consistent Terms & Conditions 
Irrespective of the final airline, the respondents expected to be informed during 
the booking process about the applicable terms and conditions (e.g. luggage 
allowance, refund & cancellation policies)  
 
When asked about the time frame prior to departure in which they would like to be 
informed (at the latest) about the final routing, all respondents stated one day as their 
ultimate limit, with a few preferring to receive the information at least one week in 
advance. Two younger respondents also expressed their willingness to be informed only 
at a specified check-in time on the departure day, if this is reflected in a larger discount 
(approximately 40%) in comparison to a regular ticket. 
 
Besides the actual flight and the operating airline travelers should also be informed at 
which terminal they have to check in. With regard to the preferred information channel 
there was a clear preference among the respondents for channels that allow them to 
confirm the receipt (e.g. an email with a confirmation link or a telephone call). 
5.1.2.3 Fears of potential customers and measures to alleviate them 
Since flexible time-range tickets do not specify certain product parameters at the time of 
booking, they involve uncertainty for the purchasers. During the interviews the 
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respondents were asked to state explicitly what they would be worried about and how 
their fears could be decreased. 
  
In line with the desire to know which airlines and airports are in the potential set of 
flights, some interviewees were afraid of flying with an untrusted airline or to having to 
change planes at an unknown or disliked airport. These worries could be countered by 
informing potential customers about all possible routing alternatives. 
 
Other respondents raised concerns about the availability of free seats on their requested 
date or the actual arrival being after the announced latest arrival time (even though they 
were told that by booking a ticket they will definitively be transported within the given 
timeframe). This requires the airline to emphasize this point during the booking process 
in order to clearly state the difference to ‘classical’ standby-tickets, where passengers 
are not guaranteed anything, but have to wait for the next available seat.  
 
In case the flight is part of a tour package that includes a transfer to the hotel, 
passengers would be afraid that their pick-up service is not informed about the actual 
arrival time. Another fear is that the actual arrival is too late in the evening and does not 
allow passengers to continue their travel to their final destination (e.g. by means of 
public transport). At destinations with infrequent onward transport connections this might 
decrease the applicability of flexible time-range tickets for travelers that usually use 
public transport. In their evaluation of different ticket options, these travelers would add 
the cost difference between public transport and a potentially required taxi to the cost of 
the flight ticket, thereby narrowing the cost advantage of flexible time-range tickets. 
5.2 Research hypotheses 
Based on the conducted qualitative interview, the stated research aims and the 
preceding literature review the following set of hypotheses was generated prior to 




Research hypotheses for empirical part 
H1  
Leisure travelers are more likely to accept flexible time-range tickets than 
business travelers.  
H2  
The perceived self-confidence with regard to flight booking behavior is 
positively related with the likelihood to select a flexible time-range ticket.427 
H3  
Passengers that usually travel alone are less likely to select a flexible time-
range ticket than passengers travelling in a group. 
H4 
Consumers that have the choice between a specified flight and an 
unspecified flexible time-range flight prefer the specified flight. 
H5  
The earlier the flight assignment time (information about actual routing), the 
more likely is the selection of a flexible time-range ticket. 
H6 
The shorter the potential time-range, the more likely is the choice of a flexible 
time-range ticket. 
H7 
The likelihood to accept a flexible time-range tickets as a function of a given 
price reduction is not following a linear but rather a logistical function. Unless 
a certain minimum discount is granted customers are hardly considering 
flexible tickets as an alternative at all. There is a saturation point, after which 
the marginal increase in acceptance triggered by additional discounts 
decreases. 
H8 Flexible time-range tickets can induce additional demand. 
Table 27: Research hypothesis for the empirical part 
5.3 Quantitative examination of hypotheses 
5.3.1 Parent population and survey mode 
In order to examine the raised hypotheses a sample of airline travelers was recruited. 
The underlying target population consisted of all Austrians aged above 18, who have at 
least travelled one time by means of an airplane during the last 12 months. The latter 
criterion has been added as a proxy variable in order to ensure that only people with at 
least certain knowledge of the air transport market were able to participate, since this 
was deemed necessary in order to properly assess the value of flexible time-range 
 
                                                
 
427 The intangible nature of transport services makes it more difficult for the consumer to assess the service 
quality prior to the purchase. In this setting, the price as such becomes a relevant substitute indicator for the 
quality of a product, which ultimately results in the acceptance of higher prices by insecure customers. 
Therefore potential consumers with little knowledge about air traffic processes might be reluctant to 
purchase a flexible time-range ticket although it is cheaper than a regular specified ticket. Cf. Friesen 
(2008), p. 77 or Bruhn  / Meffert (2003), p. 518f. 
144 
 
tickets. As a study conducted in Germany in 2009 shows, only 30% of the general 




Figure 65: Number of flights in the last 12 months (general population)428 
 
To reach a substantial amount of diverse respondents, the prevailing study survey was 
executed in cooperation with an online access panel provider, who (within the group of 
people aged above 18) invited a randomly chosen set of panelists based to participate. 
To avoid a self-selection bias, the topic of the survey as well as the screen-out criterion 
(at least 1 flight during the last year) was not disclosed in the invitation email. Based on 
a quota selection it was then ensured that the sample was representative of the parent 
population with regard to the criteria age, gender and education.  
 
In general, a large disadvantage of computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI) is the 
phenomenon of under-coverage. Since not everybody has access to the internet, certain 
people of the target population do not even have the chance to participate in a study, 
which undermines the goal of creating an Equal Probability of Selection Method 
(EPSEM) sample.429 With regard to airline travelers this problem seems negligible, 
though. As Table 28 demonstrates, the internet is predominantly used by male as well 
as by younger persons. As these groups are also overrepresented (in comparison to the 
general population) among airline passengers (especially leisure passengers, who are 
also the assumed key target group of flexible tickets), an online survey is deemed to be 
an appropriate survey mode to examine the target population of airline travelers.  
 
 
                                                
 
428 Cf. Statista (2010), www.statista.de; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, quoted in Focus (2010), 
focus.de. The data from Germany is taken as an approximation for Austria since no comparable statistics 
are publicly available for the Austrian market. 

































travelers   48% 42% 19% 
Share of leisure 
travelers   52% 58% 81% 
male 47% 52% 64% 56% 49% 
female 53% 48% 36% 44% 51% 
14-19 10% 13% 
19% 21% 33% 
20-29 15% 19% 
30-39 19% 23% 28% 24% 23% 
40-49 16% 18% 27% 27% 20% 
50-59 14% 14% 17% 
28% 24% 60-69 12% 8% 
9% 
70+ 14% 4% 
Table 28: Demographic structure of internet user and airline travelers430 
 
The suitability of online surveys in the field of airline passenger research is also 
amplified by the fact that in 2009 already 1.15 billion airline tickets were sold via the 
internet (either directly through an airline website or through online travel agencies) 
which represents 44% of all sold tickets.431 
5.3.2 Demographic structure of the sample 
After a pretest with 20 people in July 2010, from 14 January to 22 January 2011 in total 
553 Austrian residents were invited to participate in the actual survey. On the entry 
page, respondents were asked how often they have been travelling by plane in the last 
year. As a result, 29% of all respondents who did not fly at all in the preceding 12 
months were screened out (cf. Figure 66).  
 
                                                
 
430 Cf. Austrian Internet Monitor (2010), mediaresearch.orf.at; Flughafen München (2009), www.munich-
airport.de; Berliner Flughäfen (2011), www.berlin-airport.de. Munich and Berlin were selected since they on 
the one hand disclosed their passenger structure grouped according the demographic criteria which were 
also of interest in the current study, and on the other hand because they offer good examples for a 
business-passenger orientated airport with a large share of network airlines (Munich) as well as a rather 
leisure-passenger orientated airport with a large share of LCC (Berlin-Schönefeld). 




Figure 66: Number of return flights in the last year (sample) 
 
As expected, based on the strong overlap between airline travelers and internet users, 
the share of questioned Austrians without any flights in the last year was significantly 
lower than the aforementioned reference data from Germany (which has been collected 
by means of a telephone survey) would have suggested. Furthermore this can also be 
explained by the fact that the amount of passengers carried per capita in Germany (1.9) 
is by around 27% lower than the respective figure for Austria (2.6).432 
 
Out of the 390 respondents who – based on their flight behavior – qualified for the main 
survey, 356 finished the survey and thereby form the basis for the following analyses.433 
Table 29 shows the demographic structure of the sample, which with regard to the 
characteristic age and gender corresponds very well with the passenger structure at 
Munich and Berlin airport (see table above).  
 
 
                                                
 
432 Cf. Eurostat (2011), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
433 Besides regular dropouts, five respondents were also excluded since they passed the survey in a time 
which was (based on the pretest) considered as unrealistic in order to give meaningful answers. The 
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Age group Count % of sample   Sex Count % of sample
18 to 29 60 17%   Male 201 56% 
30-39 88 25%   Female 155 44% 
40-49 72 20%         
50-59 60 17%   Highest completed education Count % of sample
60 and above 76 21%   Primary school 3 1% 
    Secondary school without A-levels 103 29% 
Main occupation Count % of sample   Secondary school with A-levels 100 28% 
Employee in a company 
with >20 employees 156 44% 
  Tertiary education 150 42% 
        
Retired 78 22%   Nearest airport Count % of sample
Freelance entrepreneur 41 12%   Wien Schwechat (VIE) 225 63% 
Employee in a company 
with <20 employees 37 10% 
  Linz Hörsching (LNZ) 39 11% 
  Graz Thalerhof (GRZ) 36 10% 
Pupil / Student 18 5%   Salzburg (SZG) 21 6% 
Other 13 4%   Klagenfurt (KLU) 15 4% 
Homemaker 9 3%   Innsbruck (INN) 11 3% 
Unemployed 4 1%   Other (FDH, MUC, ZRH, MXP) 9 3% 
Table 29: Demographic description of the sample 
5.3.3 Travel behavior 
When asked about the predominant purpose of their flight trips in the last year, 64 
respondents (18%) said that they were mostly travelling on business purpose, while the 
remaining 292 (82%) declared themselves as leisure travelers. There has been a highly 
significant difference between the average amount of return trips per year between the 
two groups (t-test: p < 0.001): while business passengers in average completed 9.6 trips 
per year, leisure travelers embarked in average on 3.0 return flights per year.  
 
By multiplying the amount of travelers with the average number of trips in the respective 
categories, it turns out that business travelers are responsible for 41% of all 1504 trips 
which were made by the group of respondents. Although this is higher than the 26% 
share of business trips, which the Austrian Office of Statistics has calculated for 2009 
(which, due to the financial crisis has been a year where many companies have reduced 
their travel expenses), the obtained figure is well in the middle of the figures published 
by Munich airport (48% business passengers), Berlin Tegel (42% business travelers) 
and Schönefeld airport (with 19% of all passengers traveling on business purpose).434 
 
In average, business travelers in the sample are younger than leisure travelers. 
Furthermore, they are predominantly male and in average have completed a higher level 
of education than respondents who stated leisure as their dominant trip purpose. 
 
 
                                                
 
434 Cf. Statistik Austria (2011), p. 26. In 2009, 3.1m leisure and 1.1m business trips have been conducted. In 
2008 the share of business trips still was 31.1 percent. Cf. also Flughafen München (2009), www.munich-
airport.de; Berliner Flughäfen (2011), www.berlin-airport.de 
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The respondents were also asked how many of their trips have been done using 
LCC.435 In average, while average leisure travelers made 51% of their trips using LCC, 
business travelers in average only used LCC for 38% of their trips. The difference in the 
means of the two groups was found to be significant (t-test: p = 0.019). The correlation 
between trip purpose and propensity to use LCC is also found if travelers are grouped 
according to their individual LCC-share (χ²-test, p: 0.003). While the majority of business 
travelers (56%) used LCC for not more than one third of their trips, 41% of leisure 
travelers used LCC in more than 66% of all cases (cf. Figure 67).  
 
 
Figure 67: Share of business and leisure travelers grouped by their propensity to use LCC 
 
Overall, 569 of all 1504 trips which were made by the respondents in the last year were 
made using LCC, which translates into a market share of 37.8%. This corresponds very 
well to the market share (measured in passengers) that LCC have achieved in Germany 
(35.7%) in 2009.436 
 
In average, travelers made their trips together with another 1.4 persons who have 
accompanied them. However, there has again been a highly significant difference 
between business travelers (mean group size 2.03) and leisure travelers (mean group 
size: 2.52, t-test, p=0,009). 42% of business travelers usually travel alone, while the 
majority of leisure travelers (52%) in most cases travel in a group of two (cf. Figure 68). 
 
                                                
 
435 In the question text, LCC were defined by giving the examples of Flyniki, Air Berlin, Germanwings and 
Ryanair in contrast to traditional airlines such as Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa or Air France. 
436 Cf. Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (2010), p. 11. The German data is provided as an 
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Figure 68: Share of travelers with a certain number of accompanying passengers 
 
Overall it can be said that with regard to the presented travel characteristics, the sample 
is well representing the Austrian air travel market. 
5.3.4 Booking behavior 
In order to better be able to describe (at a later point) the characteristics of people who 
consider flexible tickets as a viable option, the booking behavior of respondents was 
analyzed. This is of special importance for airlines when it comes to marketing a new 
product, since the knowledge of preferred booking channels as well as advance booking 
periods allows for a more precise positioning of the product. 
 
The vast majority of the sample (79%) stated that they are usually booking flights on 
their own. People who delegate the booking process primarily comprise business 
travelers (in this group, 34% of all travelers do not book their tickets themselves).  
 
76% of the people who book their flights themselves use an internet-powered sales 
channel. While 41% directly purchase their tickets on the website of an airline, 35% use 
online travel agencies (such as Expedia, Opodo or others). Only 22% of people who are 
personally taking care of buying their flights make use of the services of traditional travel 
agents. A small fraction (3%) uses other channels such as tour operator hotlines or 
airline sales offices. When asked to judge their perceived self-confidence with regard to 
always selecting the best available flight, the average rating on a 7-point Likert-scale 
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Especially LCC heavily rely on the advance booking time as a criterion to distinguish 
between booking requests from business travelers and leisure travelers in their price 
discrimination policies. As shown in Figure 71, this criterion indeed is well suited as an 
approximation to identify the trip purpose and the underlying willingness-to-pay. In the 
sample, there has been a significant difference between the groups (χ²-test, p< 0.001) 
as well as a strong correlation between the likelihood to book at a late time and the trip 
purpose ‘business’ (Cramérs V: 0.38): While 67% of all business travelers book their 




Figure 71: Advance booking periods of business and leisure travelers in the sample 
 
When asked about the importance of certain criteria with regard to the selection of their 
flight, respondents overall selected the price as the most important criterion (average 
rating 1.78 on a scale where 1 corresponds to ‘very important’ and 7 stands for ‘not 
important at all’), followed by the connection type (non-stop or connection flight: 1.88) 
and the offered schedule times (2.10). However, as expected, significant differences 
were found between leisure and business travelers. While the former rated the price in 
average with 1.6, business travelers assigned a rating of only 2.80, giving higher 
priorities to other criteria, such as the convenience of the schedule, which has been 
rated the highest by this group (Anova, p < 0.001). Furthermore, significant differences 
with regard to the importance of the price were found based on a person’s affinity for 
using LCC. Respondents who used LCC for at least 2/3 of their flights exhibited an even 
higher price sensibility (1.39) than respondents who used network carriers for the 
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time between booking and departure it turned out that flexible time-range tickets are 
most attractive for people who book their flights at least three months prior to departure. 
 
People who did not accept flexible time-range tickets in their relevant set (22.75% of the 
sample) were asked for the reasons of their choice. Interestingly, the answer which has 
been selected by most respondents was the general dislike of unplanned things, 
followed by the necessity to know precise travel times in order to be able to schedule a 
meeting after arrival (cf. Figure 76). 
 
 
Figure 76: Reasons for the rejection of flexible time-range tickets440 
 
To determine the valuation of specific product components, passengers who accepted 
flexible tickets in their relevant set were taken further to a choice based conjoint study. 
Before the results are presented, the following chapter aims at providing the reader with 
an overview of the selected research method as well as the reason for choosing this 
method in an air travel context. 
5.3.6 Conjoint Analysis as a tool to test the acceptance of and the 
willingness-to-pay for new products 
There is a range of methods available to measure the willingness-to-pay for certain 
products. Depending on the way customer feedback is collected, one can distinguish 
between revealed preference (RP) as well as stated preference (SP) methods. Since the 
analysis of revealed preferences data (e.g. purchase of a specific product option) is 
based on real-world observations, this method achieves a very high external validity (i.e. 
the findings are very likely to represent the actual situation that has been analyzed). In 
contrast to RP-data, SP methods rely on surveys during which the respondents are 
asked about their preferences towards certain attributes. The resulting strength of SP 
methods, namely that it allows researchers to incorporate new product characteristics 
 
                                                
 
440 Other reasons mainly included the wish to avoid connections (quoted 5 times) as well as other individual 
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up at the airport
Reasons for rejection of flexible time-range tickets
(% of respondents; multiple answers possible,  n=81 respondents, who did not 
accept flexible time-range tickets as possible option when looking for flights)
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into the survey by building hypothetical alternatives, is at the same time often also the 
main concern of critics of SP studies, who claim that these surveys are unable to 
reproduce the complex decision making process that occurs in the real world, which also 
limits the transferability of the gained results.441  
 
However, in studies in the area of transportation that compared results obtained from 
the analysis of RP to the corresponding SP data, no large discrepancies were found. As 
Wardman notes, “the findings […] provide further evidence that individuals’ stated 
preferences among hypothetical travel scenarios are a reasonably accurate guide to 
true underlying preferences”.442  
 
Other advantages of SP surveys, besides the possibility to evaluate features that 
currently are not existent, are the ability to model strong variations between the distinct 
attributes (which are often not found in RP data) in order to reveal the influence of 
otherwise disregarded attributes, as well as the opportunity to ‘unbundle’ attributes that 
are usually strongly correlated (e.g. travel time and trip costs) in order to identify the 
utility impact of each of them separately. Finally, since RP studies usually only 
incorporates ‘technical’ input data (such as fare, departure time, passenger numbers, 
etc.) soft factors (such as seat design or the offered on-board service) are often 
omitted.443  
 
Often the aim of SP studies in the course of the design and the pricing of new products 
is to monetarily quantify the overall utility that is provided by a product that is composed 
of certain attribute characteristics to a respondent. Earlier SP studies mainly relied upon 
judgmental tasks, during which the respondents had to rank or rate singular attributes of 
a product or service. By adding up the calculated utility of each attribute according to the 
actual product design, it was then possible to estimate the overall value of a specific 
alternative (compositional approach). To overcome the valid criticism that this does not 
reflect the complex choice situation which customers face when they have to 
simultaneously judge a number of product alternatives in order to decide for one product 
that is composed of several attribute characteristics, Luce and Tuckey published a new 
approach that they labeled “simultaneous conjoint measurement” in 1964, which has 
been further developed (and first published in a marketing journal) in 1971 by Green and 
Rao.444 By asking respondents to select an alternative that is composed of several 
attributes out of a choice set, the overall value (relative to other alternatives) is obtained, 
out of which the contributions of the underlying attribute manifestations are then filtered 
out in order to obtain the part-worth utilities of each of them (decompositional 
approach).445 By adding price as a product attribute, conjoint measurement approaches 
 
                                                
 
441 Cf. Breidert (2006), p. 49 for a classification of methods that can be used to measure willingness-to-pay. 
Many of the mentioned methods can also be used in the process of developing new products or services (cf. 
Meffert / Bruhn (2006), p. 312; Boetsch (2008), p. 67ff). 
442 Wardman (1998), p. 89 
443 Cf. Kroes / Sheldron (1988), p. 12f 
444 Cf. Luce / Tuckey (1964), p. 1ff; Green / Rao. (1971), p. 355ff 
445 Cf. Gustafsson / Hermann / Huber (2003), p. 8 
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are also able to estimate the willingness-to-pay for certain products in a much more 
realistic way than this has formerly been done in surveys with the same aim, which, for 
instance, directly asked respondents what they would pay for a certain product (“direct 
approach”).446 
 
According to the widespread definition of Green and Srinivasan, who define conjoint 
analysis as “any decompositional method that estimates the structure of consumers 
preferences [...] given his/her overall evaluations of a set of alternatives that are 
prespecified in terms of levels of different attributes”, this decompositional approach is 
the main building block of all methods which are subsumed by this term.447 
 
During the past 40 years, however, the traditional conjoint analysis methods have been 
subject to a continuous development. Originally, respondents were asked to choose 
between two stimuli which either consisted of two factors with varying characteristics (so 
called trade-off or two factor method) or a full set of all included factors (full-profile 
method). This pair wise comparison, however, strongly limited the applicability of the 
method for modeling decision situations with a large amount of available options (such 
as air travel decisions). In order to avoid an information overload of the respondent that 
would lead to unrealistic answers and to restrict the survey duration to a manageable 
time, the amount of factors and attributes that can be included in traditional conjoint 
analysis (TCA) methods is clearly limited.  
 
The Hybrid Conjoint Analysis (HCA) has been introduced to overcome this deficit by 
dividing the sample of respondents into homogenous groups based on a pre-survey 
(self-explicated model) during which they on the one hand select and rate the factors 
and attributes which they assume to be relevant in their decision making process and on 
the other hand can exclude factor attributes which would definitively prevent them from 
selecting an alternative. In the actual conjoint study the respondents of each 
homogenous group are then split up into subgroups, which are then confronted with 
different choice situations. As a result, the HCA analysis is able to provide part worth 
utilities for a large set of attributes on a group level, which limits its applicability in 
situations where researchers are interested in individual utility functions.448  
 
A subtype of the HCA is the Adaptive Conjoint Analysis (ACA). Again, the respondents 
at first select relevant attributes and rate their relative importance before choosing their 
preferred option in a set of pair wise comparisons. However, to shorten the interview 
process (i.e. reduce the number of choice sets) the utility function is already adapted 
during the interview based on the given answers by eliminating attributes which are 
already sufficiently defined by previous decision situations. Drawbacks of this method 
 
                                                
 
446 Cf. Breidert (2006), p. 44f. Main drawbacks of the direct approach are its unnatural focus on the price of 
a product as well as a potential bias of consumers to either overstate their willingness-to-pay (WTP) in order 
to not appear greedy or to understate their WTP in order to keep the prices of goods they might require at 
some point as low as possible. 
447 Green / Srinivasan, p. 104 
448 Cf. Gustafsson / Hermann / Huber (2003), p. 10ff; Backhaus et al. (2008), p. 451ff 
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are the reliance on computer-assisted interviewing modes (which allow for an automatic 
adaptation of the choice sets during the interview process) as well as its poor ability to 
correctly estimate the importance of the purchase price in contrast to other criteria.449 
 
The Hierarchical Conjoint Analysis (HiCA) or Hierarchical Information Integration 
assumes a sequential decision making process, during which the respondent at first 
groups various decision criteria into a smaller number of perceptual dimensions 
(decision constructs), which are then compared to each other in a set of choice decision 
sets. For example, when the attractiveness of several housing options is judged, 
respondents would be assumed to bundle singular decision criteria such as the 
proximity of recreational areas or the local crime rate into decision constructs such as 
the quality of the neighborhood, which allows a researcher to include a large set of 
factors without overstraining the respondent. Based on the results of a ‘bridging 
experiment’ the obtained utility values for this decision construct would then be 
distributed on the included sub-factors. While this kind of decision process might be 
observed in the case of some (long-term) decisions, it is rather uncommon for many 
other decision situations, which also limits the applicability of this method.450 
 
The nowadays most widely used conjoint method is the Choice based Conjoint analysis 
(CBC), during which respondents have to select one stimuli out of a set of (usually up to 
16) hypothetical purchase options. Since CBC confronts the respondent with a setup 
that is very similar to the situation a consumer faces when booking a flight and is one 
the other hand also able to include attributes that are dependent on the characteristics 
of other factors (e.g. the price of a first-class flight will always be higher than the price of 
an Economy ticket) it has already been frequently used in an air travel context to 
measure customer preferences and will also be used in the following to assess the 
attractiveness of flexible time-range tickets.451  
 
Potential problems of Conjoint Measurement methods with regard to the estimation of 
willingness-to-pay are the price effect, the range effect and the number-of-level effect. 
• The price effect can be observed, if the number of attributes becomes too large, 
which in turn leads to an understatement of the importance of the price. It has 
been found that respondents are not able to properly process more than six 
attributes. As a consequence, facing the respondent with more attributes might 
lead to a violation of the underlying utility model. 
• The range effect occurs, if a very wide range of attribute levels is selected to 
appear in a conjoint study. By presenting the respondent with rather extreme 
values of one attribute (such as the price), this attribute is likely to become the 
 
                                                
 
449 Cf. Hermann / Huber / Regier (2009), p. 113ff 
450 Cf. Timmermans / Molin (2009), p. 562; An advancement of the HiCA also allows the respondent to use 
a ‘limit card’ to exclude options which he or she would definitively not purchase, which improves the 
predictability of purchase decisions. However, since this Hierarchical Limit Conjoint Analysis is subject to an 
increased complexity it can only be done in personal interviews, which decreases its usability. Cf. Bötsch 
(2008), p. 122 
451 Cf. for instance Bötsch (2008), p. 122; Teichert / Shehu / von Wartburg (2008), p. 227ff;  
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decisive factor in the decisions of the respondent, which might lead to an 
understatement of the importance of other (less varied) attributes. In order to 
avoid the range effects, researchers should carefully calibrate the range of 
acceptable prices for the offered product alternatives during a pretest phase. 
• A similar phenomenon occurs, if the number of offered levels of one attribute is 
larger than the number of levels of other attributes (number-of-levels effect), 
which again might give an inappropriately large weight to the concerned 
attribute. To overcome this problem, it is suggested to use the same (or almost 
the same) amount of levels for all considered attributes.452  
5.3.7 Valuation of various product options (conjoint analysis) 
5.3.7.1 The design of the choice-based conjoint exercise 
To be able to quantify the disutility that customers purchasing flexible tickets incur due to 
the fact that they do not know their precise flight routing, an embedded choice based 
conjoint design was used.  
 
Within the mentioned conjoint design, the basic assumptions were that customers fly 
with a safe airline453 that offers an average service quality between two cities that are 
approximately three flight hours away from each other.454 Since consumers usually do 
not instantly have an idea of cities that are within three flight hours from their homes, the 
respondents were shown a map with potential destinations. To make sure that all 
respondents are able to select a suitable destination, the chart included a range of 
typical business as well as typical leisure destinations (cf. Figure 77). 
 
 
                                                
 
452 Cf. Breidert (2006), p. 81 
453 No real brand names were included in the example, since the affinity for certain brands was not at the 
focus of this study and would have aggravated the interpretation of the results (cf. also Monroe et al. (1977), 
p. 281). 
454 A flight duration of approximately three hours was used in order to be able to also include connection 
flights in the choice sets, which are often no viable alternative if the flight time between two cities is shorter 
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the time window) were not subject to variations, since an inclusion of the departure time 
as another independent variable would have drastically increased the complexity of the 
model at the detriment of the other attributes, which constitute the key research interest 
of the study. Instead, the departure times were in all cases set for the early morning 
hours (09:00 – 10:00), which has proven to be the most preferred departure time from 
the passenger perspective in a number of studies.459 
5.3.7.2 Utility function and obtained part-worth utility values 
Overall 275 survey participants who accepted flexible tickets in their relevant set took 
part in the conjoint exercise. However, due to restrictions of the academic license of the 
Sawtooth software package SMRT / CBC-HB which has been used to compute the part-
worth utilites, only 250 respondents (i.e. 2,000 random choice tasks) were processed. 
 
To calculate the utility values a multinomial logit (choice) model (MNL) based on the 
assumption of an additive part-worth utility concept was used. This utility model has 
been preferred to other types since the presented attribute levels (except for the price) 
are not metric but nominal variables and therefore are not expected to follow a linear 
slope (as expected by a vector model) or to exhibit an optimum value on a scale (as it is 
assumed by ideal point models). Furthermore an additive part-worth model assumes a 
compensatory relation between various product attributes, which is in line with the 
evidence found by preceding studies about travel choice decisions (cf. chapter 4.3.2). 
The calculation of the utility of an option is described by the formula below. 460 
 
uk = ∑ ∑  ெ௠ୀଵ௃௝ୀଵ  * bjm * xjmk 
 
with: uk = utility of stimulus k J = Number of attributes 
M = Number of attributes 
levels 
bjm = part-worth utility of attribute 
m and attribute level j 
xjmk = 1 if an attribute level was part of the 
stimulus, otherwise 0 
 
In order to estimate, which product concept is going to be selected by a respondent, a 
choice model has to be incorporated. While using a ‘Max-Utility’ model would assume a 
fully rational decision, during which a respondent evaluates all concept attributes and 
then decides for the alternative with the highest overall utility, on the other hand 
selecting a ‘Random Choice’ model would imply that the decision is fully independent of 
the estimated utility scores. In the selected MNL the decision for a particular product is 
in general assumed to take place based on the overall utility of the included attributes, 
however, to take into account that individuals do not always act totally rational (see also 
the remarks on ‘bounded rationality’ in chapter 3.2.2), a ‘rationality’ factor β is added to 
the decision equation. This parameter regulates the extent of randomness in the 
decision process and is thereby able to dampen the model impact of respondents who 
do not decide consistently based on the expected utility function. The model has been 
calibrated during a total of five iterations (after which convergence of the data has been 
 
                                                
 
459 Cf. Garrow / Jones / Parker (2007), p. 283 
460 Cf. Backhaus / Erichson / Weiber (2010), p. 329ff 
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observed) with the aim of maximizing the fit between the predicted choice decisions and 
the observed choice decision. With a Chi Square value of 2630 (degrees of freedom: 10; 
root likelihood: 0.38604) the obtained model has shown a significant difference (p < 
0.005) from the null-model, which means that the composition of the attributes has a 
strong impact on the choice decisions by the respondents.461 
 
The resulting main effects are displayed in Table 31 
 
Attribute level Effect Std.Err t-Ratio 
Direct flight (3 hours) 1.1523 0.0430 26.7466 
Connection flight (5 hours) -0.6706 0.0492 -13.6066 
Direct flight OR connection flight (3 or 5 hours) -0.4816 0.0502 -9.5895 
    
Specified flight (flight times already available) 0.5862 0.0589 9.9497 
Time-range: 6 hours & notice period: one week 0.1350 0.0572 2.3571 
Time-range: 8 hours & notice period: one week 0.0477 0.0588 0.8116 
Time-range: 6 hours & notice period: one day -0.2749 0.0620 -4.4287 
Time-range: 8 hours & notice period: one day -0.4940 0.0649 -7.6119 
    
€ 75 (one-way, incl. taxes & fees) 1.3201 0.0493 26.7503 
€ 100 (one-way, incl. taxes & fees) 0.6094 0.0494 12.3333 
€ 125 (one-way, incl. taxes & fees) -0.4118 0.0594 -6.9242 
€ 150 (one-way, incl. taxes & fees) -1.5177 0.0824 -18.4103 
    
None462  -1.5560 0.1427 -10.8985 
Table 31: Aggregate part-worth utilities (main effects)463 
 
The main effects show very intuitive results, which – when it comes to the valuation of 
existing product features - are in line with other studies of airline passengers (cf. chapter 
4.3.2). First of all, the analysis showed that consumers derive the highest utilities from 
non-stop flights (1.15). What has been interesting is the fact that the option “Direct flight 
 
                                                
 
461 Cf. Sawtooth (2008), p. 21; Backhaus / Erichson / Weiber (2010), p. 333ff 
462 Overall the “none” option has only been selected in 2.65 % of all choice situations. 
463 All effects, except for the valuation of the level “Time-range: 8 hours & notice period: one week” exhibit a 
t-ratio larger than +/- 1.96, which means that they are significant on a p < 0.05 level. With regard to the 
interpretation of the values it should be noted that utility values of an attribute are interval-scaled, which 
means for instance that a utility value of 0.8 is not twice as good as a utility value of 0.4. However, from a 
respondents perspective, the perceived utility increase by moving from 0.4 to 0.8 is equally large than the 
utility gain that follows an exchange of an attribute level with a utility of 0 to another level with 0.4. 
Furthermore one has to observe that each attributes utility values are scaled in order to have a sum value of 
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iterations (so-called draws) the algorithm after that recalculates the individual 
parameters based on information drawn from the assumed overall distribution until a 
convergence of the values is achieved.464  
 
Based on the individual utility values the importance of various attributes was calculated 
(relative to each other). The values show the extent to which the overall utility is 
affected, if there is a change from the least to the most preferred option of a particular 
attribute.465 Besides the overall levels, Table 32 also shows the differences between 
business and leisure travelers with regard to the importance of certain attributes. 
 
Attribute level All CBC participants 
(n=250) 
Leisure travelers  
(85% of the subsample) 
Business travelers 
(15% of the subsample) 
Flight type 30% 29% 36% 
Flight specification 20% 19% 26% 
Price 50% 52% 38% 
Table 32: Attribute importances466 
 
As seen in the table, the price is by far the most important criterion, followed by the flight 
type and the flight specification. However, even among the group of business travelers 
who accepted flexible tickets in their relevant sets and therefore were able to participate 
in the conjoint analysis exercise, the relative importance of the price is smaller than this 
is the case with leisure travelers. This means that business travelers are placing a larger 
emphasis on other attributes (i.e. they value a specified non-stop flight higher than the 
average respondent), even if this comes at a higher cost. 
5.3.8 Market simulation based on individual utility functions 
Based on the individual utility values it is now possible to calculate the take-up rate of 
flexible time-range tickets as a function of the ticket parameters (time of information, 
given discount, etc.). In order to avoid the problems which could arise from using a 
probabilistic share of preference model to forecast consumer choices, the expected 
market shares were calculated by applying the ‘first choice’ method on the individual 
utility values.467  
 
                                                
 
464 Backhaus / Erichson / Weiber (2010), p. 356ff; Orme (2000), p. 2f 
465 The attribute importance is calculated by comparing the difference between the largest and the smallest 
part-worth value of a particular conjoint attribute against the sum of the absolute differences of all included 
attributes. For instance, the absolute difference between the part-worth value of a direct flight (1.15) and a 
connection flight (-0.67) would be 1.82, which corresponds to 30% of the sum of the difference of all 
attributes. 
466 Since the importance values are ratio data, an absolute value of 50% means that the price is more than 
twice as important in the decision process as the flight specification modalities. 
467 Cf. Orme (2000), p. 6f. In probabilistic models, the prediction of which alternative an individual would 
choose is made based on probabilities derived from the aggregated utility scores. A major problem of this 
approach is the fact that new products ‘steal’ market shares proportionally from all existing alternatives. 
However, as the following ‘blue bus / red bus’ example illustrates this is not a realistic assumption. In this 
example, a blue bus competes against the car in the modal split and achieves a market share of 50%. If 
now a red bus would also start operations on this route and would gain 33% market share, these 
percentage points would be equally subtracted from all other alternatives, although it is more likely to 





During the conjoint exercise the respondents were also shown two fixed choice 
situations (i.e. exactly the same composition of attribute levels was shown to all 
respondents), which were not taken into consideration in the utility modeling process. 
Instead, these ‘holdout’ tasks were used to assess the goodness of fit of the model by 
comparing the expected market shares of the defined product types with the actual 
decisions by the respondents. As shown in Table 33 the model achieved a very good 








flight, notice: 1 week, 
time-range 6 hours. 
€75 
Flexible connection 
flight, notice: 1 week, 
time-range 8 hours. 
€75 
Flexible ticket (non-
stop OR connection), 
notice: 1 week, time-
range 8 hours. €150 
Forecasted market 
share of alternative 54% 42% 3% 0% 
Actual % of 
respondents  50% 41% 8% 1% 
Deviation in %-
points 4% 1% 5% 1% 
          
Holdout choice 
task 2 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4  
Flexible non-stop 
flight, notice: 1 week, 
time-range 6 hours. 
€75 
Flexible connection 
flight, notice: 1 week, 
time-range 6 hours. 
€75 
Flexible ticket (non-
stop OR connection), 
notice: 1 week, time-
range 8 hours. €150 
Flexible non-stop 
flight, notice: 1 week, 
time-range 6 hours. 
€150 
Forecasted share 
of alternative 94% 3% 0% 3% 
Actual % of 
respondents  88% 5% 1% 4% 
Deviation in %-
points 6% 2% 1% 1% 
Table 33: Evaluation of market-share model based on holdout tasks468 
 
In order to be able to estimate the market share that certain flexible products could 
achieve, at first the currently prevailing products have to be described in order to be 
used as reference points later on. A test conducted by the German “Stiftung Warentest” 
in 2009 found an average ticket price at the three major European network carriers of 
around €250 - €300 incl. taxes & fees for return tickets within Europe (Lufthansa: €249; 
British Airways: €265; Air France: €308). At the same time comparable flights with the 
leading LCC could be purchased for roughly €150 (Ryanair: €144; Easyjet: €166).469 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 
‘Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives’ (IIA). By using a ‘first choice’ model based on individual data, 
the IAA problem is eliminated, since new products (if they show a higher utility) directly take away market 
shares from the previously considered alternative (and not proportionally from all available alternatives). 
468 With regard to the interpretation of the displayed market share values it has to be noted that only people 
who have accepted flexible tickets in their relevant set (77.5% of all respondents) have participated in the 
conjoint exercise.  
469 Cf. Stiftung Warentest (2009), www.test.de; The data was based on selected routes from German 
airports to Berlin, Barcelona, London, Mallorca, Paris, Rome and Vienna, which constitute rather competitive 




Since consumers in most O&D markets nowadays already have the chance to choose 
between non-stop flights and connection flights, the latter are to be included as well in 
the market share scenarios. To compensate the consumers for the additional travel time 
and the inconvenience of changing planes, these tickets are usually sold at a lower price 
than non-stop flights (a Canadian study found an average discount of 15% in 
comparison to non-stop flights).470 In the scenarios connection flights are therefore 
always priced one price step below the non-stop flights. Based on this market data three 
scenarios were build which are presented in Table 34. 
 
Scenario name /  
Offered flights & prices (one-way) 
Very competitive 






(specified flight times) 
Non-Stop flight € 100 € 125 € 150 
Connection flight €  75 € 100 € 125 
Newly added product Various types of flexible time-range tickets at different prices 
Table 34: Developed market scenarios 
 
The aim of introducing several scenarios is to be able to estimate the acceptance of 
flexible time-range tickets, while they are offered next to a realistic set of already existing 
options. Furthermore, the variation of the price of competing products (as a function of 
the competition on a route), allows for an evaluation of the likelihood to select flexible 
products as a function of the relative discount to existing market alternatives.  
5.3.8.1 Highly competitive route 
In the first scenario, a highly competitive route is assumed, where the price of a non-
stop flight does not surpass €100 and connection flights are even offered at a price of 
€75 (all prices are given for one-way flights). If a flexible product would be added to this 
market it would be able to be the first choice of up to 63% of all people, who have 
previously accepted flexible time-range tickets in their relevant set (depending on the 
product characteristics with regard to the degree of uncertainty involved). To obtain 
overall market shares, it has to be considered that 22.5% of all respondents in principle 
refused to consider flexible tickets as a possible alternative in their flight selection 
process. Therefore, if the overall market is considered, the attainable market share of 
flexible time-range tickets in a very competitive market situation ranges between 6 – 
49%. As shown in Figure 79, in general, flexible tickets which guarantee the buyer a 
non-stop flight, are able to attract more passengers, than tickets which do not define 
whether the flight will be a direct or an indirect flight. Furthermore, in both categories 
tickets entailing a notice period of one week are preferred to those, where the customers 
are only informed of their precise flight times one day prior to departure. The lowest 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 
the figure is in line with the price level measured by the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics based on a 
large and representative sample of US domestic flight fares for the first quarter 2010 (US data is taken since 
no comparable European statistics exist, however, given the competitive structure the two regions are 
deemed comparable). Looking at all flights (network carrier and LCC) a price level of €232 was found (cf. 
U.S. Department of Transportation (2010), www.bts.gov; the original value of $328 was converted to Euro 
using the exchange rate from March 2010 (0.72, cf. Oanda (2010), www.oanda.com). 
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aim will be discussed in order to be come up with concrete proposals for an optimal use 
of the presented ticket concept.  
5.4.1 The suitability of flexible tickets to address price sensitive 
travelers without cannibalizing existing revenues 
As shown in the empirical study, business travelers (18% of all travelers) are 
responsible for 41% of all flights. Moreover, they are of high importance to airlines since 
they usually book at a later point in time and are less price sensitive, thereby 
contributing more than proportionally to the overall yield of a flight. As a result, in order 
to qualify as a viable solution that is able to properly address the presented yield 
challenge faced by network airlines, flexible tickets would not only have to be highly 
attractive to low-cost travelers, but should at the same time also disqualify for business 
travelers, so as to avoid that passengers who previously purchased high-yield tickets 
switch to newer, cheaper products (product cannibalization).476 As explained in the 
following, based on the empirical study, both conditions are fulfilled. 
 
First, the attractiveness for low-cost travelers will be examined. Leisure travelers in 
general and passengers who mostly use LCC in particular, clearly rated the price as the 
by far most important criterion when it comes to selecting a flight. In exchange for a low 
price, passengers are willing to make sacrifices concerning the duration of the trip or the 
presence of connections. Furthermore, especially low-cost travelers (82% of this group) 
also stated that they are indifferent regarding the actual carrier which is operating a 
flight, thereby exhibiting a very low brand loyalty. When asked about the types of flight 
which would be considered for an intra-European flight, almost one third of all 
passengers stated connection flights as one option, with 18% also considering using a 
LCC which serves an airport that is one hour further away than their nearest airport. 
Within the latter group, which is obviously willing to exchange travel time against 
cheaper fares, 63% were also considering connection flights with network airlines. 
These findings confirm that there is a highly price-sensitive low-cost customer segment 
which is willing to fly with any airline even if it takes longer than direct flights as long as 
the price is competitive. To the contrary, business travelers rated the convenience of the 
schedule the highest and also exhibited a higher loyalty to network airlines. As a result it 
was expected that this group would also be more reluctant to use flexible time-range 
tickets. 
 
As depicted in Figure 75, 82% of all asked leisure travelers said that they could 
definitively (55%) or maybe (27%) imagine using flexible time range tickets. On the other 
hand, the majority of business travelers (44%) were clearly ruling out the use of flexible 
time-range tickets, with only 30% selecting ‘maybe’ and the remaining 27% opting for 
‘yes’.  
 
Even among those business travelers who generally accepted flexible tickets in their 
relevant set (and therefore participated in the conjoint study), at the attribute level the 
 
                                                
 
476 Cf. Diller / Köhler (2008), p. 357ff 
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importance of late bookers also became apparent in an analysis of fares between 
Amsterdam and London in spring 2009, which found that “average fares increase by 
about 3% each day as departure approaches, with a cumulative 80% increase in the last 
20 days.”479 
 
Given the monetary importance of late bookings, it is not astonishing that airlines are 
willing to reject low-yield bookings (which usually are placed several weeks earlier) by 
limiting the amount available low-fare tickets in order to preserve capacity for an 
expected business demand. However, if the forecast for a high-yield booking class turns 
out to be too high, which given typical forecast errors (on the booking class level) of up 
to 25% in the airline business480 is often the case, this passenger ‘spill’ results in unused 
capacity (‘spoilage’) and lost revenues. In this context, flexible time-range tickets would 
allow airlines to accept more low-fare booking requests than in the current environment 
by pooling the demand risk of several flights (it is unlikely that the amount of forecasted 
late-bookings materializes on all flights).  
 
To avoid accepting more bookings than the overall set of flights which are composing a 
flexible ticket is able to accommodate, airlines could use a fractional booking approach. 
This means that if a flexible booking is accepted which builds upon a set of five flights, 
the booking could be considered as 0.2 passengers in each of the flights booking 
records. If one of the flights reaches its capacity limit (based on the forecasted bookings 
corrected for the expected no-shows), the flight is withdrawn from the flexible product 
set and the fractional booking in the remaining four flights is increased to 0.25 
passengers. Once four flights out of the potential flight set are fully booked, the flexible 
ticket would be switched into a full (1.0) booking on the last remaining flight. 
 
If several flights still have available seats at the defined notification time (e.g. one week 
prior to departure), the airline could assign the booking to the alternative in the flexible-
ticket set which entails the lowest marginal costs, i.e. mainly costs for the additional fuel 
burn resulting from another passenger, passenger-specific airport fees and catering 
costs (if applicable). Ceteris paribus (e.g. assuming the same type of aircraft) this would 
usually imply to assign passengers to a non-stop flight, since these flights minimize the 
distance flown and avoid the costs of a transfer and an additional flight. From a Yield 
Management perspective the flight with the lowest bid-price (i.e. the lowest opportunity 
costs) should be selected.481 
 
By pooling the risk that more passengers arrive than there is capacity for in all flights of 
the flexible time-range ticket set and by shortening the forecast horizon (i.e. the time 
between flight allocation and departure date) as a consequence of the delayed 
assignment, airlines are able to increase the amount of low-fare tickets sold and the 
 
                                                
 
479 Cf. Alderighi et al. (2011), p. 5 
480 Cf. Belobaba / Weatherford (2002), p. 820 
481 Cf. also Petrick et al. (2010)  for a detailed discussion of various allocation mechanisms 
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• At least some flights on the considered route are sometimes subject to a load 
factor of 100% (otherwise, there is no need to further optimize the available 
capacity usage).482 
 
A study by Petrick et al. (2010) used OR-techniques to quantify the revenue gains which 
can be achieved through a delayed assignment of booking requests. They assumed a 
flexible product which incorporates both non-stop and indirect flights and is sold at a 
discount of 25% relative to the lowest specified fare. Based on their simulation they 
came to the conclusion that the gained flexibility in average allows for an increase of 
revenues by 4%. Furthermore, in line with what has been found above, they specify that 
“flexibility is more important to the firm if uncertainty is higher and that a late notification 
date helps to further increase revenues”.483 
5.4.3 Recommended use of flexible time-range tickets 
The preceding analysis examined the acceptance of flexible products on Intra-European 
flights with a length of three flight hours. This setting has been chosen since the 
qualitative pre-study revealed that on shorter routes, the potential inclusion of a 
connection flight in the flexible product set would lead to a  disproportionate prolongation 
of the overall travel time in comparison to a direct flight. Based on these preferences, it 
would be advisable to exclude connection flights from the set of potential flights that 
form a flexible time-range ticket on short O&Ds which are also served by non-stop 
flights. Irrespective of the route lengths, the simulation results also point out that the 
largest possibility airlines have to increase the acceptance of flexible time-range tickets 
is to limit the potential flights to non-stop flights. Thereby, on short routes flexible 
products could be used on all O&Ds where an airline group offers several flights a day. 
 
When it comes to less traveled O&Ds, passengers are often used to transferring flights 
in order to reach their final destination. As a result, passengers usually can chose from 
several transfer hubs and - due to this strong competition - the importance of the price 
increases: “Often the price elasticity of demand is higher for travel in through markets 
than in point-to-point markets to or from hubs.”484 While single airlines usually do not 
offer enough connections in an acceptable time-range in order to market them as 
flexible products, airline groups together usually provide enough connection flights to 
offer time-range tickets as a cheap option for through markets (cf. for instance the offer 
of nine daily Lufthansa or partner airlines flights with not more than one connection 
between Bucharest and Gothenburg as shown in Table 2). 
 
Besides selecting routes which qualify for the offer of flexible products, it also has to be 
decided, whether this kind of ticket should be constantly offered, or whether the offer 
should be temporarily limited. As pointed out before, flexible products can on the one 
 
                                                
 
482 Even on low demand flights, flexible products can be beneficial, since the degradation of the product 
allows the airline to offer lower prices which are able to induce additional demand (cf. also Gallego et al. 
(2004), p. 36) without lowering  the reference price level of regular tickets (cf. Diller / Jöhler (2008), p. 357ff). 
483 Petrick et al. (2009), p. 22 
484 Hanlon (2007), p. 118 
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hand serve as a means to induce additional demand, and on the other hand support a 
more balanced usage of capacity by shifting passengers from flights with high demand 
to flights with low demand. If an airline primarily wants to induce additional demand 
(without eroding the price of its specified product) it could use flexible products during all 
times. However, if the main aim is to achieve a more balanced demand allocation, 
flexible time-range tickets are only reasonable if at least one of the flights in the product 
set is sometimes subject to more demand than there is capacity for (which translates 
into a load factor of 100%).  
 
Given the sensitive nature of load factor data in a competitive environment it is not 
surprising that airlines in general only publish aggregated load factor data. In 2007 the 
airlines of the Association of European Airlines published a load factor of 70% on 
European routes and approximately 80% on long-haul routes.485 However, given the 
strong variances in demand between seasons, weekdays and even time periods during 
the day (cf. chapter 2.5.3), it is obvious that in order to reach an average load factor of 
70%, many flights have to be operated close to full capacity. Wensveen (2007) for 
instance presents the empirical example of a Boeing 757 routing during two days in 
summer. In total, the aircraft has been flying 15 flight legs on these days and reached an 
average load factor of 60%. However, this average is composed of eight flights which 
had a load factor of more than 75% (at least one of these flights was even so heavily 
overbooked that the airline had to turn some passengers away), three flights which had 
a load factor around 50% and four flights that experienced load factors between 15-
45%.486 
 
On a broader scale, Malighetti et al. (2009) examined all flights of the leading LCC 
Ryanair from July 2005 until June 2006 in order to find out how often a flight is fully 
booked. They concluded that around 15% of all flights are fully booked (cf. also Figure 
85).487  
 
                                                
 
485 Cf. AEA (2007), p. 5 & 15 
486 Cf. Wensveen (2007), p. 192 
487 Cf. Malighetti / Paleari / Redondi (2009), p. 201 
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tickets with a relatively long notice period (e.g. one week) as a means to induce 
additional demand without having to compromise the overall fare level. In case of a 
rather poor forecast quality, a short notice period (e.g. one day) should be selected, 
since this allows shifting flexible bookings in order to fill seats which contrary to 




6.1 Summary and conclusions 
The airline industry has seen considerable growth during the last 60 years. In the recent 
past, the liberalization of air traffic in the European Union has even promoted this 
growth. In particular, the market entry of Low Cost Carriers (LCC), which provided 
simplified products (point-to-point traffic) at lower fares than traditional network airlines, 
has tapped new passenger potentials and led to an average yearly passenger growth of 
more than 5% from 2000 to 2008.489 With regard to market shares, this growth has been 
detrimental to network airlines, which were not able to match the prices of their new 
competitors particularly at the intra-European level. Therefore, many airlines of this 
group lost market shares. In average, the revenues from intra-European traffic covered 
only 98% of the costs, thereby making it the least attractive segment for European 
network airlines.  
 
The reasons for this mismatch can be found on the cost, as well as on the revenue side. 
First of all, in a hub-and-spoke network, airlines focus on filling their long-haul flights by 
means of short-haul feeder flights with the aim of maximizing the overall network 
revenues. Often, this also implies offering flights which, if analyzed on an individual 
level, are not profitable in order to sustain a sufficient flow of passengers into the long-
haul network. Furthermore, many of the cost advantages of LCCs are not accessible to 
network airlines due to their transfer-oriented production network on the hub. One 
disadvantage that network airlines face is having to keep some airplanes longer on the 
ground at the hub than technically needed, in order to allow passengers of other 
incoming flights to transfer onto the next outgoing flight. The amount of hours that an 
airplane can actually spend in the air is therefore significantly limited (an area, where 
LCCs achieve significantly better values and therefore lower unit costs). This difference 
is even amplified by the fact that a wave structure of departures and arrivals at a hub 
leads to temporal congestion and costly delays. Finally, the operation of a diverse fleet 
of short-haul (feeder) and long-haul aircrafts reduces the ability to profit from economies 
of scale which occur in the harmonized aircraft fleets of LCCs. 
 
On the revenue side, the introduction of restriction-free one-way pricing schemes by 
LCCs has also strongly lowered the acceptance of price discrimination by means of 
traditional rate fences (e.g. minimum stay requirements). Network airline customers are 
less willing to accept these practices, which forced network airlines to reduce the degree 
of applied price discrimination. Current yield management approaches are mainly 
focusing on the booking date in order to distinguish between passengers with low or 
high willingness to pay. As a result of the increased competition, network airlines were 
confronted with a decline in yields by 15% from 2001 until 2007. In a situation of rising 
costs (especially fuel costs) and falling revenues, many small network carriers were 
 
                                                
 
489 Cf. Eurostat (2009), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
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forced to cut routes, which decreased their overall network size and in turn also their 
ability to compete with larger airlines on long-haul routes. The consequence was a large 
consolidation wave among European airlines, which led to the formation of three 
dominant network airline groups (with Lufthansa, Air France-KLM and British Airways as 
the dominant firms respectively). A by-product of these mergers was the appearance of 
partly overlapping multi-hub networks. From a network perspective, this development 
gives room to new marketable connections in through-hub markets under the control of 
a single company (e.g. a passenger could use a morning flight from A to C via Hub 1 
and return with an afternoon flight from C to A via Hub 2). 
 
The redundant connection between origin-destination pairs, however, also offers new 
opportunities for yield management practices. Currently airlines have to decide on a 
flight-per-flight basis based on forecasted demand of late-booking high-yield passengers 
(mostly traveling on business purposes) whether they should restrict the sale of low-
yield early bird specials in order to preserve capacity. In order to decrease this 
dependency (on usually highly erroneous forecasts), airlines could bundle redundant 
connections as flexible time-range ticket sets, which guarantee transportation from A to 
B within a defined time window at a guaranteed cost, without specifying the precise flight 
times at the moment of purchase. These tickets build upon the concept of demand risk 
pooling, which lowers the variance of forecast errors by grouping several similar 
products. Given the fact that on average 30% of the available capacity on intra-
European flights carried out by network carriers is unused,490 these tickets could also be 
used as a means to induce additional low-yield demand in order to raise the load factor 
without cannibalizing existing revenues.  
 
An analysis of existing flexible products revealed that they either lack a broad customer 
acceptance by hiding the destination point during the booking process, which strongly 
limits the potential target group); or, by assigning passengers to a specific flight directly 
after the payment process, lose out on the potential to increase the load factor by 
assigning passengers to flights with an unexpectedly low number of passengers at a 
later point in time (i.e. after most of the actual demand for a particular flight has been 
revealed). 
 
This dissertation, therefore, includes an empirical survey to elaborate on how 
uncertainty would be valued if destination details were available at the moment of 
purchase, but not the precise routing and the exact travel times (within a defined time 
window). Based on the findings of an explorative study, a quantitative main study was 
undertaken in January 2011, which initially included 553 Austrians, who were older than 
18 and were invited to participate in a screening process based on age, gender and 
education. Out of this initial group, 356 participants passed the screening process 
(which limited the participation to respondents who were flying at least once during the 
last year) and completed the survey. 
 
 
                                                
 
490 Cf. AEA (2007), p. 5 & 15 
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Besides confirming the importance of the price when it comes to selecting a flight, the 
survey also revealed that 70% of all travelers are indifferent with regard to the operating 
carrier when selecting an intra-European flight. When asked to rate the importance of 
several characteristics of a flight, there has also been a clear distinction between 
business and leisure travelers. While the former considered the convenience of the flight 
type (non-stop or connection) as the most important criterion, leisure travelers ranked 
the price first. This fosters the assumption that flexible time-range tickets, which exclude 
the flight type and the flight times, can serve as a vital mean to address price-sensitive 
travelers without risking a downward shift in business traveler revenues. 
 
This hypothesis was also confirmed in the direct question, whether or not passengers 
could imagine using flexible time-range tickets: while 82% of all leisure travelers stated 
that they could maybe (27%) or even definitively (55%) can imagine the use of these 
tickets, the corresponding acceptance rate of business travelers (of which 26.5% 
answered ‘yes’ and 29.5% selected ‘maybe’) was significantly lower.  
 
In the subsequent choice based conjoint exercise, various product features of potential 
flexible time-range tickets were examined. The results indicate that there is a large 
willingness to pay for non-stop flights. This dampens the attractiveness of flexible tickets 
because they eventually (based on their design) include connection flights in the 
potential flight set. With regard to the notification period, a clear preference for a 
notification at least one week prior to departure was shown. The length of the time-
window in which the transportation is guaranteed (i.e., six or eight hours) turned out to 
be of lower importance to the respondents. 
 
Based on a Hierarchical Bayes estimation of individual utility functions of the 
respondents, a market share simulation was performed, which compared different 
flexible time-range products (i.e., at varying prices, notice periods and time window 
lengths) to specified non-stop or connection flights. The results indicate that even in 
competitive markets, flexible tickets can achieve market shares between 6 - 49% when 
sold at a discount of 25% relative to specified non-stop flights. If the incurred uncertainty 
is lower (i.e. for instance: only non-stop flights are included in the set of potential flights, 
the customer is informed already one week prior to departure and the potential time-
window entails only six hours), then the acceptance rate by customers is higher. The 
study also shows that the likelihood in accepting a time-range ticket as a function of the 
given discount does not follow a linear but rather a logistical function; thus, many 
respondents are only willing to accept the comprised uncertainty if they are able to make 
a substantial bargain. 
 
In conclusion, flexible time-range tickets were found to be a suitable mean to attract the 
low-fare market without significantly cannibalizing existing revenues. Given their high 
acceptance rate, the addressable target segment appears to be large enough to justify 
investments in IT infrastructure and marketing, which are necessary to introduce such a 
product. By pooling the demand risk across several flights through the use of flexible 
time-range tickets, network airlines can increase marketable capacity and attainable 
load factor and thereby use their redundancy in multi-hub networks as a strategic asset 
against their LCC competitors. 
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6.2 Limitations of the study and further research areas 
The presented empirical results are built upon an online-survey among the members of 
an online access panel. As a result, travelers without access to the internet were 
systematically excluded from participating in the survey. However, given the large 
overlaps between the populations of internet users and airline travelers (see also 
chapter 5.3.1) and the strongly increasing role of the internet as a sales channel for 
internet tickets, this downside of the chosen survey mode was nonetheless deemed 
acceptable. 
 
With regard to the results of the market share simulation (cf. chapter 5.3.8), it must be 
stated that the obtained market shares are assuming a stable price of competing 
products. In reality, however, flights are subject to various price changes as a 
consequence of the yield management practices of an airline. Therefore, the obtained 
results should be considered as an approximation, which mainly express how many 
respondents would select a particular flexible product, that is, if it were offered next to 
the specified alternatives. In order to gain a more realistic estimate for a particular route, 
practitioners should use a combination of the three scenarios according to the 
competitive situation at various booking times. 
 
Finally, the external validity of choice-based conjoint studies without real purchase 
obligation has often been challenged. In their meta-study, Backhaus and Broszka (2004) 
come to the conclusion that there is a tendency to overestimate the willingness to pay 
for certain services in Stated Preference surveys. However, since it is not possible to 
observe the revealed preferences for currently non-existent products, this limitation had 
to be accepted. As a consequence, the overall acceptance for flexible products might in 
reality turn out to be lower than in the presented market share simulation.491 Given the 
calculated acceptance levels of up to 60% of all travelers (i.e. depending on the selected 
product features), this limitation does not affect the main finding of the study, though, 
namely that there is a large segment of the market for which flexible time-range tickets 
are a vital travel option. Furthermore, this does not influence the relative valuations of 
the tested product alternatives. 
 
Although this paper focused on intra-European flights, the concept of flexible time-range 
tickets could also be extended to other flight lengths or other modes of transport. 
Furthermore, future research could also, based on the identified acceptance rates of 
various features of uncertainty (notice period, possible flight types and length of the 
travel time-window) model the benefits of flexibility from the perspective of the airline 
together with the achievable sales in order to narrow down under which circumstances a 




                                                
 
491 Cf. Backhaus / Broszka (2004), p. 39ff or Voelckner (2006), p. 147 
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Appendix 1: Qualitative interview structure guideline 
Questions about the travel sector: 
• Have you ever booked a journey without knowing important details before you 
left? For example when you were leaving, where you were going, or where you 
were going to stay. Give examples. 
• How often do you fly on average per year? What is the main purpose of your 
flights? 
• Do you normally book flights on your own? How do you book flights? Are you 
familiar with the booking processes? Do you think you have good knowledge of 
the structure of the different offers? 
 
What is your most important criterion when purchasing flight tickets? For example price, 
reputation of the airline, departure/arrival time, stopover times. 
 
Presentation of flexible time-range tickets: 
At the moment airlines are thinking about the introduction of a new ticket type which is a 
bit (~10%-20%) cheaper than current discount prices. When you buy a ticket, the airline 
informs you about when you have to be at the airport and when you will arrive at your 
destination at the latest. However, you are not told which exact flight you will be 
assigned to. 
For example, if you buy a ticket from Vienna to Lisbon two months prior to departure, 
you will be told to be at the airport check-in at 8 a.m. at the latest and the airline 
promises you an arrival time no later than 3 p.m. This is about two hours later than in a 
predetermined connection with one change of planes. Only a short time prior to the day 
of departure, the airline assigns you to a flight within the given timeframe. It can either 
be a direct flight, if there are seats available, or a connecting flight, meaning the transfer 
from one airplane to another via one of the airline’s hub airports (e.g. Munich, Frankfurt 
or Zurich). If there are available seats on the direct flight, you might even be in Lisbon 
much earlier. In any case, you will arrive no later than the promised time unless there 
are unexpected flight delays. 
 
Questions about flexible time-range tickets: 
• What are the first thoughts that come to your mind when you hear about the 
concept? 
• What do you want to know to consider buying flexible time-range tickets? 
• Depending on the design of the ticket, would you be willing to buy it? If yes, why? 
If no, what are your fears? How do you judge this ticket in comparison to a direct 
flight or a connection flight? 
• What information do you want to receive when you book the ticket? 
• Do you want to know the possible routings in the set of alternatives of the flexible 
ticket that you buy? 
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• When would you like to be informed about your actual routing at the latest? For 
example one week before the flight, one day before the flight or at check-in? 
Why is it important for you to know it at the mentioned point of time? 
• How would you like to be informed about your actual routing? 
 
Questions about the interviewees: 
• How old are you? 
• What is your occupation? 
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